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Chapter 1
Introduction
Education is an investment in human capital which has large positive impacts upon individual and
social outcomes. In particular, education causes individuals to earn higher wages (Harmon et al.,
2003), to have better health (Oreopoulos, 2007), to commit fewer crimes (Webbink et al., 2012), and
is positively related to the prosperity of regions and countries (Barro, 2001; Gennaioli et al., 2012). It
is for this reason that the Netherlands spent 43.8 billion euro on the education system in 2017, which
amounts to roughly 6.5 percent of its gross domestic product. Education design involves using these
scarce resources to implement a series of policies that characterize the education system. The stakes
are high while designing the system; it is a crucial opportunity to influence important outcomes such
as wages and health. Policymakers therefore like to make informed decisions while designing the
education system. However, this requires knowledge about the consequences of intended policies.
To illustrate, one of the most debated policies in education is to decrease the number of students
in class. Does such a policy yield benefits in terms of student outcomes? If so, do they outweigh
the costs of hiring additional teachers? Another example is that the Netherlands tracks students at a
relatively early age into different types of education levels and schools. What are the consequences
of early tracking? One of the main goals of Economics (of Education) is to answer such questions.
More generally, it aims to provide policymakers with knowledge to make informed decisions when
designing the education system. This thesis aims at contributing to this knowledge by means of four
self-contained chapters on the impact of design features in education. To put it differently, this thesis
investigates education design matters, and finds that education design matters.
1.1 Economics (of Education)
In order to inform policymakers, education economists focus on estimating the causal relationship
between inputs (e.g. an education policy such as smaller classes) and outputs (e.g. student outcomes
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such as test scores). A causal relationship indicates what would happen to the output in the absence
of the input and is, therefore, crucial to inform policymakers about the consequences of education
policies. Estimating such causal relationships is, however, far from easy. There are multiple observed
and unobserved inputs that often change at the same time, making it difficult to isolate the causal
impact of one single input, such as a small class size.
To better understand this difficulty, assume that each individual has two potential outcomes (e.g.
test scores); one when exposed to the policy (e.g. small class size), also referred to as the treatment,
and one when not exposed to the policy (e.g. large class size), also referred to as the control. Then
the causal impact of the policy is the difference between the two potential outcomes. We observe,
however, only one potential outcome of each individual. Rubin (1974) denotes this as the fundamental
problem of causal inference. In practice, we thus have to compare individuals who received the
treatment with individuals in the control. The fundamental assumption is that the observed outcome
of the individuals in the control group is identical to the potential outcome of the individuals in the
treatment group had they not been treated.
Individuals often select themselves into treatments, making this fundamental assumption unlikely
to hold. Imagine that you would observe that pupils in small classes have higher test scores than
pupils in large classes. This might reflect a causal impact of class size, but it might also be the case
that higher ability pupils have selected themselves into smaller classes. If the latter is the case, then at
least part of the difference in test scores between pupils in large and small classes cannot be ascribed
to differences in class size. Indeed, this difference rather reflects a violation of the fundamental
assumption; the observed test score of pupils in large classes is lower than the potential test score of
the pupils in smaller classes had they been exposed to larger classes. Subsequently, we cannot reliably
inform policymakers about the consequences of a class-size reduction.
To overcome this problem (i.e. selection bias), in several settings economists started to take con-
trol over the mechanisms that assign individuals into treatments since the early 1990s. Angrist and
Pischke (2010) refer to this as the credibility revolution in empirical economics. The most credible as-
signment mechanism is randomization. The reason behind this is not difficult to understand; random-
ization ensures that the treatment and control group are similar except for exposure to the treatment.
This makes the fundamental assumption stated above likely to hold. Hence, randomization allows us
to uncover causal effects. Krueger (1999) uses random assignment of students to class size and finds
that pupils in small classes score better than those in larger classes. However, randomized experi-
ments are often not possible due to financial or ethical constraints. Fortunately, bureaucratic rules or
natural forces sometimes allow for indirect control over the assignment mechanism. These are often
referred to as natural experiments rather than randomized experiments. For example, Fredriksson
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et al. (2013) exploit the fact that classes in Swedish primary schools were formed in multiples of 30;
30 students in a grade level in a school yielded one class, while 31 students yielded two classes. They
find that smaller classes have a positive impact on long term outcomes, such as completed education
and wages.
1.2 Outline
The first three chapters of this thesis consist of studies that exploit randomization of some sorts to
estimate the causal impact of three separate design features in education. Chapter 2 uses random
assignment of students to classes to study ability peer effects. In the presence of peer effects, alterna-
tive group assignment policies might have important consequences for student outcomes. The third
chapter exploits a bureaucratic feature of a university policy to study the causal impact of additional
structure for student performance; something recent scholarship argues may be good for academic
performance. Chapter 4 uses the random order of questions in cognitive tests to document that fe-
males are better able to sustain their performance during a test than males. This finding suggests
that test design could play a role in further promoting gender equality in participation in math and
sciences.
Conditional on the question of interest being one for which randomized experiments are feasible,
randomized experiments are clearly superior. For some questions in economics, however, random-
ization is difficult or even conceptually impossible. One example is the impact of macroeconomic
policies; experimenting with countries seems quite impossible. In line with Imbens (2010), I would
argue that this should not discourage researchers from asking questions concerning the effects from
macroeconomic policies. Imbens (2010) writes that history abounds with examples where causality
found general acceptance without any experimental evidence. With this in mind, chapter 5 somewhat
deviates from the previous chapters, as its focus is not on credible inference. In the fifth chapter we
analyze to what extent the well-studied relationship between the performance on international cog-
nitive tests and economic growth should be interpreted as evidence on the importance of cognitive
versus noncognitive skills. Given the differences in policy interventions required to foster cognitive
and noncognitive skills (Cunha et al., 2010), it is important to gain a better understanding of their
respective roles in fostering economic growth. In what follows, I will describe each of the chapters in
more detail.
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1.3 Summary
Economists have an ongoing interest in ability peer effects. The possible existence of peer effects
generates a big promise; simply by reorganizing peer groups, and without additional resources, it
may be possible to increase aggregate student performance. In the second chapter we analyze ability
peer effects at a large European university across six cohorts of undergraduate economic students. We
exploit that students are randomly assigned a tutorial group and one of two subgroups within their
tutorial group. The university encourages peer bonding within, and not between, these subgroups via
a series of informal meetings. Hence, each student can divide her tutorial peers into close and distant
peers. We find the existence of positive peer effects on student grades and passing rates that originate
from close peers only. We take this as evidence that spillovers arise due to social proximity rather than
via classroom-level effects. Through the use of supplementary data we provide suggestive evidence
that students with better close peers change their study behavior by substituting lecture attendance for
collaborative self-study with their close peers at university.
Examining heterogeneity in spillovers by own and close peer ability, we document that high and
low ability students benefit (suffer) from social proximity with high (low) ability peers. Alternative
group assignment policies - such as tracking high ability students - entail a transfer from one student
group to the other.
In the second part of this chapter, we use detailed data on first-year tutorial attendance and second-
year tutorial registration and find that students voluntarily sort into new peer groups over time. This
sorting behavior leads to an erosion of the social proximity between close peers, and we argue that
this erosion provides an intuitive explanation for our finding that the spillovers from assigned close
peers diminish over time. Apart from its importance for policies aiming to exploit peer effects, our
findings on voluntary sorting provide a rare insight into the degree to which friendship groups can
be institutionally manipulated against the formation of homogeneous subgroups based on gender,
ethnicity, and prior bonds. This might have implications for promoting diversity in higher education,
something that policymakers in both the U.S. and Europe have recently emphasized.
In chapter 3 we turn to the debate on additional structure in higher education. Recent scholarship
argues that structure, which amounts to constraining the choices of students, may be good for aca-
demic performance. The arguments usually focus on student predispositions towards non-academic
activities, emanating from behavioral biases such as impatience, or imperfect information about be-
haviors that engender success at university. We investigate the impact of an attendance policy that
imposed greater structure on students at a large European university. At this university, students who
average less than 7 (out of 10) in their first year are forced to attend at least 70 percent of their tu-
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torials in second year. Conversely, students above 7 had the freedom in choosing their attendance.
This allows for a comparison of students near 7 to estimate the causal impact of a full year of forced,
frequent, and regular attendance.
Our findings suggest that additional structure has no positive impact on student performance.
Instead, we show forced students have lower grades and lower passing rates. This average effect on
second-year student performance aggregates differential effects across courses. The largest effects
are in courses where the attendance advantage of above-7 students was greatest, where they had full
discretion over their attendance. We argue that for these courses the university policy forces below-
7 students to spend a substantial number of hours in a specific way, leaving them with less time
for other activities, including activities which are important for grades. Grades decrease because
the grade loss from spending less time on other academic activities outweighs the grade gains from
additional attendance. Reports of total study time suggest further that forced students spend less time
on nonacademic activities such as leisure. Overall, our evidence suggests that this forced attendance
policy makes students worse off.
Chapter 4 studies gender gaps in cognitive test scores. An abundance of research has shown that,
on average, females outperform males in verbal and reading tests, while males perform better than
females in math and science (see e.g. Cornwell et al. (2013)). In turn, math-science classes have been
found to be important for college attendance, college completion, occupational choices, and wages
(Goldin et al., 2006; Joensen and Nielsen, 2009). Chapter 4 provides new insights on gender gaps in
the test scores of 15 to 16 year-old students participating in the (low-stakes) PISA test (Programme for
International Student Assessment). It studies how gender gaps in test scores change throughout the
test. Countries from around the world participate in the PISA, which varies the order of test questions
among test booklets and randomly allocates the booklets to students.
We compare, by country, the performance of males and females on the same test question at differ-
ent positions in the test booklet. Overall, we find females are better able to sustain their performance
during tests. This result is present across PISA waves and holds for a vast majority of countries. The
pattern is independent of the topic being assessed and provides new insights into gender gaps in test
scores. At the beginning of the test, males score better in math and science and females score better
in reading. After two hours of test taking, the gender gap in math and science is completely offset and
is even reversed in roughly one-third of the countries considered. In more than half of the countries,
females decrease their initial disadvantage in math and science by at least 50 percent by the end of
the test. At the same time, the advantage that females have in reading grows larger as the test goes on.
In chapter 5 we delve into a question that is of great importance, but where randomization is
extremely difficult; what is the relationship between cognitive test scores and economic growth?
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Many studies have already found a strong association between economic outcomes of nations and
their performance on international cognitive tests. Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) find evidence
consistent with a causal interpretation of this relationship. However, noncognitive skills also affect
performance on cognitive tests. This raises the question whether noncognitive skills are (partly)
responsible for the well-studied relationship between cognitive test scores and economic growth.
In the first part of this chapter, we use a similar method as in chapter 4 to decompose the student
performance in the PISA test into two components: the starting performance and the decline in per-
formance during the test. The latter component is interpreted to be closely related to noncognitive
skills, whereas the first component is a cleaned measure for cognitive skills. Students from different
countries exhibit differences in performance at the start of the test and in their rates of deterioration
in performance during the test. In the second part of this chapter, we document that both components
have a positive and statistically significant association with economic growth. The estimated effects
for both components are quite similar and robust. Our results suggest that noncognitive skills are also
important for the relationship between test scores and economic growth.
Reverse causality and omitted variable bias is an obvious concern if one is interested in putting a
causal interpretation upon the results of macroeconomic growth regressions. We try to address these
issues by applying the decomposition method to an early test in 1991 and via a tentative IV-analysis.
We find that our results are consistent with an effect of skills on growth and not vice versa.
Chapter 2
What Drives Ability Peer Effects?
Joint work with Max Coveney
2.1 Introduction
Economists’ ongoing interest in classroom peer effects is not hard to justify; simply by reorganizing
peer groups, and without additional resources, it may be possible to increase aggregate student per-
formance. Taking into account important methodological advances (Manski, 1993), the past decade
of empirical research includes many well-identified studies in primary, secondary, and tertiary edu-
cation (Sacerdote, 2014). While these studies have to a large extent confirmed the existence of small
peer effects in the classroom, little to no credible evidence exists on the mechanisms through which
these effects operate. For instance, it remains unclear whether students benefit from better peers be-
cause of social interaction with these peers, or because the quality of teacher instruction improves in
a classroom with better students, or through another potential mechanism.
This paper is the first to exploit random group assignment to empirically test between two ex-
haustive and policy-relevant channels driving ability peer effects. Based on the current literature, we
distinguish between the following two channels; social proximity and classroom-level effects. So-
cial proximity relates to the degree of familiarity between classroom peers (Foster, 2006), and this
channel captures spillovers that arise due to friendship, bonding, and student-to-student interaction
between classroom peers. Classroom-level effects capture spillovers that stem from the classroom
environment, which are independent of the social proximity between students, e.g. teacher response
to the ability composition of the classroom. The context in which we study these two channels is the
first year of an economics undergraduate program across six cohorts at a large public university in the
Netherlands.
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We exploit the institutional manipulation of the social proximity between students and their class-
room peers. Students are randomly assigned to a tutorial group of approximately 26 students and one
of two subgroups of 13 students within their tutorial group. The university encourages interaction,
bonding, and friendship within, and not between, these subgroups during the first weeks of the aca-
demic year via several informal meetings. From the perspective of one student, the close peers are the
subset of their tutorial peers with whom social proximity is encouraged, whereas their distant peers
belong to the adjacent subset with whom social proximity is not encouraged. For each student, her
close and distant peers together form her tutorial group whom she follows classes with throughout the
first year. By exploiting the differences between these two types of peers, we are able to disentangle
the two broad mechanisms driving ability peer effects. We use high school GPA - which includes
the nationwide final exams before entering university - as a pre-treatment indicator of own and peer
ability. This allows us to avoid problems related to reflection and common shocks.
Exploiting the novel within-classroom random assignment we find that peer effects are solely
driven by a student’s close peers; the subset of peers within the classroom with whom students are
socially proximate. We find no role for distant peers. This implies that meaningful social interaction
drives peer effects, whereas classroom-level effects are unimportant. The point estimate from our
linear model implies that a one standard deviation increase in close peer GPA causes student perfor-
mance to increase with 0.026 standard deviations. Using student evaluations we provide suggestive
evidence that students with better close peers change their study behavior by substituting lecture at-
tendance for collaborative self-study with their close peers at university. Examining heterogeneity in
spillovers by ability, we find that high and low ability students benefit (suffer) from social proximity
with high (low) ability close peers. These spillovers, however, diminish over time, and are completely
absent by the end of the first year.
Having shown that peer effects arise due to social proximity, the evolution of the social proximity
between students and their assigned close peers, and the degree to which new friendship are formed,
is of major importance to group assignment policies. We study how students cluster by daily tutorial
attendance in first year and find some evidence that the social proximity between assigned close peers
gradually diminishes. Analyzing tutorial choice in second year we confirm that students largely sort
themselves out of their close peer groups. We also show that they sort into new self-chosen peer
groups, which are based on shared characteristics such as gender and ethnicity. We do not find evi-
dence that students sort on ability, though our estimates suggest this could be academically beneficial.
Overall, we believe this sorting behavior shows that students have strong preferences dictating with
whom they become socially proximate. The erosion of social proximity between assigned close peers
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provides an intuitive explanation for the short-lived spillovers on student performance, though we
cannot provide causal evidence to confirm this intuition.
Our study has three main implications for group assignment policies aiming to exploit spillovers.
First, our results suggest that such policies should focus on fostering social proximity within student
groups. As it stands, attempts to implement alternative group assignment policies using estimates of
peer effects under one particular assignment policy do not lead to predictable results. A well-known
example of this is the study by Carrell et al. (2013), in which the authors use credible estimates of
spillovers to construct “optimal” peer groups at the United States Air Force Academy. They find that
low ability students whom they intended to help with this group assignment policy actually performed
worse than untreated low ability students.1 The importance of social proximity and the absence
of classroom-level effects implies that it may be insufficient to simply place students together in a
classroom. Our results suggest group assignment policies could be more successful if social proximity
within peer groups was fostered. Additionally, such fostering could result in larger spillovers than
those previously observed. Our estimated spillovers in the linear-in-means model are more than twice
the size of those found in very similar contexts, where manipulation of social proximity is absent
(Booij et al., 2017; Feld and Zo¨litz, 2017).
Second, our results imply that social proximity between diverse assigned peers can indeed be
manipulated by a relatively simple intervention, consisting of several informal meetings.2 However,
the persistence of these bonds in the longer run, especially among students of different backgrounds,
may be low.
Third, given the importance of social proximity to ability peer effects, our results imply that
long-run effects on student performance from group assignment policies may be difficult to sustain.
Individuals have strong homophilic preferences, and over time tend to experience diminishing social
proximity with their assigned peers as they sort into new peer groups based on these preferences.
With respect to the literature on peer effects more broadly, Sacerdote (2014) highlights the large
degree of heterogeneity in the magnitudes of spillovers across the current studies. The findings of this
paper may to some extent help explain this heterogeneity. Given that peer effects crucially depend on
the degree of social proximity, the study-to-study variation in peer spillovers may partly be explained
by the degree that social proximity was present, or perhaps even encouraged.
1In Carrell et al. (2009), data based on ability mixing (natural random variation) suggested that low ability students
would benefit from being mixed with high ability students, were high ability students would not suffer from being paired
with low ability students. Carrell et al. (2013) then create optimal squadrons that consisted of low- and high ability students
(bimodal squadrons) and squadrons with middle ability students only (homogeneous squadrons).
2The analysis on voluntary sorting shows that a student’s close peers are more strongly related to her first-year tutorial
attendance and second-year tutorial registration than distant peers.
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Our results may also provide some suggestions for the literature on theoretical models of peer
effects, which in turn might generate new insights for empirical work. Most of the well-known models
of educational peer effects imply that they take place at the classroom level. Lazear (2001) argues that
a classroom can be considered as a public good, where one disruptive student may impose negative
externalities on all students. The taxonomy of models on peer effects by Hoxby and Weingarth (2005)
also encapsulates this idea, whereby e.g. one superstar student can increase the grades for the rest of
the class. Our results imply more nuanced versions of these existing models; a model which focuses
on social interaction would more realistically capture the processes driving peer effects in tertiary
education.
Apart from their importance for understanding peer effects, the patterns on voluntary sorting be-
havior of students also provide a rare insight into how friendship formation occurs at university, a
question that has been asked independently by Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006) using data on email
exchanges between students. The exogenous allocation of first year students to close peer groups
allows us to analyze the importance of “manipulated social proximity” against other factors like eth-
nicity and gender. These results are of interest because of the recent emphasis on the importance of
diversity in the education process both by European and American universities.3 To this end, our
results show that the intervention did little to promote long-lasting diversity on campus. We cannot
rule out, however, that a more sustained and focused intervention would deliver larger effects.
2.1.1 Related Literature and Channels
Based on the empirical literature, we distinguish between two broad and exhaustive channels driving
peer effects; social proximity and classroom-level effects.
• Social Proximity: peer effects driven by meaningful social interactions between classroom
peers. Peer effects from this channel are restricted to peers who are socially proximate; those
for whom bonds exist and social interactions occur.
• Classroom-Level Effects: peer effects that stem from the overall classroom environment and
are independent of the social proximity between students. They potentially originate from and
have an impact on all students in a classroom, even between students that do not explicitly
interact.
3In the U.K., the former Prime Minister David Cameron and the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS)
announced applications to be name-blind from 2017 onward, after which several institutions introduced pilots. In the U.S.,
many leading American institutions, such as MIT and University of Chicago, filed an amicus brief in November 2015 with
the U.S. Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas. This brief stressed the role of government in diversity of higher
education, of which race and ethnicity are components.
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The social-proximity channel would, for instance, include having a high ability peer in the classroom
with whom a student discusses material. This could potentially happen both inside or outside class.
Alternatively, an example of a classroom-level effect is teachers responding to the composition of
students in the classroom. Having many high ability students in a class might induce teachers to
change the level of their instruction. A student posing an insightful question in class that benefits all
other students is another example of a classroom-level effect.4
Several papers rely on social proximity, and thus interaction between peers, as the main expla-
nation for spillovers. Booij et al. (2017) and Feld and Zo¨litz (2017) use voluntary course evaluation
data and find that students with better tutorial peers reported better interactions with other students. In
attributing the negative results of their experiment to voluntary sorting, Carrell et al. (2013) implicitly
argue that peer effects are generated via the social proximity of peers.5
Other researchers attribute their findings to classroom-level effects. Duflo et al. (2011) argue that
the resulting peer effects of a student tracking experiment can be explained by changes in teaching
behavior based on the ability composition of the class. Lavy et al. (2012a) and Lavy and Schlosser
(2011) explore potential channels using a student survey and find that a higher proportion of low
ability students has negative effects on the quality of student-teacher relationships, on teachers’ ped-
agogical practices, and increases classroom disruptions.6
The strategies used in the empirical literature thus far to explore potential channels is to (i) search
for heterogeneity in the data that supports or refutes certain peer effect channels or (ii) look at addi-
tional outcomes using secondary data sources, such as student evaluations.7 The results using the first
strategy are, however, mostly circumstantial and unable to definitively rule out other competing ex-
planations. An example of this is Carrell et al. (2009), who looks at the heterogeneity of peer effects
between courses to find suggestive evidence of study partnerships as a driver of peer effects. With
the second strategy researchers must often attribute their results to other unobserved factors (see e.g.
Feld and Zo¨litz (2017)). In both cases, these strategies involve looking for an explanation after the
fact. Researchers have rightly been cautious in interpreting the findings derived from these strategies.
4Because classroom-level effects are defined as the complement of social proximity, together they are exhaustive.
Though our main distinction is between these two broad channels, we also use supplementary data to hint at finer channels
such as those listed by Sacerdote (2011). We find suggestive evidence that spillovers revolve around collaborative self-study
and peer-to-peer teaching.
5Other papers that attribute their results to the social-proximity channel include Garlick (2018); Brunello et al. (2010);
Carrell et al. (2009); Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006); Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005).
6Other research relying on a classroom-level explanation are Oosterbeek and Van Ewijk (2014); Burke and Sass (2013);
Lyle (2009); Foster (2006); Hoxby and Weingarth (2005).
7For strategy (i) see, among others, Garlick (2018); Oosterbeek and Van Ewijk (2014); Duflo et al. (2011); Brunello
et al. (2010); Carrell et al. (2009); Lyle (2009); Foster (2006); Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005); Hoxby and Weingarth
(2005); Hoxby (2000). For strategy (ii) see, for example, Booij et al. (2017); Feld and Zo¨litz (2017); Lavy et al. (2012a);
Lavy and Schlosser (2011); Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2006).
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The definition of what constitutes a peer group varies substantially in the literature. It includes
entire schools (Lavy and Schlosser, 2011), classes (Feld and Zo¨litz, 2017), dorms (Garlick, 2018)
and dorm roommates (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003), students in the same group during uni-
versity orientation week (Thiemann, 2017), students that share more than a certain number of classes
(De Giorgi et al., 2010), and students who sit next to each other in class (Lu and Anderson, 2014;
Hong and Lee, 2017). It may be that different types of peers deliver spillovers via different mecha-
nisms. The manipulation of social proximity allows us to cleanly separate the two broad channels in
the same context. Furthermore, our results may be of more general interest than many of the studies
mentioned above, as opportunities to manipulate classroom peers arise in almost every educational
setting, while contexts where universities or schools can assign dorm mates or students’ seating ar-
rangements are far more infrequent.
Finally, it is worth noting that the relative importance of the two different channels might vary
across different levels of education. Our focus is on university students and tutorial peer groups,
which are mostly taught by senior students and PhDs. Because of the inexperience of these teachers,
one might reason that teacher response is unlikely. However, evidence from a similar public Dutch
university suggests academic rank of instructors is unrelated to student performance; Feld et al. (2018)
show that full professors are not significantly more effective in tutorial teaching than students or PhDs.
Moreover, since future employment at the university depends largely on their performance in student
evaluations, teaching assistants (TAs) have incentives to teach well and put forth effort. Similarly,
one might argue that disruptive students are not present at the university level. However, personal ex-
perience and interviews with TAs suggest otherwise. Notably, every TA at the university of our study
undergoes a one-day training, part of which teaches them to deal with disruptive student behavior
through role-playing.8 Thus, we believe that there is a priori little reason to dismiss the presence of
either channel in the university setting, and that our results are not necessarily uninformative for other
education contexts.
2.2 Context
2.2.1 Institutional Setting
Our setting for studying peer effects is the economics undergraduate program at a large public uni-
versity in the Netherlands. Every year the economics program experiences approximately 400 newly
8A web search reveals that many other universities also provide advice to their teaching staff on how to deal
with disruptive students, indicating that the phenomenon is not absent in higher education. For example, see the fol-
lowing resource page from Stanford University: https://teachingcommons.stanford.edu/resources/
teaching-resources/interacting-students/classroom-challenges.
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enrolled first-year students. During the first two undergraduate years the program is identical for every
student, as they follow the same twenty courses across the two years, covering basic economics, busi-
ness economics, and econometrics. Come the third year, students must choose their own courses. The
program only admits Dutch students. The admission requirement is based on a having a pre-scientific
high school diploma.
The three academic years are divided into five blocks of eight weeks each (seven weeks of teach-
ing and one week of exams).9 Students in the first- and second year have one light and one heavy
course per block, for which they can earn four and eights credits respectively. Sixty credits account
for a full year of study.10 In the first- and second year, courses consist of both lectures and tutorial
sessions. The heavy courses have three large-scale lectures per week, while light courses have two.
Heavy courses have two small-scale tutorials per week, while light courses have one. Lectures and
tutorials both last for 1 hour and 45 minutes. While attendance at lectures is voluntary, first-year
students have to attend at least 70 percent of the tutorials per course. Students who fail to meet the
attendance requirement are not allowed to take the final exam for their course and must wait a full
academic year before they can take the course again.
During tutorial sessions a teaching assistant (TA) typically works through question sets based on
the materials covered in the lectures. Roughly 10 percent of the TAs are PhDs, with some exceptions
the remaining 90 percent are senior students. Unlike lectures, the tutorial sessions often require
preparation and active participation from the student, e.g. via discussion of assignments or related
materials. First-year students follow the tutorials with the same group throughout the whole first year.
To verify whether the 70 percent attendance requirement is met, TAs register attendance at the start
of each session. The requirement ensures that students experience a sizable degree of exposure to
tutorials and their tutorial peers, and are not able to voluntarily attend different groups during the
first year. Appendix Table A.2.1 gives an overview of the first-year courses, their characteristics, and
an accompanying tutorial description. We investigate peer effects originating from these first-year
tutorial peer groups.
Grading is done on a scale that ranges from 1 to 10. Students fail a course if their grade is below
5.5. Most of the courses in first- and second year are (partly) multiple choice and therefore graded
without interference by the instructor or TAs. For exams with open questions, instructors disallow
TAs from grading their own groups.
9At the end of the academic year, at the start of summer, there is a resit period. During two weeks first- and second-year
students have the opportunity to resit a maximum of three courses.
10In this institution credits are measured through ECTS, which is an abbreviation for European Transfer Credit System.
This measure for student performance is used throughout Europe to accommodate the transfer of students and grades
between universities. The guidelines are that one ECTS is equivalent to 28 hours of studying.
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2.2.2 Close and Distant Peers
A key institutional feature of the economics program is that each first-year tutorial group is divided
into two subgroups. The university induces social proximity, and thus student-to-student interaction,
only within these subgroups of students. For a student we term close peers to be the group with whom
bonds are encouraged, where distant peers are the adjacent group of peers in the tutorial group with
whom interaction is not encouraged. This means that if student S1 and S2 are in the same tutorial
group but in different subgroups, the close peer group of student S1 will be the distant peer group for
student S2 and vice versa.
The main purpose of the close peer group is to facilitate the formation of social ties to help
students adjust to, and get acquainted with, life at university. These ties are primarily facilitated
via five compulsory close peer group meetings during the first block.11 As discussed in more detail
below, these meetings revolve around discussion and active student participation, which the university
aims to foster via the smaller subgroups. The first close peer group meeting is in the first week of
university, before any lectures or tutorials have taken place. As well as meeting each other in the
subsequent tutorial sessions, which also include the set of distant peers, there are weekly close peer
group meetings up until week five. During the first five weeks close peers see each other 20 times;
5 times at the close peer meetings and 15 times at the regular tutorials. There are four remaining
meetings with the close peer groups that are evenly spread out across the year (one per block). An
overview of the first block and the whole undergraduate program can be found in Figure 2.1.
The university assigns senior students as discussion leaders to guide the close peer meetings. The
subjects and the setting of these meetings are less formal than the tutorial groups. The first close
peer meeting is a get-to-know-you session, where students have to introduce themselves to the group.
The subsequent four sessions in the the first block consist of group discussions of the use of study
timetables, exam preparation, fraud and plagiarism, teamwork, and plans concerning the future of
their studies, among other topics. There is an emphasis on active participation of all students during
these discussions. Importantly, course material is not discussed during these meetings.
Given the timing and the nature of their introduction, the close peer groups serve as the first
plausible group of fellow students that a new student will interact with and form friendships with. Our
empirical evidence presented later on implies that the close peer meetings resulted in substantial social
proximity between close peers, at least initially. Conversely, the structure of the program resulted in
comparatively much less, if any, meaningful bonding with members of distant peer groups.
11While the students do not get any credits for these meetings, according to the Teaching and Examination Regulations
students must attend all of these meetings in order to pass the first year. Our administrative attendance data reveals students
attend on average 94 percent of the sessions of the group they have been assigned to.
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Figure 2.1: An overview of the characteristics of the undergraduate Economics program relevant to our study
2.2.3 Assignment of Students to Groups
During the final year of students’ pre-scientific education, and before the start of the academic year,
students must preregister for the economics program. Those who have done so are requested to come
to campus on the first day of the academic year to confirm their registration.12 This is done by means
of approximately 10 to 15 administrative personnel, who add students’ numbers and names to an
electronic register.
A list containing the information of all students who confirmed their registration is sent to an
administrative worker. This list is then sorted by a randomly assigned ID and group membership is
determined on a rotating basis. The first student on the list is allocated to tutorial group 1, close peer
group 1A; the second student is allocated to tutorial group 2, close peer group 2A; the third student
is allocated to tutorial group 3, close peer group 3A, and so forth. The allocation continues until the
maximum tutorial group has been reached, after which the rotation begins again by allocating the
next unassigned student to tutorial group 1, close peer group 1B, the next student to tutorial group 2,
close peer group 2B, and so forth. The university uses this allocation method to ensure that students
are exposed to new peers and that the groups are roughly of equal size.13
12In this way the university avoids, to a large extent, taking into account no-shows when forming the first-year groups.
13We conducted numerous interviews with the administrative worker and university administrators, and received accom-
panying documentation, in order to confirm that the allocation process occurred as described. The same administrative
worker has been in charge of this process across the six cohorts we study. The allocation process is done with BusinessOb-
jects BI and Microsoft Excel software.
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Figure 2.2: A graphical representation of the allocation to tutorial and close peer groups for a hypothetical cohort
Figure 2.2 clarifies the structure of the tutorial and close peer groups for a hypothetical cohort.
The 144 students, represented by dots, are distributed across 6 tutorial groups and 12 close peer
groups. For a student in close peer group 1A, her distant peers are those students belonging to close
peer group 1B, and vice versa.
A student who wants to follow the program, but did not show up at the first day of the year, is
allocated to a group at the discretion of the administrative worker. Reallocating a student to a different
group only happens in case of special circumstances, such as when a student practices top sports, has
special needs, or has some otherwise unresolvable scheduling conflicts. Again, the groups to which
these students are reallocated to is at the discretion of the administrator. Our data does not allow us
to observe which student registered late or ended up in their group via a reallocation. According to
the administrative worker these cases are rare, but may result in slightly different variation in peer
ability and class size than would have been observed when strictly following the allocation procedure
described above. We present balancing tests in Section 2.4 that cannot reject the final allocation
results in a random assignment of students to tutorial, close, and distant peer groups.
2.3 Data
Our main source of data is the administrative database of the university between the academic years
2009-10 and 2014-15. This database includes the complete history of student outcomes and choices
at university; grades of all courses followed by the student, first-year tutorial attendance, and second-
year tutorial choice. Additionally we observe a rich set of student characteristics; gender, age, resi-
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dential address, high school GPA and zip code, and the groups students have been assigned to in their
first year. Our baseline results are based on almost 19,000 first-year grades from 2,300 students.14
This sample only includes a student’s first attempt at completing a course. Although we also observe
resits, which are taken at the end of the academic year at start of summer, we do not include them in
our analysis as they do not require preparation via tutorials.
High school GPA is a 50-50 weighted average of grades obtained during the last three years
of high school and on the nationwide standardized exams at the end of high school (before entering
university) across all courses. We use high school GPA as a comprehensive proxy for the latent ability
of students and their peers. In case of classical measurement error, our estimate for spillovers would
be attenuated as students are randomized into groups (Feld and Zo¨litz, 2017).15
2.3.1 Attendance and Student Evaluations
In the first year all students are required to attend at least 70 percent of the tutorials per course.
To verify whether the attendance requirements are met, TAs register attendance at the start of each
tutorial. This attendance is then uploaded to the university portal and verified at the end of the block
by the exam administration. We merge this attendance data with the administrative database, which
allows us to observe attendance at the student-tutorial-course level for 98.5 percent of the student-
course observations.16
At the end of the course, students are invited by email to fill in student evaluations. A set of
20 questions are asked covering 9 characteristics of the course, which are detailed in Appendix Ta-
ble A.2.2. Merging the student evaluations to the administrative data gives a response rate of roughly
30 percent. Column (1) of Appendix Table A.2.8 reveals that participating in the course evaluation is
selective. Students with a better high school GPA are more likely to respond. However, column (1)
also shows the absence of a relationship between the high school GPA of a student’s close peers and
their response rate. Results using the course evaluations should be interpreted with caution, and we
use them to provide supplementary evidence on the channels of peer influence.
14This sample excludes some students. For 227 students we do not observe high school GPA (225 students) or one of the
main control variables (2 students). Furthermore, to ensure that peer GPA consists of an appropriate number of students,
we dropped fourteen tutorial groups (215 students) for whom we observe less than ten students’ GPA in at least one of the
two close peer groups. Our results are completely robust to the inclusion of these groups. Note that these groups occurred
because of missing data on high school GPA and because some students were reallocated after the initial assignment.
15There are two potential sources of measurement error in our measure of ability. First, for 50 percent high school GPA
is determined via unstandardized school exams. It should be noted, however, that the Dutch Inspectorate of Education pays
strong attention to schools where the grades on school exams deviate more than 0.5 points from grades on the nationwide
standardized exams (DUO, 2014). Second, although students have followed the same level of education in high school
(pre-scientific), entering the last three years of high school students must choose one of four tracks. Though these tracks
share compulsory courses (such as Dutch), some courses between tracks differ. For a subsample we can show that over 70
percent of our students followed the same track.
16For our grade-analysis we use the whole sample. Results are identical for the sample that is matched to the attendance
data. We verified that peer high school GPA cannot explain whether a student is matched.
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2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics by cohort. Panel A provides an overview of the student
characteristics. Panel B does the same for student outcomes. All student characteristics show similar
values across cohorts. The percentage of women fluctuates somewhat around 20 percent, the students
are on average 19.5 years old halfway into their first year, and their high-school GPA is close to the
nationwide average of 6.7 (scale from 1 to 10, a 5.5 is sufficient). Appendix Figure A.2.1 shows
histograms of student’s own high-school GPA, the leave-out mean for the tutorial- and close peer
group, and the mean for the distant peer group. Notice that, in contrast to the leave-out mean for the
close peer group, the mean for the distant peer group takes upon identical values for everybody in the
same subgroup. This explains the somewhat more discrete nature of this figure. A histogram of the
leave-in mean for the close peer group is similar to the mean for the distant peer group.17
Table 2.1 further shows that the size of the close peer group fluctuates between 12 and 14 students.
In 2009 the groups where somewhat larger due to an unexpectedly high number of enrolled students.
University grades seem to gradually increase, also reflected by the increase in the number of credits
earned. This is most likely the consequence of stricter academic dismissal policies introduced halfway
in our sample. Course dropout occurs if a student does not attend the final exam for that particular
course. Across cohorts, 8 to 19 percent of the students dropped out of both courses in block 5, the
final block of the first year. We refer to this as student dropout.
2.4 Empirical Specification
To derive our empirical model we start with the canonical specification for peer effects as laid out by
Manski (1993):
Yigct = α0 + α1Y (−i)gc + α2GPA(−i)g + α3GPAi + µgct + igct
Where Yigct is the grade at university of student i in tutorial group g on course c of cohort t. GPAi
is the average grade obtained in high school and the variables Y (−i)gc and GPA(−i)g are leave-
out means for tutorial group g for student i of university grades and high school GPA respectively.
Everything else that is common to tutorial group g is captured by µgct.
In the terminology of Manski (1993), α1 measures the endogenous effect of peers’ outcomes on
the outcome of student i, α2 captures the exogenous effect of pre-determined peer characteristics, and
17Angrist (2014) shows that using leave-in means, rather than leave-out means, would only change the peer-effects
estimate for close peer high school GPA by a factor ofNg/(Ng−1), whereNg is the size of close peer group g. Therefore,
this distinction has little to no importance for our results.
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µ measures the correlated effects capturing, for example, common shocks such as a good TA. The
distinction between α1 and α2 reveals little about the channels, but it does have different implications
for policy, as endogenous effects might generate a social multiplier.18 However, identification of α1
is obscured, mostly due to the well-known reflection problem; did the peers affect student i, or did
student i affect her peers? As such we follow most of the previous peer effects literature and solve for
the reduced form.
2.4.1 Reduced-Form Peer Effects
Assuming that the number of peers within tutorial group g approaches infinity we arrive at the stan-
dard linear-in-means specification:
Yigct = β0 + β1GPA(−i)g + α3GPAi + β2µgct + ˜igct (2.1)
Where β1 = α2+α1α31−α1 . Subsequently a test for whether β1 is different from zero is a test for the
presence of peer effects, may they be exogenous and/or endogenous.
The institutional manipulation of the social proximity between students and their tutorial peers
allows us to extend this standard model. We make a distinction between the leave-out mean of the
close peer groupGPAClose(−i)g and the mean of the distant peer groupGPADistantg. To identify
the separate potential channels we replace GPA(−i)g in Equation (2.1) by the following expression:
GPA(−i)g =
NC − 1
NC +ND − 1GPAClose(−i)g +
ND
NC +ND − 1GPADistantg
Where NC and ND are the total number of students in the two subgroups within a tutorial group. In
practice, NC = ND = 13. This substitution allows us to arrive at the following specification:
Yigct = β0 + β
C
1 GPAClose(−i)g + β
D
1 GPADistantg + α3GPAi + β2µgct + ˜igct (2.2)
Estimates of this equation allow us to separate the two peer effect channels possibly at work. Equa-
tion (2.2) tests the restriction of Equation (2.1) that the spillovers β1 from close and distant peers are
identical. Recall that the only distinction between an individual’s close and distant peers is that social
18When referring to the social multiplier, Manski (1993) uses the example of a tutoring program. If such a program is
provided to only one half of the student population, it might indirectly help the other half of the students as well, as peers’
outcomes affect each other.
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proximity was induced with the former, whereas no social proximity exists with the latter.19 Hence,
the difference between βC1 and β
D
1 captures peer effects through the social proximity channel. If β
C
1
and βD1 are approximately equal, this indicates that peer effects work solely through classroom-level
effects.20
Consistent with their definitions, the two channels are presented as being substitutes in the pro-
duction of student grades. However, to capture possible complementarities between social proximity
and classroom-level effects, some specifications will also include an interaction between close and
distant peer ability.
The peer group meeting intervention that encouraged social proximity permits the investigation of
the mechanisms underlying peer effects. In order for our results to be generalizable however, we must
assume that the intervention itself does not alter the nature of the mechanisms through which peer
effects operate in the classroom. In the counterfactual scenario in which social proximity between
close peers was not encouraged, we think our finding of no classroom-level effects would hold. It
seems unlikely that a non-invasive intervention of little duration would comprehensively change the
nature of classroom peer effect channels. Instead, our findings suggest that without the intervention
the spillovers from tutorial peers would be smaller than what we observe, and would diminish at a
faster rate.
2.4.2 Balancing Tests
As the average high school grade is a predefined measure, we avoid the reflection problem and the
estimates for β1 are unlikely to be biased by common shocks. The main identifying assumption,
however, is that peer high school GPA is uncorrelated with other characteristics that might determine
a student’s grade. As we are not able to observe all other characteristics that might be important for
grades, we need the covariance between GPA(−i)g and (µgct, ˜igct) to be zero. Random assignment
of students to groups makes this identifying assumption likely to hold.
We test this identifying assumption in several ways. First, we analyze whether the treatment, in
the form of assigned peer ability, can be explained by background characteristics (Xi) or high school
19In practice, we cannot rule out ex-ante that some social proximity exists between a student and her distant peers. If this
was the case, we would overestimate the importance of classroom-level effects and underestimate the importance of social
proximity. Our finding of zero for βD1 implies that there was no meaningful social proximity between students and their
distant peers.
20In fact, because the mean GPA from the distant peer group contains one more student than the leave-out mean of
the close peer group, if the spillovers from close and distant peers are identical then βC1 = βD1 ( 1213 ). We confirm this in
a simulation, in which we arbitrary re-allocate existing tutorial peer groups into placebo close peer groups 1,000 times.
Estimating Equation (2.2) and taking the average of the estimates we verify that βˆC1 ≈ βˆD1 ( 1213 ). For practical testing
purposes we deem this as sufficiently close to equality.
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GPA:
GPA(−i)g = γ0 + γ1Xi + γ2GPAi + Tt + igt
We include cohort fixed effects (Tt) as randomization into groups takes place cohort-by-cohort. Esti-
mates of γ1 or γ2 that are different from zero most likely violate the identifying assumption mentioned
above. Table 2.2 shows the results of this test, where column (1) to (3) take tutorial, close, and distant
peer high school GPA as outcome variables respectively. Across the three specifications we find all
student characteristics to be individually and jointly insignificant.21 This stands in stark contrast to
the joint significance of student characteristics in a regression where first-year GPA at university is
taken as an outcome variable (p-value<0.000).
Our second balancing test is more flexible. We regress background characteristics - student num-
ber, gender, age, and distance to university - and high school GPA on close peer group dummies and
cohort fixed effects. Next, in a separate model we regress the student characteristics upon cohort fixed
effects only and perform a F-test on the small versus big model. This test would reveal if students
with certain characteristics cluster together in certain groups. Appendix Table A.2.3 shows the F-test
does not reject the null hypothesis for all student characteristics. In other words, a small model with
cohort fixed effects only is favored above a model that also includes close peer group dummies.
We perform a similar analysis per cohort. We regress each student characteristic on a set of
close peer group dummies separately for each cohort. Appendix Figure A.2.2a plots the histogram
of the p-values of the close peer group dummies obtained from these regressions. As expected under
randomization, the p-values are roughly uniformly distributed, where for instance roughly 10 percent
of the p-values are below 0.10. Figure A.2.2b shows the results for this analysis are identical if close
peer group dummies are replaced with tutorial group dummies. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of
distribution test does not reject the null-hypothesis of a uniform distribution in both cases; the p-
values are equal to 0.86 and 0.60 for the histograms belonging to the close- and tutorial peer group
dummies respectively.
Allocation of teaching assistants to tutorial groups is done for each course by the instructor of that
specific course. Our analysis would still be compromised if instructors base the TA assignment upon
tutorial group ability. Instructors are unaware of the GPA composition of the tutorial groups and base
the assignment of the TAs upon scheduling restrictions. To confirm this, we code the gender of the
TA and whether he or she was a PhD. If coordinators base their decisions on the difficulty of groups,
21If we regress student high school GPA on peer high school GPA we reach identical conclusions. Guryan et al. (2009)
argue this balancing test should also control for the mean high school GPA of all peers that can be matched with student
i in group g. In our case this control would be the leave-me-out mean GPA of her cohort. This is infeasible as there is no
variation in the group that student i can be matched too. Indeed, GPAi is related to the mean GPA of her cohort GPAt
and the leave-me-out mean GPA of her cohort, GPA(−i)t, by the following identity: GPAi = N ×GPAt − (N − 1)×
GPA(−i)t.
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Table 2.2: Balancing Tests for Peer Ability
Tutorial Close Distant
Peer GPA Peer GPA Peer GPA
(1) (2) (3)
Student Number -0.0157 -0.0187 -0.0077
(0.0410) (0.0451) (0.0401)
Female -0.0339 -0.0319 -0.0212
(0.0376) (0.0457) (0.0504)
Age -0.0081 -0.0024 -0.0100
(0.0220) (0.0232) (0.0191)
Distance to -0.0132 0.0022 -0.0227
University (0.0145) (0.0173) (0.0151)
Own GPA 0.0076 -0.0171 0.0285
(0.0281) (0.0283) (0.0255)
Observations 2296 2296 2296
Adjusted R2 0.151 0.085 0.098
F-test 0.25 0.26 0.77
p-value 0.938 0.933 0.570
Notes:
1. All regressions also include cohort fixed effects.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for
the tutorial- and close peers, and to the mean for distant peers.
All dependent and independent variables are standardized except
for the female dummy.
3. The F-test, and corresponding p-value, refer to a test for the
joint significance of all the independent variables shown in the
table.
4. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
they might, for example, assign PhD’s to low GPA groups. Regressing TA type on tutorial peer GPA,
however, shows that coordinators do not base TA assignment on class composition (see Appendix
Table A.2.4). The same assignment method is used for the discussion leaders that guide the close
peer group, though we cannot confirm this empirically as we do not observe these discussion leaders
in our data.
We conclude that we are able to identify reduced-form peer effects and estimate Equation (2.1)
and (2.2) without controlling for µgct. Throughout all specifications we will, however, include course-
cohort fixed effects and background characteristics; student number, gender, age, and distance to
university. The baseline results are identical when we do not control for background characteristics.
We cluster standard errors at the tutorial level, which nests the close-peer-group level cluster. Own
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GPA, peer GPA, and the outcome variables (when suitable) are standardized over the estimation
sample, such that the estimates can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations.
2.5 Baseline Results
Before presenting the baseline results for grades and passing rates, we discuss the extent to which
course- and student dropout could potentially bias our estimates. Table 2.1 shows that the student
dropout rate at the end of first year is relatively low; between 8 and 19 percent across the six cohorts.
In Section 2.5.3 we will show that average peer high school GPA has no impact on the number
of courses a student attends the final exam for nor on whether the student dropped out by the end
of first year. We can show, but omit for brevity, that these null-results for number of courses and
student dropout extend to the non-linear model used in Section 2.5.5. Selection bias therefore does
not contaminate the following baseline peer effects estimates.
2.5.1 First-Year Grades and Passing Rates
Table 2.3 shows our baseline results, where panel A regresses first-year grades upon average peer
high school GPA. Column (1) shows the estimated effect of tutorial peers. The positive coefficient
has a p-value of 0.11 and shows that a one standard deviation increase in tutorial peer high school
GPA increases a students’ first year grade by 0.019 standard deviations. Columns (2) and (3) show
the effect while separating the tutorial group by one’s close- and distant peers. This reveals that
the positive spillovers are entirely driven by close peers. The estimate for peer GPA when moving
from tutorial to close peers in column (2) increases somewhat in magnitude and precision. It is
statistically significant at the 5%-level. The estimate for distant peers in column (3) is economically
and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Column (4) shows the estimates for close- and distant
peer high school GPA are identical to (2) and (3) respectively when including both peer measures in
one regression. These results imply that peer effects are entirely driven by social proximity.
In terms of the Dutch grading scale, columns (2) and (4) imply that increasing the close peers’
high school GPA from 6.5 to 7 increases a student’s grade from 7 to 7.14. This is economically small,
but 2.1 times the size of Feld and Zo¨litz (2017), while Booij et al. (2017) find no peer spillovers in
their linear-in-means specification. Both of these studies investigate spillovers in a similar context
as ours; classroom peer effects at a public university in the Netherlands. This suggests that fostering
social proximity has the capacity to generate larger spillovers than previously found in the literature.
Whereas students with good peers obtain higher grades, they are not necessarily better off if
the only goal is to pass courses. We study the probability of passing a first-year course in panel B
Table 2.3: Peer Effects on First-Year Course Grades (Panel A) and Pass or Fail (Panel B)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Grades (Standardized)
Tutorial Peer GPA 0.0191
(0.0118)
Close Peer GPA 0.0255∗∗ 0.0254∗∗ 0.0256∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0109)
Distant Peer GPA 0.0034 0.0008 0.0010
(0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0131)
Close × Distant -0.0150
Peer GPA (0.0122)
Own GPA 0.3427∗∗∗ 0.3434∗∗∗ 0.3427∗∗∗ 0.3433∗∗∗ 0.3433∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0120)
Observations 18736 18736 18736 18736 18736
Adjusted R2 0.323 0.323 0.322 0.323 0.323
Panel B: Pass (1) or Fail (0)
Tutorial Peer GPA 0.0090∗∗
(0.0043)
Close Peer GPA 0.0080∗ 0.0075∗ 0.0075∗
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043)
Distant Peer GPA 0.0056 0.0048 0.0048
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Close × Distant -0.0005
Peer GPA (0.0046)
Own GPA 0.1186∗∗∗ 0.1189∗∗∗ 0.1183∗∗∗ 0.1187∗∗∗ 0.1187∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Observations 18736 18736 18736 18736 18736
Pseudo R2 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number, gender, age,
and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the tutorial- and close peers, and
to the mean for distant peers. Own GPA refers to own high school GPA. All GPA measures are
standardized.
3. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
4. Panel A is estimated with OLS, Panel B uses Probit. Marginal effects are reported.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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of Table 2.3, where the outcome variable is replaced with a pass-fail indicator. Column (1) shows
that a one standard deviation increase in the high school GPA of one’s tutorial peers increases the
probability of obtaining a sufficient grade by 0.9 percentage points. This effect is significant at the
5%-level. Again, columns (2) to (4) show that these spillovers originate entirely from close peers.
Column (5) of both panel A and B includes an interaction effect between high school GPA of
the close and distant peers. This interaction effect tests for possible complementarities between social
proximity and classroom-level effects. For instance, having a superstar student in class posing insight-
ful questions may only increase grades if one has high ability close peers to discuss the questions with.
We find this interaction term is negative for grades and the probability of passing, but insignificant in
both cases. We interpret this as showing that complementarities between both channels are unlikely
to play a role.
2.5.2 Randomization Inference
The results above use analytic standard errors. In this section we present p-values based on ran-
domization inference for the baseline results on first-year grades, an alternative inference approach
that does not rely on large sample approximations. This method involves re-drawing a large number
(10,000) of randomly assigned hypothetical tutorial and close peer groups, respecting the size of the
original groups. For each of these hypothetical groups, we re-run the models presented in Panel A of
Table 2.3 in order to assess the effect of the hypothetical peers’ high school GPA on students’ first-
year grades. Comparing the actual estimate to the estimates from the simulated groups allows us to
test the sharp null hypothesis that peer effects are equal to zero (Athey and Imbens, 2017). The results
for the corresponding exact p-values are presented in Appendix Table A.2.5 and Figure A.2.3, which
are nearly identical to those presented in Table 2.3. Given the similarity between the two approaches,
the remainder of this paper uses analytic standard errors.
Additionally, these results address one of the concerns of Angrist (2014). He shows that the peer
effects estimate is identical to the (scaled) difference between a 2SLS estimator using peer group
dummies as instruments for individual high school GPA and an OLS estimator of individual GPA. In
some settings this may lead to a spurious, mechanically driven finding of peer effects. In our setting,
however, with random assignment of students to many small groups, there is little reason for this
estimate to be different from zero in the absence of spillovers (Angrist, 2014). This is confirmed by
the fact that the peer effect coefficients from the 10,000 hypothetical groups, containing unconnected
students, are centered around zero.
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2.5.3 Additional Outcomes
In this section we turn our attention to five additional first-year outcomes: credit weighted GPA,
number of credits, number of courses taken, student dropout, and tutorial attendance. We analyze the
first four of these outcomes by estimating our baseline equations on the student level.
Table 2.4 shows the results, where columns (1) and (2) reveal that the positive effects on grades
and passing rates have a cumulative effect on a student’s GPA (p-value<0.01) and the number of
credits she collects (p-value=0.13). The estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase of
close peer high school GPA increases a student’s credit weighted GPA (total first-year credits) by
roughly 0.04 standard deviations (0.52 credits). Column (3) and (4) reveal this increase in student
performance is not due to the fact that peers impact the number of courses a student writes the final
exam for.22 Column (5) shows that peer GPA does not change the probability of student dropout,
which is measured by an indicator variable that takes the value one if a student was no longer active
in block five of their first year.
Appendix Table A.2.6 shows the results when analyzing the impact of peer high school GPA on
the percentage of tutorials attended per course in the first year. These estimates show that peers do
not have an effect on average tutorial attendance. Recall, however, that students are required to attend
70 percent of the tutorials per course, so the scope for any improvement would be limited.
2.5.4 Robustness
The results above show that peer GPA does not affect dropout, which implies our results are not
contaminated by selection bias. However, the estimate for own GPA in Table 2.4 reveals that low
GPA students take fewer courses and have a higher probability of dropping out by the end of their
first year. This means that a student randomized into a tutorial group with many low ability rather
than high ability students will experience a larger amount of course dropout among her peers, and
thus have a smaller actual class size. This results in a positive correlation between peer GPA and
class size, which could partly explain our baseline results if class size also impacts grades. Appendix
Figure A.2.4 plots the number of students writing the final exam as a fraction of the initial students
per block and separately for high, average, and low GPA close peer groups. This reveals that dropout
increases during the year, being 15 to 20 percent at the end of the first year. It also reveals that dropout
is somewhat larger for low GPA close peer groups.
We investigate whether our results are robust to class size and course dropout in Table 2.5, which
presents the results of our baseline equation while including variables measuring class size and course
22Note that this also implies that course dropout is not influenced by peer GPA.
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Table 2.4: Peer Effects on Additional Outcomes
GPA Number of Number of Followed the Dropout
Weighted Credits Courses Course?
by Credits Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Close Peer GPA 0.0450∗∗∗ 0.5230 0.0269 0.0034 0.0009
(0.0146) (0.3462) (0.0497) (0.0051) (0.0083)
Own GPA 0.5073∗∗∗ 8.7081∗∗∗ 0.4747∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗∗ -0.0693∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.3560) (0.0438) (0.0054) (0.0082)
Observations 2218 2218 2218 22180 2218
R2 0.300 0.241 0.062 0.048 0.056
Binary Outcome No No No Yes Yes
Notes:
1. All regressions include cohort fixed effects and controls; student number, gender, age, and distance to
university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the close peer group. Own GPA refers to
own high school GPA. Both GPA measures are standardized.
3. Column (1), (2), (3) and (5) are estimated on the student level. Column (4) creates a balanced panel on
the student-course level, where the outcome variable takes the value one if a student wrote the final exam
for that course and zero otherwise.
4. Column (1) has first-year credit weighted GPA as outcome variable and is based on the number of
courses that the student took. Column (2), (3) and (4) refer to the number of credits obtained or the number
of courses a student wrote the final exam for. Dropout in column (5) is one if a student did not write an exam
in the last block of the first year and zero otherwise. Credit weighted GPA in column (1) is standardized, all
other outcomes are unstandardized. Number of credits range from 1 to 60. Number of courses range from
1 to 10.
5. Across the six cohorts there are 78 students (3.4%) who confirmed their registration on the first day but
for whom we observe no valid grade. These students dropped out before the first exam week. As we cannot
calculate a GPA for them, these students are dropped from this analysis. Results do not change when we
include these students.
6. Column (1), (2) and (3) are estimated with OLS, column (4) and (5) with Probit. Marginal effects are
reported. The R2 refers to the Adjusted and Pseudo R2 respectively.
7. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
8. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
dropout as explanatory variables. Column (1) includes a dummy for the assigned number of students
to the close peer group at the start of the first year, column (3) for the actual number of students
that wrote the exam for the course, and column (6) for the difference between the two. The latter
is a measure for dropout per course. All three columns reveal a stable estimate for close peer GPA,
suggesting that class size and course dropout are unlikely to explain our baseline results.
Columns (2), (4), and (7) of Table 2.5 include the assigned class size, actual class size, and
course dropout as continuous variables, while also including their interaction with close peer GPA.
The measures for original and actual class size in column (2) and (4) are standardized, while the
difference between the two in column (7) is unstandardized. As such, the estimate for close peer GPA
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Table 2.5: Robustness of Baseline Peer Effects
Grades (Standardized)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Close Peer GPA 0.0254∗∗ 0.0253∗∗ 0.0275∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗ 0.0387∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.0146)
Peer GPA × -0.0059
Assigned Class Size (0.0093)
Peer GPA × 0.0042 -0.0043
Actual Class Size (0.0076) (0.0112)
Peer GPA × -0.0056
(Assigned-Actual) (0.0052)
Own GPA 0.3435∗∗∗ 0.3436∗∗∗ 0.3436∗∗∗ 0.3438∗∗∗ 0.3438∗∗∗ 0.3433∗∗∗ 0.3433∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Observations 18736 18736 18736 18736 18736 18736 18736
Adjusted R2 0.324 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323
F-tests on Assigned Class Size: 141.85
Excl. Instruments Its Interaction with Peer GPA: 475.24
Class-Size Dummies Yes No Yes No No Yes No
Robustness Check Assigned Class Size Actual Class Size (Assigned-Actual)
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number, gender, age, and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the close peer group. Own GPA refers to own high school GPA.
Both GPA measures are standardized.
3. Column (1) includes dummies for the number of students at the beginning of the year in the close peer group (assigned class size),
column (3) for the number of students that wrote the exam for the course (actual class size on the course-cohort level), and column
(6) for the difference between these two (assigned-actual). The latter is a measure for course dropout.
4. Assigned and actual class size are standardized in column (2), (4) and (5). The difference between the two in column (7) is not
standardized. The coefficient on close peer GPA in column (7) measures spillovers in classes where there has been no course dropout
(assigned-actual=0). Roughly 20 percent of the groups experience no course dropout and have a value of zero, where the average is
2.19.
5. Column (5) uses the assigned number of students and its interaction with close peer GPA as instruments for the actual number of
students and for its interaction with close peer GPA.
6. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
7. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
in (7) measures the peer effect for groups where there has been no course dropout. Again we find
stable estimates for close peer GPA across all three columns. Moreover, we find the estimates for the
interaction terms between peer GPA, class size, and course dropout to be unimportant. From this we
conclude that the social proximity, and the corresponding nature of spillovers, is not different between
classes of different size.
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Whereas assigned class size is exogenous, one may have remaining concerns that actual class size
is an outcome of close peer GPA. Therefore we report an additional specification in column (5) of
Table 2.5, where we use assigned class size as an instrument for actual class size.23 Using only the
variation in actual class size that originates from the original assignment, we find our results to be
virtually unchanged.
2.5.5 Heterogeneity
Do the baseline estimates of Section 2.5.1 hide heterogeneity by own and peer ability? This question
has important implications for policy. It is only when peer effects are non-linear that aggregate gains
can be generated by reorganizing peer groups.
Following Carrell et al. (2013) we test for heterogeneity using a two-way interaction model. We
define low and high ability students to be in the bottom and top quartiles of high school GPA across
the six cohorts. The remaining 50 percent of students are defined as being of average ability. For every
student we calculate the (leave-out) proportion of low, middle, and high ability students separately
for their close and distant peer groups. We estimate models with interactions of student’s own ability
type with the fraction of high and low ability peers. For each ability type, these interactions show
the impact of increasing the proportion of high or low ability students by decreasing the proportion
of average ability students. For example, Own Low × Peer High shows the estimated effect on
student performance for low ability students of increasing the proportion of high ability students by
decreasing the proportion of average ability students in the relevant peer group.24
Table 2.6 presents our results. Column (1) and (2) first document that our baseline results from
the linear-in-means specifications carry over to a model where we use the share of high and low
ability students, rather than the mean of peer high school GPA, to measure peer ability. Next, column
(3) and (4) show the heterogeneity results on first-year grades for the close and distant peer groups
respectively, where column (5) and (6) do this for a pass-fail indicator. The results in column (3)
and (5) reveal spillovers that are roughly linear in close peer ability, implying that the estimates of
the linear-in-means model are insightful. Specifically, the columns show that the observed close peer
spillovers are driven primarily by low and high ability students benefiting from social interactions
with high ability students. Both high and low ability students are negatively affected by increasing
23The variation in assigned class size comes partly from the original allocation and partly from the cases in which the
administrator reallocates students across tutorial and close peer groups (see Section 2.2).
24Appendix Table A.2.7 repeats the first balancing test described in Section 2.4 while replacing average peer GPA as
the outcome variable separately with the (leave-out) share of low, average, and high ability peers in the close and distant
peer group. We find that student characteristics cannot explain the share of peers by ability type; only two out of the 35
estimated coefficients (γ1 and γ2) are significant, and the characteristics are always jointly insignificant. This result holds
if we perform this balancing test separately for low, average, and high ability students.
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Table 2.6: Heterogeneity by High School GPA of Peer Effects
Grades (Standardized) Pass (1) or Fail (0)
Close Distant Close Distant Close Distant
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share Peer High 0.1774∗ 0.0096
(0.0915) (0.1104)
Share Peer Low -0.0483 0.0171
(0.1064) (0.1108)
Own High × Peer High 0.3659∗∗ 0.0007 0.2258∗∗∗ 0.1069
(0.1456) (0.1701) (0.0730) (0.0789)
Own High × Peer Low -0.3036∗∗ 0.1024 -0.1141∗ 0.0329
(0.1507) (0.1506) (0.0614) (0.0666)
Own Avg × Peer High -0.0257 -0.0687 -0.0081 -0.0153
(0.1086) (0.1239) (0.0434) (0.0508)
Own Avg × Peer Low 0.1063 0.0474 0.0698 0.0506
(0.1196) (0.1272) (0.0463) (0.0509)
Own Low × Peer High 0.3510∗∗ 0.1987 0.1146∗ 0.0884
(0.1503) (0.1624) (0.0593) (0.0655)
Own Low × Peer Low -0.1492 -0.1654 -0.0400 -0.0689
(0.2212) (0.2002) (0.0794) (0.0692)
Observations 18736 18736 18736 18736 18736 18736
R2 0.323 0.322 0.324 0.323 0.188 0.187
Binary Outcome No No No No Yes Yes
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects, controls; student number, gender, age, and distance to
university, and own high school GPA.
2. Students are classified into dummies that refer to the bottom 25 percent (low), middle 25 to 75 percent (average),
and top 25 percent (high) of high school GPA. The peer measures are the (leave-out) shares of students in the close
(distant) peer group belonging to each category. The shares are unstandardized.
3. Odd columns include the shares for the close peer group and even columns for the distant peer group.
4. Column (1) to (4) are estimated with OLS, column (5) and (6) with Probit. Marginal effects are reported. The
R2 refers to the Adjusted and Pseudo R2 respectively.
5. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
the share of low ability students, insignificantly so for low ability students. Increasing the share of
either high or low ability students appears to have no impact on average ability students. Conversely,
column (4) and (6) show that the proportion of high and low ability types in one’s distant peer group
has no significant effect on grades or passing rates for any ability type, further supporting the lack of
classroom-level effects.
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The coefficient for Own High × Peer High in column (3) reveals that increasing the share of
high ability students by 25 percent, the equivalent of replacing 3 out of 12 average ability students
with 3 high ability students, increases the grade of a high GPA student by almost 0.1 standard devi-
ation. To get a sense of the size of this effect, we follow Marie and Zo¨litz (2017) and compare it to
other treatments known to have an impact on student performance in higher education. An estimate
of 0.1 standard deviation is roughly twice the size of having a same-sex instructor (Hoffmann and
Oreopoulos, 2009), resembles the effect of increasing professor quality by one standard deviation
(Carrell et al., 2009), and is similar to the impact of a temporary restriction of legal cannabis access
(Marie and Zo¨litz, 2017). It is perhaps useful to remark that 0.1 standard deviation corresponds to
approximately half of the math gender gap in the fifth grade in the U.S. (Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2010).
In an additional analysis, we considered more restrictive definitions of high and low ability stu-
dents to better reflect the concept of having superstar students or bad apples in the classroom. In
particular, we defined superstar students as those having a GPA above 8.25 (cum laude) and bad
apples as those having a GPA below 5.75; both categories form roughly one percent of our sam-
ple. Subsequently we constructed close and distant peer group dummies which are equal to one if the
group contained such a student. Replicating the regression in column (1) of Table 2.6, while replacing
the shares with a close-peer-group superstar and bad-apple dummy, we find the first is significantly
positive and the latter to be insignificantly negative. Similar to column (2), both the superstar and
bad-apples dummy for the distant peer group are smaller and statistically insignificant. Separating
these effects by students’ own ability, we find a similar pattern for low, average, and high ability
students as documented in column (3) and (4) of Table 2.6. These results further support peer ef-
fects revolve around meaningful social interaction between peers, rather than classroom-level effects
(results available upon request).
2.5.6 Group Assignment Policies
The previous results imply that alternative assignment policies entail a transfer from one student group
to the other. Therefore it is not possible to provide a Pareto-ranking of different policies. However, we
can use the results in Table 2.6 to estimate the effects of alternative assignment policies. University
administrators that want to maximize student grades can use such an exercise to weigh the grade
benefits of one group against the costs of another.
Following Booij et al. (2017) we consider five alternative group assignment policies; low, average,
high, three-way, and two-way ability tracking. Table 2.7 summarizes, for the average student as
well as per ability type, the estimated change in a first-year course grade when switching from the
current ability mixing regime to one of the five tracking policies. According to these estimates,
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Table 2.7: Estimated Effects of Alternative Group Assignments Compared to Mixing
Effect For Student With
Average Low Avg. High
Effect GPA [L] GPA [A] GPA [H]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Track Low [L],[A,H] -0.0400 -0.2030 -0.0290 0.1009∗∗
(0.0512) (0.1829) (0.0300) (0.0396)
Track Average [A],[L,H] 0.0062 0.0476 -0.0202 0.0177
(0.0115) (0.0589) (0.0432) (0.0502)
Track High [H],[L,A] 0.0686∗∗ -0.1036∗∗ 0.0148 0.3484∗∗∗
(0.0335) (0.0486) (0.0271) (0.1167)
Three-way Tracking [L],[A],[H] 0.0262 -0.2030 -0.0202 0.3484∗∗∗
(0.0556) (0.1829) (0.0432) (0.1167)
Two-way Tracking [L,A],[A,H] 0.0123 -0.1247∗ 0.0011 0.1717∗∗∗
(0.0255) (0.0730) (0.0012) (0.0551)
Notes:
1. For each alternative group assignment, we randomly allocate students depending on their ability
type to groups of 14 to 15 students. The student types are low ability [L], average ability [A], and
high ability [H] defined by the bottom quartile, two middle quartiles, and top quartile of high school
GPA respectively.
2. Low (average or high) tracking involves grouping low (average or high) ability students together,
while mixing the remaining students. Three-way tracking involves separate groups for each ability
type. Two-way tracking involves defining students as either high or low ability, depending on whether
their high school GPA is above or below the median. Groups are then composed of only high or low
ability students.
3. For each student we subtract the actual leave-out ability shares (mixing) from the ability leave-out
shares obtained via the alternative group assignments, denoted by (xtrack − xmixing). Then the
average tracking effects are equal to (xtrack − xmixing)′ βˆ. Note that nearly identical estimates can
be derived directly from column (3) of Table 2.6.
4. Standard errors are equal to
√
(xtrack − xmixing)′V (βˆ)(xtrack − xmixing), and shown in paren-
theses.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
the policy that will deliver the largest increase in student performance is the high tracking policy,
whereby high ability students are grouped together and low and average students are mixed to form
the remaining groups. Note however that this policy is predicted to decrease grades for low ability
students compared to mixing.
A potential concern with using estimates based on ability mixing to inform alternative group
assignment policies is that some peer configurations will not be covered by the data.25 Such a problem
was encountered by Carrell et al. (2013), who found that extrapolating from estimates based on ability
mixing failed to predict the results of alternative group assignments. Given that social proximity is
25This point has recently been made by Booij et al. (2017). In their study they manipulate the composition of groups to
achieve a wider range of support in peer ability than observed under ability mixing.
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vital for the existence of peer effects, it may well be that such failures can be attributed to social
proximity breaking down in more extreme group configurations. Our results are based on a setting
in which social proximity has been fostered between close peers. If such fostering is achieved in
more extreme group configurations then the results presented here may actually provide an accurate
description of what will occur under alternative assignment policies. Given the lack of support they
should still be treated with caution, however.
2.6 Nature of Social Interactions
Our results indicate better peers have small positive implications for a student’s grades, passing rates,
cumulative GPA, and credits in first year. These spillovers originate from peers with whom students
are socially proximate and interact with. What is the nature of these social interactions? A possible
answer to this question allows us to speak to the finer categorization of possible peer effect mecha-
nisms listed by Sacerdote (2011), including peer-to-peer teaching or effects on student motivation or
preferences.
We start with the use of course evaluations. Recall that the response rate, which is roughly 30
percent, is unrelated to a student’s close peer GPA (see Appendix Table A.2.8). Hence, we worry
little about sample selection when interpreting the following set of results. Table 2.8 uses data on
self-reported lecture attendance and total study time to investigate whether the beneficial social inter-
actions changed the inputs regarding the study process. Column (1) reports the effect of close peer
high school GPA on an indicator for whether the student attended lectures. Column (2) does this for
total study time (tutorials + lectures + self study). The estimates reveal that a student with better close
peers is less likely to attend lectures, while reported total study time is not impacted. The estimate in
column (1) suggests that a one standard deviation increase in close peer high school GPA decreases
the probability to attend lectures by 1.8 percentage points. Due to the rough (binary) nature of the
question, however, we are inclined to interpret only its sign and significance (p-value=0.019).26 Re-
call that Appendix Table A.2.6 showed that tutorial attendance is unaffected by close peer high school
GPA. Taken together, the estimates in column (1) and (2) suggest that students with better close peers
substituted lecture attendance for additional self study.
Next we investigate the impact of close peer high school GPA on perceived lecturer and TA
quality, and the perceived usefulness of lectures and tutorials. Column (3) and (4) indicate that having
better close peers significantly decreases the perceived quality of the lecturer and usefulness of the
26For this question students are asked only about the extensive margin of their lecture attendance: “Have you attended
lectures?”. Even students who attended a few lectures may answer this question with yes (1) instead of no (0). As such, it
may well be that these results understate the true reduction in lecture attendance.
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Table 2.8: Peer Effects on Time Use and Additional Outcomes using Course Evaluations
Attended Total Lecturer Usefulness TA Usefulness
Lectures Study Time Quality Lectures Quality Tutorials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Close Peer GPA -0.0180∗∗ -0.1935 -0.0574∗∗∗ -0.0585∗∗ -0.0332 -0.0064
(0.0077) (0.1877) (0.0195) (0.0285) (0.0241) (0.0281)
Own GPA -0.0139 -0.5414∗∗∗ 0.0348∗ 0.0268 0.0029 0.0024
(0.0089) (0.1484) (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0191) (0.0308)
Observations 4361 4361 3560 2178 3560 2178
R2 0.147 0.268 0.245 0.251 0.079 0.124
Binary Outcome Yes No No No No No
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number, gender, age, and distance to
university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the close peer group. Own GPA refers to own high
school GPA. Both GPA measures are standardized.
3. The dependent variable in column (1) is the answer to the question “Have you attended lectures?”. The de-
pendent variable in column (2) is the answer to the question “Average study time (hours) for this course per week
(lectures+tutorials+self study)?” where we used the maximum for the interval to convert the categories into hours.
The dependent variables in column (3) and (5) are the mean of the answers to the questions that evaluate the Lec-
turer/TA. The dependent variables in column (4) and (6) are the answers to the questions “Were the lectures/tutorials
useful?”. The dependent variables in column (3) until (6) are standardized.
4. Column (1) is estimated with Probit, the other columns with OLS. Marginal effects are reported. The R2 refers
to the Pseudo and Adjusted R2 respectively.
5. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
lectures. This is consistent with, and further reinforces that, students substitute lecture attendance
for additional self study. It seems most likely that this increase in self study involves close peers
studying together. However, an alternative explanation might be that the beneficial student-to-student
interactions only take place during the tutorials, after which individual self study takes place. If this
is the case, we would expect students’ perception of the quality of their TA and the usefulness of
tutorials to increase when having better close peers. Column (5) shows that close peer high school
GPA is unrelated to students’ perceptions of the quality of the TA. Column (6) shows that there are
no effects on the perception of the usefulness of the tutorials. Combining these results suggest that
students exposed to better close peers substitute lecture attendance for collaborative self study.27
Next we turn to our data on student gender, high school location, and residence to shed additional
light on the nature of the social interactions. We calculate for each student the leave-out proportion of
females in their close peer group, the number of peers in their close peer group that attended the same
27Appendix Table A.2.8 reveals no effect of students’ close peers on the remaining questions regarding their perceptions
of the course.
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high school as the student, the distance of the student’s residence to the residence of every student in
their close peer group, and the leave-out proportion of a student’s close peers that live in the city in
which the university is located.
Column (1) of Table 2.9 adds the leave-out share of females in the close peer group while interact-
ing it with the female dummy in our baseline equation. The results replicate the finding of Oosterbeek
and Van Ewijk (2014), who also find that the gender composition does not have an effect on student
performance. Column (1) also documents an unchanged estimate for close peer high school GPA.
This implies that the meaningful social interactions do not only take place in certain high ability
groups with a high share of males or females. Column (2) shows that being assigned peers from
one’s former high school in the close peer group does not have implications for spillovers. Given
that high school peers are most likely acquainted before university, this points to spillovers also being
generated between formerly unknown peers.
If collaborative study meetings would take place outside university, we would expect to observe
larger peer effects for students who live closer to their high ability peers. In column (3) we include
the median distance of a student’s residence to her close peers and interact this with close peer high
school GPA. We do not find that a student who lives closer to her peers enjoys larger spillovers. This
suggests that the study meetings take place on the university campus.
The notion that students benefit from collaborative self-study outside class implies that students
would fail to benefit from having better close peers if these peers have other commitments that prevent
such studying. We attempt at investigating this in column (4), which includes a dummy for whether
the student lives in the city of the university and the leave-out share of students within their close peer
group living in the city. First, notice column (4) documents that city students perform significantly
worse in their first year, scoring on average 0.11 standard deviations lower. Moreover, with our
administrative tutorial attendance data we can show that the percentage of first-year tutorials attended
per course is 0.07 standard deviations lower for city students (p-value=0.001). We conjecture that
these findings partly reflect the large range of extra-curricular activities available to these students,
most of whom are living outside of their parent’s home for the first time.28 The coefficient for the
interaction of close peer ability with the proportion of close peers living in the city implies that peer
effects vanish if all of one’s close peers live in the city. Although we cannot definitively rule out other
28For example, these activities could include a fraternity membership, which is common among our student population
living in the city. From the Dutch student survey “Studenten Monitor” we observe that students living outside of their
parent’s home spend in total roughly twice as much money on fraternity memberships and roughly 1.5 as much money on
leisure activities than students living with their parents (http://www.studentenmonitor.nl/).
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Table 2.9: Peer Effects by Gender, Prior Bonds and Location
Grades (Standardized)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Close Peer GPA 0.0250∗∗ 0.0286∗∗ 0.0254∗∗ 0.0190∗
(0.0104) (0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0099)
Share of Female Peers -0.0087
(0.0120)
Female × 0.0290
Share of Female Peers (0.0232)
Peer Same High School × -0.0155
Peer GPA (0.0229)
Distance of Peers to Your -0.0091
Residence × Peer GPA (0.0089)
Live in City -0.1113∗∗∗
(0.0294)
Share of Peers that Live -0.0246∗∗
in City × Peer GPA (0.0110)
Own GPA 0.3430∗∗∗ 0.3426∗∗∗ 0.3435∗∗∗ 0.3408∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0120) (0.0122)
Observations 18736 18229 18736 18736
Adjusted R2 0.323 0.324 0.324 0.325
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number, gender,
age, and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the close peer group. Own
GPA refers to own high school GPA. Both GPA measures are standardized.
3. Column (1) includes the leave-out share of females in the close peer group (standardized)
and its interaction with the gender dummy. Column (2) includes the number of students that
attended the same high school (unstandardized) and its interaction with close peer GPA. For
some students we do not observe their high school address, explaining the somewhat fewer
number of observations. Column (3) includes the median distance of a students’ peers to his
or her residence (standardized) and its interaction with close peer GPA. Column (4) includes
the leave-out share of peers that live in the city where the university is located (standardized)
and its interaction with close peer GPA.
4. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
competing explanations, we believe this result is most consistent with the existence of spillovers
depending upon peers not having busy social lives or other distractions outside of class.29
29Notice that this result is unlikely to be explained by non-city peers studying together in public transport. Column (3)
in Table 2.9 has shown that spillovers are unrelated to having high ability peers closer to ones’ residence.
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To summarize, these results suggest meaningful social interaction between close peers takes place
on campus, where in place of attending lectures, students study together with their close peers. It
seems that social interaction with high ability peers increases grades by increasing the productivity
of (collaborative) self study. While only suggestive, these findings are consistent with laboratory evi-
dence examining peer effects mechanisms. Kimbrough et al. (2017) find that low ability participants
were able to solve more logic puzzles when allowed to socially interact with high ability partici-
pants, and audio recording revealed that these social interactions generated spillovers via peer-to-peer
teaching.
2.7 Voluntary Sorting and Potential Implications for Group Assign-
ment Policies
Our results indicate that peer effects in the classroom work through social proximity. The extent to
which students sort out of their close peer groups over time, and become socially proximate with
other, self-chosen peers, is therefore crucial to the evolution of peer effects from assigned close peers.
For example, interventions aiming to help low ability students by matching them with high ability
students may not be sustainable if the social proximity between these students wanes over time. Had
classroom-level effects driven peer effects, any changes in social proximity would be of no concern.
In this section we analyze voluntary sorting and discuss its potential implications for group as-
signment policies. First, we track the effect of close peers on grades during the first year. We find
that peer effects from close peers diminish over time; they are strongest in the first block and vanish
by the fourth block of the first year. Second, we use detailed tutorial attendance data and present
some evidence that the social proximity between close peers diminishes in a similar fashion during
the first year. Third, we use second-year tutorial registration and confirm that students largely sort out
of their assigned close peer group. Concurrently, students sort into new peer groups based on prior
bonds, ethnicity, and gender, but not on ability. While we cannot know with certainty the reason that
academic spillovers from close peers vanishes during the first year, we believe the degree and type of
voluntary sorting behavior provides an intuitive explanation.
2.7.1 Diminishing Peer Effects
To study how peer effects evolve over time we repeat the analysis of close peer GPA on grades per
block of the first year. The results are presented in Table 2.10 where the column number refers to
the block being analyzed. Columns (1) and (2) reveal that during the first two blocks the estimates
for close peer GPA are comparatively large (p-value<0.05). The magnitude slightly drops in block 3,
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Table 2.10: Peer Effects per Block
Grades (Standardized)
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Close Peer GPA 0.0404∗∗ 0.0361∗∗ 0.0318∗∗ 0.0080 0.0062
(0.0177) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0135) (0.0178)
Own GPA 0.4139∗∗∗ 0.3451∗∗∗ 0.3849∗∗∗ 0.2537∗∗∗ 0.3026∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0145) (0.0176) (0.0151) (0.0160)
Observations 4271 4024 3650 3462 3329
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.474 0.264 0.191 0.301
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number, gender, age,
and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave out mean of high school GPA for the close peer group. Own
GPA refers to own high school GPA. Both GPA measures are standardized.
3. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
4. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
while still being significant at the 5%-level. In blocks 4 and 5 spillovers become statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. Appendix Table A.2.9 shows that distant peers are unimportant throughout all
five blocks. We investigate several potential explanations for the diminishing peer effects in the Ap-
pendix, such as differences in course types across blocks, direct effects of dropout, and measurement
error in peer ability due to dropout. The results imply these explanations are unimportant.
2.7.2 First-Year Tutorial Attendance
To study whether a reduction in social proximity could be a potential explanation, we analyze whether
a student’s tutorial attendance is associated with the attendance of their close and distant peers. Given
a preference to attend tutorials with ones’ friends, we interpret coordination of tutorial attendance
among students as being indicative of social proximity. Let Attendanceisgct be a binary variable
taking the value one if student i attended tutorial session s, in group g, for course c, of cohort t. We
run the following regression:
Attendanceisgct = δ0 + δ1AttClose(−i)sgc + δ2AttDistantsgc +Ggct + δ3Xi + isgct (2.3)
Where AttClose(−i)sgc and AttDistantsgc are the proportions of individual i’s close and distant
peers who attend session s of course c. By running this regression per block, δ1 and δ2 detect any
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changes in attendance coordination as the first year progresses. Recall that across the seven weeks
there are fourteen and seven tutorial sessions for large and small courses respectively.
Equation (2.3) regresses attendance on its own group leave-out mean. If one is trying to detect
causal peer effects this model would suffer from the reflection problem. Our goal, however, is to
detect the degree of attendance coordination. Is a student more likely to go to tutorials with her
close than distant peers, and does this change over time? The reflection problem poses no threat to
answering this question. Another concern with such models is that group-level attendance shocks,
such as bad weather, can result in coefficients that suggest peer coordination even if peers do not
deliberately coordinate. Given that such shocks will take place at the tutorial level, both δ1 and δ2
are affected by these shocks. We will only compare their relative sizes and changes across blocks.
Moreover, note that Equation (2.3) includes course-tutorial fixed effects (Ggct) to capture common
shocks. The remaining control variables (Xi) are identical to the baseline regressions.
The results of the δ1 and δ2 coordination coefficients from these regressions per block are pre-
sented visually in Figure 2.3.30 To highlight their potential relevance for the diminishing peer effects,
the figure also contains a similar representation of the close group peer effect on grades during the
first year.
We identify three main patterns. First, the degree of coordination in attendance between a student
and her close peers is higher than between a student and her distant peers. This supports the notion
that the close peer group meetings induced social proximity and further reinforces our results in
Section 2.5. Second, the attendance coordination with close peers falls over time. Notably, the largest
drop occurs after the second block, at which point there is a Christmas break. The timing of the
break is indicated by the dashed vertical line in the figure. This drop is relatively large, significant (p-
value=0.028), and stands in stark contrast to all other changes in coordination across blocks, which
are relatively small and insignificant. Third, this drop in coordination after the second block is not
visible between students and their distant peers. We take this as evidence that, while there was initially
a difference in the degree of social proximity between a student and her close and distant peers, this
diminished over time. The Christmas break might have resulted in a severing of the bonds between
close peers.
The results above provide some evidence that the social proximity between assigned close peers
diminishes as time progresses. Are students sorting out of their close peer group into other groups?
Second-year tutorial registration, which by then is under the purview of the students, provides us with
an opportunity to analyze exactly this.
30The full regression results are presented in Appendix Table A.2.10. The table also presents p-values of a test for the
equality of coefficients between adjacent blocks for close and distant peers separately and p-values of a test for the equality
of the coefficients between close and distant peers within a block.
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Figure 2.3: Diminishing Peer Effects in Grades (top graph) and Tutorial Attendance Coordination (bottom graph)
Notes:
1. Top graph shows the point estimates of close-peer effects on first year grades per block
and the corresponding 90% confidence interval. The precise estimates can be found in
Table 2.10.
2. Bottom graph shows the point estimates of first year tutorial attendance coordination for
both close and distant peers and the corresponding 90% confidence interval. The precise
estimates can be found in Appendix Table A.2.10.
3. The vertical dashed line indicates the timing of the first two-week break that occurs during
the students’ first year.
2.7.3 Second-Year Tutorial Choice
All students in second year have to register for the tutorials a few weeks before the start of the course.
If we assume that students prefer to be in a tutorial group with one’s friends, then observing joint
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tutorial registration allows us to analyze peer group formation. We look for evidence of students co-
registering based on shared characteristics; a phenomenon referred to as homophily. In particular, we
use the following six characteristics: close and distant peer groups, ethnicity, gender, former bonds
based on a student’s high school, and ability (measured by high school GPA). Recall the program only
admits Dutch students, and so students with a different ethnicity than Dutch are either first- or second
generation immigrants. In the Dutch context, the categories European (81%, including Dutch), Arabic
(5%), and Asian (14%) are ex-ante most relevant.31
Similar to the strategy of Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006), we first form all possible pairs of
students who are observed to take course c in the second year of cohort t. Given Nct students this
procedure generates (Nct ×Nct − 1)/2 pairings of students.32 Let SecondY earTutorial(i, j)ct be
an indicator variable taking the value of one if both student i and j registered to the same second-year
tutorial group and zero otherwise. We define a similar set of indicator variables for each of the char-
acteristics listed above, taking the value of one if students i and j share that particular characteristic
and zero otherwise. We then run the following regression per block:
SecondY earTutorial(i, j)ct = pi0 + pi1SharedCharacteristic(i, j) + Cct + (i, j)ct (2.4)
pi1 captures the change in the probability of two students sharing the same tutorial group in second
year if they e.g. share the same gender. Equation (2.4) includes course-cohort fixed effects (Cct),
but, as the unit of observation is a student pair, it does not include other control variables. We cluster
standard errors based on a variable that takes upon unique values for every combination of first-year
tutorial groups of each student pair (i, j).
Table 2.11 reports the results per block of the second year.33 The last row reports the uncondi-
tional mean for the outcome variable, which is approximately 7 percent. The estimates for the shared
characteristics can be compared to this mean, which reflects the probability of any two students reg-
istering together, independent of shared characteristics.34
The results reveal four main patterns. First, the Close Peer Group coefficient indicates that only
some bonds from the close peer groups have remained up until the second year. The coefficient
in block 1 is 0.06, which indicates that sharing a close peer group increases the probability of co-
31We determine ethnicity using the surname-based classification algorithm NamePrism (Ye et al., 2017).
32This is done by crossing the relevant list of student numbers with itself, removing all duplicate pairs (i, i), and keeping
only one instance of the same pairing ((i, j) and (j, i)).
33Notice that the last year we observe is 2014-15, and we therefore do not observed the second-year tutorial registration
for the 2014 cohort.
34This unconditional mean coincides with our student-level data, where we observe roughly 200 students and 14 tutorials
of 14 students each per course-cohort combination. As such, there is roughly a probability of 1/14 of registering in the same
tutorial with any other student.
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registration by 6 percent. As any two students have a 7 percent probability to co-register, a student
registers together with 1 out of every 14 students. This becomes 2 out of 14 when the students
originate from the same close peer group. Though this coefficient is significantly different from 0, it
is far away from 1. This confirms the attendance results above and shows that by second year students
have sorted out of their close peer groups to a large extent.
Second, a comparison of the Close Peer Group and Distant Peer Group coefficients reveals that,
across blocks, the former is roughly 1.5 to 2 times larger than the later. The differences are statistically
significant (p-values<0.05) and provide further evidence that the close peer group meetings indeed
manipulated social proximity. Notice, however, that the Distant Peer Group estimates are also positive
and statistically significant. Thus, while distant peers remain less important than close peers, a student
is more likely to form bonds with her distant peers than with someone in a different first-year tutorial
group altogether. Based on the estimate from block 1 of 0.035, on average students co-register with
approximately 1 out of every 10 students from their distant peer group.
Third, Table 2.11 reveals that students sort into more homogeneous peer groups. Especially mi-
norities, such as Arabic and female students are significantly more likely to appear in the same tutorial
groups. The marginal effect of e.g. the coefficient for Both Arabic in block 2 indicates that two eth-
nically Arabic students are roughly 2 percentage points more likely to register together than e.g. an
ethnic Arab with any other student. The largest predictor of co-registration is having shared the same
high school, which increases the probability of being in the same second-year tutorial by roughly
8 percentage points across blocks. This supports our assumption that students seek to co-register
to tutorial groups with existing friends, and rejects an explanation where student clustering is ob-
served only due to shared preferences on the exact time at which the second-year tutorials are held.35
Comparing the coefficients of the shared characteristic with the baseline unconditional mean of the
outcome variable reveals that these effects are large. Sharing an Arabic ethnicity, or having shared
the same high school, increases the baseline probability to register for the same tutorial by 33 and 110
percent respectively.
35To this end, it is useful to note that across courses there are approximately two to three tutorial groups (of in total
fourteen) taught at identical times. Thus, students with similar preferences regarding tutorial times could still register in
different tutorial groups. We do not, however, observe the time of the second-year tutorial groups.
Table 2.11: Voluntary Sorting in Second-Year Tutorials (All Blocks)
Same Tutorial in Second Year? Yes (1) or No (0)
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Close Peer Group 0.0591∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0487∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0486∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0067)
Both Asian 0.0031 0.0029 0.0007 -0.0044 0.0127∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0055)
Both Arabic 0.0128 0.0227∗ 0.0258∗ 0.0578∗∗∗ 0.0273∗
(0.0108) (0.0119) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0160)
Both Europe 0.0043∗∗ 0.0044∗∗ 0.0020 0.0033 0.0056∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0023)
Both Female 0.0376∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0284∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0052)
Both Male 0.0010 0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0004
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0028)
Same High School 0.0844∗∗∗ 0.0867∗∗∗ 0.0884∗∗∗ 0.0912∗∗∗ 0.0886∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0072) (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0077)
Distant Peer Group 0.0350∗∗∗ 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.0385∗∗∗ 0.0342∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0067)
Both High GPA -0.0009 -0.0023 0.0034 0.0039∗ 0.0030
(0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0029)
Both Average GPA 0.0009 0.0030∗ 0.0015 -0.0017 0.0040
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0025)
Both Low GPA -0.0015 0.0000 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0038
(0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0061)
Unconditional Mean 0.0756∗∗∗ 0.0755∗∗∗ 0.0764∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0746∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Observations 229428 214691 218183 188896 106630
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects, other controls are excluded.
2. Block 5 has half the number of observations as one course does not have tutorials.
3. The unit of analysis is a student-pair. The outcome variable is one if both students in the pair
registered for the same tutorial and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are one if both
students in the pair share the given characteristic.
4. Models are estimated with Probit. Marginal effects are reported.
5. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered based on a variable that takes upon unique values
for every combination of first-year tutorial groups of each student pair.
6. Unconditional mean refers to the mean of the outcome variable in that particular block.
Standard error reported in parentheses.
7. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Fourth, the estimates for high school GPA reveal little to no co-registration of students with similar
ability. The small degree of ability clustering is in line with the findings of Marmaros and Sacerdote
(2006).36
2.7.4 Long-Term First-Year Bonds
Which characteristics determine the long-term bonds that persist from the first-year close peer group?
To investigate this, Table 2.12 shows results for a specification which includes interaction terms for
each shared characteristic and the indicator for shared first-year close peer group. It appears that long-
term first-year bonds are especially prevalent among close peers of the same gender; across the second
year a pair of female (male) close peers are roughly 5 (3.5) percentage points more likely to form a
long-term bond than a mixed gender pair. The estimates also reveal that long-term first-year bonds
do not seem to be based on ability, which is consistent with our evidence of little to no clustering by
ability presented above.
Note that in this specification the Close Peer Group coefficient provides a rare insight into the
degree to which friendship groups can be institutionally manipulated against the formation of ho-
mogeneous subgroups based on gender, ethnicity, and prior bonds. More specifically, the coefficient
measures the probability of co-registration among first-year close peers who share no observable
characteristics. While relatively large and statistically significant in the first two blocks, as the second
year progresses the coefficient diminishes in size and significance. This suggests that the manipulated
social proximity further decreases in the long-term among students who differ on a wide range of
characteristics.
Policy makers and university administrators in both the U.S. and Europe have recently empha-
sized the importance of diversity in higher education. Table 2.12 implies that the group intervention
mainly formed long-term bonds among students with similar characteristics and did little to promote
long-lasting diversity on campus. We cannot rule out, however, that a more sustained or focused
intervention would be more successful.
36We have performed a similar analysis for third-year course choice. The results of the regressions, per characteristic
and for the ten most popular courses, are presented visually in Appendix Figure A.2.5. The conclusions are threefold. First,
we find no evidence that close or distant peers choose the same courses in third year. Second, we find strong evidence of
third-year course clustering based on shared high school, gender, and ethnicity. Third, in contrast to our results with the
second-year tutorial registration, we find strong clustering based on ability. Taken together, this suggests that course choice
also captures that students with some characteristics have preferences for certain topics, rather than reflecting bonding. For
instance, high ability students sort into difficult courses.
Table 2.12: Characteristics of Long-Term First-Year Bonds (All Blocks)
Same Tutorial in Second Year? Yes (1) or No (0)
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Close Peer Group 0.0409∗∗∗ 0.0332∗∗∗ 0.0090 0.0190∗∗ 0.0129
(0.0107) (0.0093) (0.0095) (0.0091) (0.0115)
Both Asian × -0.0299 -0.0711∗ 0.0122 -0.0069 -0.0808∗∗
Close Peer Group (0.0242) (0.0387) (0.0236) (0.0262) (0.0399)
Both Arabic × 0.0034 -0.0264 0.0453 -0.0531 -0.0013
Close Peer Group (0.0407) (0.0530) (0.0563) (0.0693) (0.0688)
Both European × 0.0175∗ 0.0039 0.0116 0.0117 0.0028
Close Peer Group (0.0097) (0.0093) (0.0079) (0.0095) (0.0106)
Both Female × 0.0480∗∗∗ 0.0615∗∗∗ 0.0562∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗∗ 0.0536∗∗∗
Close Peer Group (0.0149) (0.0172) (0.0150) (0.0170) (0.0180)
Both Male × 0.0122 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0391∗∗∗ 0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0416∗∗∗
Close Peer Group (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0128)
Same High School × 0.0221 0.0377 0.0143 0.0239 0.0537
Close Peer Group (0.0254) (0.0289) (0.0324) (0.0316) (0.0343)
Both High GPA × -0.0175∗ -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0155 -0.0209∗
Close Peer Group (0.0089) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0116)
Both Average GPA × -0.0078 -0.0023 0.0061 0.0025 0.0254∗∗
Close Peer Group (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0102)
Both Low GPA × -0.0538∗∗ -0.0308 0.0089 -0.0209 -0.0046
Close Peer Group (0.0273) (0.0195) (0.0252) (0.0237) (0.0237)
Unconditional Mean 0.0756∗∗∗ 0.0755∗∗∗ 0.0764∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0746∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Observations 229428 214691 218183 188896 106630
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.008
Notes:
1. Table shows results of a regression including all observable shared characteristics as predictors
of shared second year tutorial, and with interactions between the shared characteristics and an
indicator for shared first year close-peer group. Only results of shared first year close-peer group
and the interaction terms shown.
2. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects, other controls are excluded.
3. Block 5 has half the number of observations as one course does not have tutorials.
4. The unit of analysis is a student-pair. The outcome variable is one if both students in the pair
registered for the same tutorial and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are one if both
students in the pair share the given characteristic.
5. Models are estimated with Probit. Marginal effects are reported.
6. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered based on a variable that takes upon unique values for
every combination of first-year tutorial groups of each student pair.
7. Unconditional mean refers to the mean of the outcome variable in that particular block. Stan-
dard error reported in parentheses.
8. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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2.7.5 Implications of Voluntary Sorting for Peer Effects
We have provided some evidence that the social proximity between close peers decreases during the
first year. In turn, we have shown that by second year students’ chosen peer groups hardly resemble
their first-year assigned groups; they prefer to become socially proximate with others based on shared
characteristics, such as gender and ethnicity. While we cannot know with certainty the reason that
academic spillovers from close peers vanished during the first year, the voluntary sorting behavior
provides an intuitive explanation. The social proximity between assigned close peers waned over
time, which might have led to the corresponding decline in spillovers.
Another result is that students do not appear to choose their peers based on whether they are ben-
eficial to their performance at university. We find no evidence of sizable sorting by ability and close
peers that stay together do not appear to base this choice on high school GPA. For instance, we do not
find evidence that high (low) ability students sort into (out of) study partnerships with other high (low)
ability students, though according to our peer effect estimates this would be academically beneficial.
This stands in stark contrast to sorting based on other characteristics. Students are seemingly willing
to trade off potentially higher grades in order to satisfy other preferences when choosing peers. Con-
sistent with this, column (6) of Appendix Table A.2.13 shows that second-year chosen tutorial peers
do not generate spillovers on student performance in second year.37
This might have further implications for group assignment policies. Policy makers may hope that
targeted students would form new friendships with academically beneficial peers, thereby enjoying
persistent peer effects despite sorting away from their assigned peers. Apparently this is not the case.
2.8 Conclusion
The promise of the peer effects literature is that simply reorganizing students among classes could
increase overall student performance. Despite an abundance of papers aiming to properly identify
spillovers, the literature has not yet delivered on this promise. A primary reason for this is our
inability to understand the channels at work behind the various reduced-form estimates.
Our first set of results address this shortcoming. We focus on first-year student performance
across six cohorts of economics undergraduate students at a large public university in the Netherlands.
Students are randomly assigned to a tutorial group and one of two subgroups within their tutorial
group. We take advantage of a university policy that stimulates social proximity within, and not
between, these subgroups via a series of informal meetings at the start of the first year. We find the
37Column (6) of Appendix Table A.2.13 shows that high school GPA of second-year chosen tutorial peers, while being
instrumented with first-year assigned close peer GPA, has an insignificant effect on second-year grades.
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existence of spillovers on student performance that originate from students’ socially proximate peers
only. This implies that social proximity between peers, and the corresponding meaningful social
interactions, are the driving force behind peer effects. Supplementary data suggests that these social
interactions involve collaborative studying outside of class that occurs at university. Our non-linear
estimates imply that alternative group assignment policies may result in aggregate, but not Pareto,
improvements in performance.
The second part of this paper investigates the implications of voluntary sorting for group assign-
ment policies. Given that peer effects arise due to social proximity, who students choose to become
socially proximity with and how this evolves over time is crucially important. We first document
that peer effects from assigned close peers diminish over time, and are completely absent by the end
of first year. Using administrative data on daily tutorial attendance in first year and tutorial choice
in second year we find that students increasingly sort out of their assigned close peer group into
more homogeneous groups. This voluntary sorting behavior foreshadows, and we argue provides an
intuitive explanation for, the short-lived spillovers on student performance.
Similar to our analysis in Section 2.5, some researchers have used their reduced-form estimates
on student performance to predict the effects of alternative group assignment policies (Booij et al.,
2017) or to estimate the effects of optimal group assignment policies (Carrell et al., 2013). Such a
practice usually assumes that there are no costs accompanying these effects. As our results imply that
spillovers work solely through improving the productivity of (collaborative) self study, rather than
through increasing teacher effort or decreasing leisure time, this assumption may be justifiable.
2.A Appendix
Potential Explanations for the Decline in Peer Effects
Why do we observe that spillovers gradually diminish during, and become absent at the end of,
the first year? Two overarching factors that vary during the first year, and could potentially drive
the diminishing peer effect, are changes in the type of courses and dropout. Below we explore the
evidence for each of these competing explanations.
Changes in the content, structure, and other characteristics of the courses during the first year
could potentially drive the diminishing peer effect estimates. To explore this possibility, we look at
heterogeneity in peer effects by course type. Following the classification of the university we group
the ten first year courses into three categories: economics, business economics, and econometrics
courses (see Appendix Table A.2.1). Appendix Table A.2.11 replicates our baseline specification
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while including an interaction between close peer ability and an indicator for course type, where
economics courses are the baseline. The estimates reveal spillovers are statistically indistinguishable
between the different types of courses. Feld and Zo¨litz (2017) reach similar conclusions, also at a
public university in the Netherlands. In Lavy et al. (2012b) identification of peer effects is obtained
via individual fixed effects together with the assumption that spillovers are the same across English,
mathematics, and science courses. Note that Appendix Table A.2.11 does reveal the estimate of own
high school GPA differs for the different types of courses. It appears that the returns to peer ability
are disconnected from the returns to students’ own ability.
It may be that the nature of the tutorial sessions changes from course to course, and that this has
consequences for the existence of peer effects. Appendix Table A.2.1 reveals that the nature of the
tutorial sessions is unrelated to the presence of peer effects. For example, tutorial descriptions are
identical in Accounting and Microeconomics situated in block 1 and 2 and Marketing and Organisa-
tion & Strategy situated in block 4 and 5, while spillovers are only found in the former courses.
If courses get progressively easier during the first year, then the potential for peers to improve
students grades could also diminish. To investigate this possibility Appendix Figure A.2.6 displays
the coefficients on own and peer high school GPA per block, separately for small and big courses.
Apart from a drop for the estimate on own high school GPA in block 4 for the big course (Marketing),
the estimate for own GPA does not show a diminishing pattern across blocks. For instance, from block
2 to 3 this coefficient slightly increases, whereas the estimate for peer high school GPA decreases.
Note that this evidence coincides with the results in Appendix Table A.2.11, where the returns to peer
GPA were detached from the returns to own GPA. Based on the three pieces of evidence presented
above, we conclude changes in course type is an unlikely explanation for the diminishing peer effects.
A second potential explanation of diminishing peer effects is dropout. Indeed, Appendix Fig-
ure A.2.4 shows that dropout gradually increases as the blocks progress. Dropout could potentially
reduce our peer effects estimates for at least two reasons; dropouts might be more responsive to peer
high school GPA, and dropouts change the composition of the actual peer group for the remaining
students. To investigate whether dropout interacts with the decline in peer spillovers, we repeat our
robustness analysis of Section 2.5.4 and interact peer GPA with the number of course dropouts per
close peer group for blocks 1 to 3 and block 4 to 5 separately. The results are presented in Appendix
Table A.2.12. The estimates for close peer GPA imply that the decline in spillovers is present even in
groups that did not experience any course dropout.
A consequence of dropout is that high school GPA of the initial close peer group becomes a
worse measure of the actual ability of close peers. We overcome this potential problem by using an
instrumental variable approach. For each student, per course, we calculate the average close peer
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GPA of only those close peers who are also observed to write the final exam for the course. We then
repeat the regression of close peer GPA on first-year grades per block, while instrumenting the actual
close peer GPA with the initially assigned close peer GPA. The first and second stage results of these
regressions are presented in Appendix Table A.2.13. Panel A shows that assigned peer GPA is a strong
instrument for actual peer GPA throughout the first year. Panel B shows that the decline in spillovers
remains when using the variation in actual close peer GPA that originates from the assigned close peer
GPA. From these results, we conclude that dropout is unlikely to be responsible for the diminishing
peer effects during the first year.
Finally, Appendix Table A.2.14 repeats the analysis on lecture attendance and total study time
for blocks 1 to 3 and blocks 4 to 5 separately. The negative estimate for close peer GPA on lecture
attendance is only present in blocks 1 to 3. This suggests that the channel put forward in Section 2.6
- collaborative self study - is only present in the period for which we find significant peer effects.
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Table A.2.2: Overview of Categories and Questions in Course Evaluations
Question Measurement Category Std.?
scale
Objectives of course are clear 1-5 General
Course is relevant for my studies 1-5 General Yes
Course is interesting 1-5 General
Course is well organized 1-5 Structure Yes
Course material is understandable 1-5 Structure
Can be completed within allocated study points 1-5 Fairness
Time needed to complete exam is enough 1-5 Fairness Yes
Exam reflects course content 1-5 Fairness
Exam questions are clearly defined 1-5 Fairness
Total study time (lectures+tutorials+self study) 1-10 Total study time No
Have you attended lectures? 0-1 Lecture attendance No
Lectures are useful 1-5 Lectures useful Yes
Tutorials are useful 1-5 Tutorials useful Yes
Lecturer is competent 1-5 Quality lecturer(s)
Lecturer makes you enthusiastic 1-5 Quality lecturer(s) Yes
Lecturer can be easily contacted 1-5 Quality lecturer(s)
Lecturer provides sufficient assistance 1-5 Quality lecturer(s)
TA gives good tutorials 1-5 Quality TA
TA can be easily contacted 1-5 Quality TA Yes
TA provides sufficient assistance 1-5 Quality TA
Notes: Questions are measured on a Likert scale, where 1 equals strongly disagree and 5 equals strongly agree,
with the two exceptions being total study time (1 being 0 hours, 2 being [1− 5] hours, 3 being [6− 10] hours and
10 being≥ 40 hours) and lecture attendance (1 being yes and 0 being no). We take the mean for questions within
a category, ignoring potential missing values within a category. Std. refers to whether the (mean of a) category
was standardized before the analysis.
Figure A.2.1: Histograms of High School GPA (Unstandardized)
(a) Own High School GPA (Left) and Tutorial Peer High School GPA (Right)
(b) Close Peer High School GPA (Left) and Distant Peer High School GPA (Right)
Notes:
1. Figure shows histograms of student’s own high school GPA, the leave-out mean for the tutorial- and close peer
group, and the mean for the distant peer group.
2. In contrast to the leave-out mean for the close peer group, the mean for the distant peer group takes upon identical
values for everybody in the same subgroup. This explains the somewhat more discrete nature of this figure. A
histogram of the leave-in mean for the close peer group is similar to the mean for the distant peer group, where it
would only change the peer-effects estimate on close peer high school GPA by a factor of Ng/(Ng − 1), where Ng
is the size of close peer group g (Angrist, 2014).
Table A.2.3: Balancing Tests for Background Characteristics
Student Gender Age Distance to High School
Number University GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Close Peer Group 1 855.7164 0.0117 -0.7190 -5.8792 0.1693
(3904.3123) (0.1363) (0.4737) (9.0781) (0.1668)
Close Peer Group 2 1578.1608 0.0117 -0.1796 -2.5438 0.0331
(3904.3123) (0.1363) (0.4737) (9.0781) (0.1668)
Close Peer Group 3 -2206.2697 -0.0855 -0.3141 -7.1964 0.0785
(4027.6709) (0.1406) (0.4887) (9.3649) (0.1721)
Close Peer Group 4 2209.5719 -0.0772 -0.5452 -3.3456 0.0247
(4099.9048) (0.1431) (0.4975) (9.5329) (0.1752)
Close Peer Group 5 683.0497 0.0117 0.4360 13.8007 -0.0804
(3904.3123) (0.1363) (0.4737) (9.0781) (0.1668)
Close Peer Group 6 257.0553 -0.1105 1.0621∗∗ -1.9330 0.2936∗
(3802.7454) (0.1327) (0.4614) (8.8419) (0.1625)
Close Peer Group 7 -598.4830 0.0248 -0.3997 -1.4188 0.2320
(3962.8418) (0.1383) (0.4808) (9.2142) (0.1693)
Close Peer Group 8 2902.1579 -0.0000 -0.5621 1.2335 0.3371∗∗
(3851.1900) (0.1344) (0.4673) (8.9546) (0.1646)
Close Peer Group 9 1121.8830 0.0117 -0.6279 0.0155 0.2005
(3904.3123) (0.1363) (0.4737) (9.0781) (0.1668)
...
...
...
...
...
Observations 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296
Adjusted R2 0.832 -0.013 -0.005 -0.003 0.001
F-test 0.75 0.85 0.93 0.87 0.94
p-value 0.993 0.921 0.728 0.878 0.687
Notes:
1. Regressions include cohort fixed effects and dummies for the close peer group. No further controls are
included.
2. The dependent variable is shown at the top of each column.
3. The F-test, and corresponding p-value, refer to a test for the joint insignificance of the close peer group
dummies. It tests whether a large model with both cohort dummies and close peer group dummies can
explain the background characteristics better than a small model with only cohort dummies.
4. Standard errors in parentheses.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Figure A.2.2: Histograms of p-values of Balancing Tests
(a) p-values of Close Peer Group Dummies
(b) p-values of Tutorial Group Dummies
Notes:
1. Figures display histograms of the p-values of group dummies that
originate from regressions where student characteristics are ex-
plained by group dummies.
2. The regressions were estimated for all student characteristics (stu-
dent number, gender, age, distance to university, and high school
GPA) separately for each cohort. The histograms include the p-
values of all years and student characteristics combined.
Table A.2.4: Balancing Tests for TA Characteristics
Is TA a PhD? Is TA Female?
Yes (1) or No (0)
(1) (2)
Tutorial Peer GPA -0.0041 -0.0148
(0.0120) (0.0199)
Own GPA 0.0005 -0.0042
(0.0024) (0.0036)
Observations 17535 6921
Adjusted R2 0.254 0.345
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and con-
trols; student number, gender, age, and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA
for the tutorial peers. Own GPA refers to own high school
GPA. Both GPA measures are standardized.
3. Despite the two binary outcomes, we estimate the models
with OLS. In some cases the course-cohort dummies predict
the outcome variable perfectly, which means the Probit esti-
mates for these dummies must be (minus) infinity.
4. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial
level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.2.5: Randomization Inference and Exact p-values
Simulated Mean (SD) Estimated Value Exact p-value
Panel A: Separate Models
Tutorial Peer GPA -0.0002 (0.0128) 0.0191 0.1387
Close Peer GPA -0.0001 (0.0123) 0.0255 0.0392
Distant Peer GPA -0.0002 (0.0123) 0.0034 0.7852
Panel B: Simultaneous Model
Close Peer GPA -0.0001 (0.0123) 0.0254 0.0408
Distant Peer GPA -0.0002 (0.0123) 0.0008 0.9489
Panel C: Simultaneous Model with Interaction
Close Peer GPA -0.00003 (0.0124) 0.0256 0.0412
Distant Peer GPA -0.0002 (0.0124) 0.0010 0.9341
Close × Distant -0.00003 (0.0126) 0.0150 0.2326
Peer GPA
Notes:
1. Table summarizes the results of a randomization inference analysis of our baseline results
presented in Table 2.3, in which we re-draw 10,000 alternative close- and tutorial peer group
assignments. The table presents the mean and standard deviation of the coefficients under the
10,000 re-draws, the coefficient values under the actual assignment, and the exact p-value based
on the randomization inference.
2. Panel A displays the results for models in which the peer GPA measures have been included
separately. Panel B displays the results for a model in which the close and distant peer GPA
measures have been included simultaneously. Panel C shows the results for a model in which
the close and distant peer GPA measures, as well as their interaction, have been included si-
multaneously. Panels A, B and C correspond to columns (1) to (3), (4) and (5) of Panel A of
Table 2.3, respectively.
3. The exact p-value shows the proportion of coefficients under the 10,000 re-draws for which
a value at least as extreme as the actual value is observed.
Figure A.2.3: Histograms of Estimates Under 10,000 Group Assignment Re-draws
(a) Close Peer GPA (Left) and Distant Peer GPA (Right) on First Year Grades, Separate Models
(b) Close Peer GPA (Left) and Distant Peer GPA (Right) on First Year Grades, Simultaneous Model
Notes:
1. Figures show histograms of the estimates of close and distant peer GPA on first-year grades under 10,000 alternative
group assignments.
2. Top figures (a) show results for models in which the peer GPA measures have been included separately. Bottom
figures (b) show results for a model in which peer GPA measures have been included simultaneously.
3. Red dashed lines indicate the observed estimate under the actual assignment.
Table A.2.6: Peer Effects on First-Year Tutorial Attendance
Attendance (% Tutorials Attended; Standardized)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tutorial Peer GPA -0.0122
(0.0176)
Close Peer GPA -0.0030 -0.0017 -0.0016
(0.0131) (0.0123) (0.0121)
Distant Peer GPA -0.0128 -0.0126 -0.0124
(0.0149) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Close × Distant -0.0146
Peer GPA (0.0189)
Own GPA 0.0378∗∗∗ 0.0377∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0380∗∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0092)
Observations 18445 18445 18445 18445 18445
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.123
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number, gender, age,
and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the tutorial- and close peers, and
to the mean for distant peers. Own GPA refers to own high school GPA. All GPA measures are
standardized. The outcome variable is the standardized percentage of tutorials attended per course.
3. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
4. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Figure A.2.4: Course Dropout per Block
Notes:
1. This figure plots the number of students writing the final exam as a fraction of the ini-
tial students per block, separately for high, average, and low GPA close peer groups.
2. Low and high ability groups are in the bottom and top quartiles of close peer high
school GPA. The average group refers to the middle 50 percent.
Table A.2.7: Balancing Tests for Non-linear Peer Ability
Close Peer Group Distant Peer Group
Share Low Share Avg Share High Share Low Share Avg Share High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Student Number 0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0010 0.0031 -0.0076 0.0045
(0.0050) (0.0071) (0.0064) (0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0052)
Female 0.0027 -0.0056 0.0029 0.0105∗∗ -0.0085 -0.0021
(0.0059) (0.0074) (0.0059) (0.0048) (0.0067) (0.0063)
Age -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0025 0.0018
(0.0027) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0022)
Distance to 0.0025 -0.0027 0.0002 0.0029 -0.0019 -0.0010
University (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0021)
Own GPA 0.0058∗∗ -0.0050 -0.0008 -0.0032 0.0037 -0.0006
(0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0029)
Observations 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.071 0.070 0.073 0.086 0.093
F-test 1.61 0.87 0.10 1.44 0.92 0.18
p-value 0.154 0.502 0.992 0.207 0.468 0.972
Notes:
1. All regressions also include cohort fixed effects.
2. The outcome variables are the (leave-out) proportion of low, middle, and high ability students separately for close
and distant peer groups. Low and high ability students are defined as students in the bottom and top quartiles of high
school GPA across the six cohorts, the remaining 50 percent is referred to as average ability. The dependent variables
are unstandardized, where the independent variables are standardized except for the female dummy.
3. The F-test, and corresponding p-value, refer to a test for the joint significance of all the independent variables shown
in the table.
4. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.2.8: Peer Effects on Perceptions of Course using Course Evaluations
Completed the General Structure Fairness
Evaluation?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Close Peer GPA 0.0021 -0.0198 -0.0327 -0.0244
(0.0084) (0.0183) (0.0254) (0.0179)
Own GPA 0.0494∗∗∗ 0.0620∗∗∗ 0.0657∗∗∗ 0.1087∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0151) (0.0171) (0.0165)
Observations 18736 3352 3352 3352
R2 0.058 0.156 0.147 0.272
Binary Outcome Yes No No No
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number,
gender, age, and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the close peer group.
Own GPA refers to own high school GPA. Both GPA measures are standardized.
3. The dependent variable in column (1) equals one if the student completed the course
evaluation and zero otherwise. The dependent variables in column (2) until (4) are the
means of the answers to questions that embody the course characteristic showed in the
top of the column. The dependent variables in column (2) until (4) are standardized.
4. Column (1) is estimated with Probit, the other columns with OLS. Marginal effects
are reported. The R2 refers to the Pseudo and Adjusted R2 respectively.
5. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.2.9: Peer Effects for Distant Peers per Block
Grades (Standardized)
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distant Peer GPA -0.0159 -0.0014 0.0167 0.0064 0.0180
(0.0199) (0.0179) (0.0168) (0.0147) (0.0184)
Own GPA 0.4133∗∗∗ 0.3442∗∗∗ 0.3836∗∗∗ 0.2534∗∗∗ 0.3021∗∗∗
(0.0159) (0.0143) (0.0176) (0.0151) (0.0158)
Observations 4271 4024 3650 3462 3329
Adjusted R2 0.279 0.473 0.263 0.191 0.301
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number, gender, age,
and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the mean of high school GPA for the distant peer group. Own GPA refers
to own high school GPA. Both GPA measures are standardized.
3. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
4. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.2.10: Coordination of First-Year Tutorial Attendance
Attended Tutorial? Yes (1) or No (0)
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Attendance Close Peers 0.3690∗∗∗ 0.4089∗∗∗ 0.2598∗∗∗ 0.2890∗∗∗ 0.3007∗∗∗
(0.0355) (0.0573) (0.0345) (0.0258) (0.0310)
Mean Attendance Distant Peers 0.2956∗∗∗ 0.2326∗∗∗ 0.2647∗∗∗ 0.2247∗∗∗ 0.2293∗∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0510) (0.0350) (0.0295) (0.0285)
Observations 40321 40045 32920 33882 19654
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.086 0.136 0.059 0.060
p-value Block t = (t− 1) Close 0.556 0.028 0.486 0.776
p-value Block t = (t− 1) Distant 0.287 0.578 0.335 0.908
p-value Close = Distant 0.173 0.078 0.889 0.107 0.133
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-tutorial fixed effects and controls; student number, gender, age, and distance to
university.
2. Mean attendance refers to leave-out mean attendance per tutorial session for close peers and to the mean attendance
per tutorial session for distant peers. The unit of analysis is on the student-tutorial-course level.
3. Block 5 contains somewhat less observations because the big course has 6 tutorials (one every week) instead of 13
to 14 tutorials (two every week).
4. The p-value “Block t = (t − 1)” refers to a test for the equality of coefficients between adjacent blocks for close
and distant peers separately. The p-value “Close = Distant” tests the equality of the coefficients between close and
distant peers within a block.
5. The outcome is a binary variable, where the regressions are estimated with OLS. Our goal is to detect coordination
in first-year attendance by relating the attendance of a student to her peers, we do not aim to estimate a causal peer
effects regression. Probit estimates, and corresponding marginal effects, show qualitatively similar results.
6. Standard errors for the coefficients in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
7. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Figure A.2.5: Voluntary Sorting in Third-Year Courses
Notes:
1. Figures display marginal effects and 90% confidence intervals of a Probit model that explains whether a student pair
enrolled in the same course with their shared characteristics (e.g. both students in the pair are female).
2. The models are identical to the ones displayed in Table 2.11, only the binary outcome variable in this model is equal
to one if a student pair enrolled in the same course and zero otherwise.
3. Significant marginal effects are made bold.
Table A.2.11: Peer Effects by Course Type
Grades (Standardized)
(1)
Close Peer GPA 0.0205∗
(0.0115)
Business Economics × Peer GPA 0.0002
(0.0116)
Econometrics × Peer GPA 0.0120
(0.0147)
Own GPA 0.3712∗∗∗
(0.0136)
Business Economics × Own GPA -0.0535∗∗∗
(0.0115)
Econometrics × Own GPA -0.0292∗∗
(0.0123)
Observations 18736
Adjusted R2 0.323
Notes:
1. The regression includes course-cohort fixed effects and controls;
student number, gender, age, and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the
close peer group. Own GPA refers to own high school GPA. Both GPA
measures are standardized.
3. The dummy business economics is one for business-economics
courses and the dummy econometrics is one for econometrics courses.
The baseline consists of economics courses. Appendix Table A.2.1
shows which courses belong to which category.
4. The course dummies are not included as separate variables as they
are a linear combination of the course-cohort dummies.
5. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Figure A.2.6: Effect of Peer GPA and Own GPA per Block
Notes:
1. Top graph shows the point estimates of close peer high school GPA on first year
grades per block for big (8 ECTS) and small (4 ECTS) courses separately, and the
corresponding 90% confidence intervals.
2. Bottom graph shows the point estimates of own high school GPA on first year grades
per block for big and small courses separately, and the corresponding 90% confidence
intervals.
Table A.2.12: Robustness of Peer Effects to Dropout Per Blocks
Grades (Standardized)
Block 1-3 Block 4-5
(1) (2)
Close Peer GPA 0.0514∗∗∗ 0.0007
(0.0162) (0.0203)
Peer GPA × (Assigned-Actual) -0.0092 0.0027
(0.0061) (0.0068)
Own GPA 0.3819∗∗∗ 0.2779∗∗∗
(0.0130) (0.0138)
Observations 11945 6791
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.257
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls;
student number, gender, age, and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the
close peer group. Own GPA refers to own high school GPA. Both
GPA measures are standardized.
3. The regressions include a measure for the difference between the
number of students at the beginning of the year in the close peer
group (assigned class size) and the number of students that wrote
the exam for the course per close peer group (actual class size). This
is a measure for course dropout and is not standardized.
4. The coefficient on close peer GPA measures spillovers in classes
where there has been no course dropout (assigned-actual=0).
5. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.2.13: Instrumental Variable Analysis. Assigned Peer GPA is used as an Instrument for Actual Peer GPA
First Year Second Year
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Actual Peer High School GPA (First Stage)
Assigned Close 0.8520∗∗∗ 0.8647∗∗∗ 0.8996∗∗∗ 0.8985∗∗∗ 0.9032∗∗∗ 0.0660∗∗∗
Peer GPA (0.0229) (0.0223) (0.0321) (0.0360) (0.0395) (0.0214)
Own GPA -0.0028 -0.0013 0.0006 0.0046 0.0043 0.0251∗
(0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0110) (0.0129) (0.0143) (0.0139)
Adjusted R2 0.918 0.865 0.801 0.745 0.723 0.166
F-test on 1386.07 1498.46 784.00 622.00 521.67 9.49
Excl. Instrument
Panel B: Grades (Standardized; Second Stage)
Actual Peer 0.0475∗∗ 0.0418∗∗ 0.0353∗∗ 0.0089 0.0069 0.1850
GPA (0.0205) (0.0165) (0.0162) (0.0149) (0.0196) (0.3411)
Own GPA 0.4140∗∗∗ 0.3451∗∗∗ 0.3849∗∗∗ 0.2537∗∗∗ 0.3026∗∗∗ 0.3091∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0144) (0.0176) (0.0150) (0.0158) (0.0203)
Observations 4271 4024 3650 3462 3329 10470
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.474 0.263 0.190 0.301 0.196
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number, gender, age, and distance to
university.
2. Own GPA refers to own high school GPA. All GPA measures are standardized.
3. In Panel A, the independent variable (Assigned Peer GPA) refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for
the close peer group at the start of the first block in first year. This variable is used as an instrument for Actual Peer
GPA, which is calculated on the course-cohort level and is equal to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the
close peer group in column (1) to (5) or for the tutorial peer group in column (6) while only taking into account the
students who wrote the final exam of that course.
4. Panel B shows the results for the second stage, where Actual Peer GPA is the independent variable and has been
instrumented with Assigned Peer GPA. The outcome variables are the standardized course grades for the first year
per block in column (1) to (5) and for the second year pooled in column (6).
5. The number of observations for the second year in column (6) is lower than the baseline results for the first year.
This is for three reasons; we do not observe the second-year grades of the 2014 cohort, students do not take all
second-year courses in their second year, and for a small percentage we do not observe second-year tutorial choice.
6. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
7. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.2.14: Peer Effects on Time Use per Blocks using Course Evaluations
Attended Lectures Total Study Time
Block 1-3 Block 4-5 Block 1-3 Block 4-5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Close Peer GPA -0.0223∗∗∗ -0.0072 -0.1239 -0.3454
(0.0083) (0.0112) (0.1922) (0.2989)
Own GPA -0.0118 -0.0176 -0.4963∗∗∗ -0.6343∗∗∗
(0.0098) (0.0124) (0.1730) (0.2050)
Observations 2995 1366 2995 1366
R2 0.192 0.048 0.297 0.204
Binary Outcome Yes Yes No No
Notes:
1. All regressions include course-cohort fixed effects and controls; student number,
gender, age, and distance to university.
2. Peer GPA refers to the leave-out mean of high school GPA for the close peer
group. Own GPA refers to own high school GPA. Both GPA measures are standard-
ized.
3. The dependent variable in column (1) and (2) is the answer to the question “Have
you attended lectures?”. The dependent variable in column (3) and (4) is the an-
swer to the question “Average study time (hours) for this course per week (lec-
tures+tutorials+self study)?” where we used the maximum for the interval to convert
the categories into hours.
4. Column (1) and (2) are estimated with Probit, column (3) and (4) with OLS.
Marginal effects are reported. The R2 refers to the Pseudo and Adjusted R2 respec-
tively.
5. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the tutorial level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

Chapter 3
The Price of Forced Attendance
Joint work with Sacha Kapoor and Dinand Webbink
3.1 Introduction
For many people their first real encounter with autonomy happens at college or university. Out from
under the roofs of their parents and high school teachers, how they manage their lives is now largely
up to them. Many students use their newfound autonomy to skip class, especially in the early years
of their undergraduate education, choosing instead to focus on extracurricular activities, such as stu-
dent government, watching March Madness, or chasing other young men and women. To combat the
rampant absenteeism this newfound autonomy begets,1 and because of the substantial returns to col-
lege performance and graduation (Oreopoulos and Petronijevic, 2013; Cunha, Karahan and Soares,
2011; Jones and Jackson, 1990), university administrators and instructors often mandate frequent and
regular class attendance among their students.23 These attendance policies provide students with
structure, helping them to circumvent behavioral predispositions towards non-academic activities,
and ultimately to avoid decisions that can be bad for their lifetime utility (Lavecchia, Liu and Ore-
opoulos, 2014). By this token, and as long as attendance is valuable, additional structure should be
good for academic performance. At the same time, however, additional structure constrains choices
(e.g. time on self study) which are important for grades and, by doing so, precludes sensible students
from choices that best serve their own self interest. This can be bad for academic performance.
1Student absenteeism can be upwards of 60 percent of classes (Romer, 1993; Kottasz et al., 2005; Desalegn, Berhan and
Berhan, 2014).
2An early discussion of mandatory attendance can be found in the correspondence section of the Journal of Economic
Perspectives in 1994 (Correspondence, 1994). Motivated by Romer (1993), it consists of short letters by economics profes-
sors detailing their use of mandatory attendance.
3American universities spend 33 percent of their total budget on student instruction. This amounts to 56.7 billion dol-
lars (for private nonprofit universities, years 2013-2014). Obtained via NCES: https://nces.ed.gov/programs/
digest/d15/tables/dt15_334.40.asp, retrieved on 15-02-2017.
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In this article we argue that additional structure is, in fact, bad for the performance of relatively
good students. To make this argument, we draw on a natural experiment at a large European Uni-
versity to estimate the causal effects of a full year of forced, frequent, and regular attendance. The
experiment requires students who average less than 7 (out of 10) in their first year to attend 70 per-
cent of tutorials in each of their second-year courses. It imposes heavy time costs on students, as they
can expect to spend 250 additional hours traveling and attending tutorials over a full academic year,
amounting to approximately 7 additional hours per week. Students who fail to meet the attendance
requirement face a stiff penalty, as they are not allowed to write the final exam for their course and
must wait a full academic year before they can take the course again. Because students have imprecise
control over their average grade in the first year, the experiment facilitates a regression discontinuity
design (Lee, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010) for identifying the various effects of forced attendance.
What does it mean to be forced? Our working definition is that a person is forced if a higher
authority unilaterally takes away some of their potential choices. Or, more formally, if the authority
imposes a heavy sometimes infinite penalty on a particular choice.4 The policy we study is well within
confines of this definition.5 The policy asks students to come to campus frequently and regularly,
choices which are normally under the purview of the student, and imposes a heavy penalty when they
fail to do so. In addition to fitting well with a natural definition for economists, students perceived the
policy as one where their attendance was forced, as this was how it was communicated to them by the
university. Our data supports the notion that attendance was forced, as below-7 students collectively
failed to meet the 70 percent criteria in less than one half of one percent of their courses. A more
severe penalty, death e.g., would have increased participation by less than half a percent, in other
words.
Our estimates imply that forced students can expect a GPA decrease of 0.20 standard deviations
over the remainder of their undergraduate degree. They can expect a decline of 0.15 standard devi-
ations in their second year, when their attendance is forced, and a decline of 0.25 deviations in their
third and last year, when they regain the right to decide their attendance. While the negative effects on
second and third year performance are marginally significant or insignificant at conventional levels,
we are able to rule out positive effects in the ranges of 0.05 and 0.1 standard deviations.
The average effect on second-year performance aggregates differential effects across all courses.
While the university required all students below 7 to attend 70 percent of tutorials in all their second-
4Our paper is about more than just the role of sticks versus carrots in university education. A stick is typically defined
as a penalty on performance, which itself is determined by choices and luck. Sticks constrain choices only implicitly, as the
decision maker still has the freedom to make “bad” choices, and can simply hope that good luck helps them avoid penalties
for poor performance.
5Our definition differs from the notion of labor coercion, which focuses on how physical force or the threat of it influ-
ences labor market institutions and outcomes.
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year courses, it had no policy on how students above 7 should be treated. Unsurprisingly, several
courses overlaid their own attendance initiatives onto the university policy, each differing in the in-
tensity of the attendance constraint they imposed on students who scored above 7 in first year. Some
courses penalized absenteeism by any student (absence-penalized courses), others strongly intimated
and explained why all students should attend (attendance-encouraged courses), while a third group
of courses followed the university policy and left the attendance decision up to above-7 students
(attendance-voluntary courses). We observe the same students in all three scenarios because students
have no discretion over course choice in second year.
The university policy had its largest effects in courses where attendance was voluntary for above-
7 students. In these attendance-voluntary courses, it increased attendance by more than 50 percent,
significantly decreased grades by 0.35 standard deviations, and significantly decreased the chances of
passing by more than 10 percentage points. Self reports of total study time suggest further that forced
students spend less time on non-academic activities such as leisure.
We delve into mechanisms behind the significant grade decreases in attendance-voluntary courses.
We argue that the university policy forces students to spend a substantial number of hours in a spe-
cific way, leaving them less time for other activities, including activities which are important for
grades. Grades decrease because the grade loss from spending less time on other academic activities
outweighs the grade gains from additional attendance. What we observe fits with a model where
students care about their grades and make informed decisions about their attendance. The latter is
reinforced by our complier analysis, which identifies the most affected students, and shows that the
largest policy effects are on the attendance of students who live far from campus or had a greater
propensity to miss tutorials in first year.
In addition to aggregating the differential effects across all courses, the average second-year ef-
fect aggregates spillovers across courses taken concurrently. Forced students have slightly lower
grades and passing rates in absence-penalized courses, even though they are not disadvantaged in
their attendance decisions, having the same attendance rates as above-7 students. We explain that
absence-penalized courses are always taken concurrently with a course where forced students are
at an attendance disadvantage, arguing in turn that the grade decreases are consistent with negative
spillovers from these courses. The spillovers, together with our results for activities other than at-
tendance (e.g. leisure), suggest that the policy effect on grades does not operate through attendance
alone.6
6We use all three courses, including the attendance-encouraged courses, to investigate other mechanisms, such as direct
policy effects on self-perception or identity or stigmatization by other students, general discontent with the policy itself,
negative peer effects, or course-level differences in the usefulness of tutorials. Our results imply these other mechanisms
are unimportant.
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The university policy was abolished in the last year of our sample. The abolition came as a
surprise, as students only learned of it after the start of their second year. We show there was no grade
difference near 7 for the abolition cohort. No grade difference for this cohort provides additional
evidence against differential sorting of forced students into second year. More generally, it helps us
rule out shocks other than the policy as drivers of worse performance just below the threshold. It also
helps us show our results are driven by worse performance among forced students rather than better
performance among above-7 students. Finally, it supports the presence of spillovers during years
when the policy was in place.
Our study contributes to an expanding literature on incentives in education. A good deal of
recent work analyzes the effects of interventions that reward students financially for “good” choices
or better academic performance (Angrist, Oreopoulos and Williams, 2014; Castleman, 2014; Cohodes
and Goodman, 2014; De Paola, Scoppa and Nistico, 2012; Leuven, Oosterbeek and van der Klaauw,
2010; Dynarski, 2008).7 We instead analyze the effect of an intervention which penalizes students
heavily for “bad” choices, where the penalty is in terms of time rather than money.
Our findings contribute to debates over the merits of mandatory attendance in higher education
(Romer, 1993).8 The argument for mandatory attendance is based on a robust positive correlation
between grades and attendance.9 The argument has been reinforced by studies showing positive
correlations between mandatory attendance and grades (see e.g. Marburger (2006) and Snyder et al.
(2014)). We estimate the causal effects of a large-scale mandatory attendance policy and find negative
effects.
One explanation for the discrepancy relates to the weight of the constraint imposed by the policy
we study. A hefty constraint, spanning a full academic year, makes a negative finding more plausible.
Another explanation relates to identification concerns in other studies. Previous research has relied
on either year-over-year comparisons of students from different cohorts, or a discontinuity that allo-
cates students to mandatory attendance later on in the same course. These strategies are problematic
because the estimated effects of mandatory attendance may instead be attributable to heterogeneity
across cohorts or students’ initial efforts to avoid mandatory attendance later on. Our context allows
for within-cohort comparisons and lets us deal with anticipation effects.
7For more comprehensive lists, at all levels of education, see Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos (2014) and Gneezy, Meier
and Rey-Biel (2011).
8Our study has an indirect link with the compulsory schooling literature (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Oreopoulos, 2007).
We also examine the effect of a policy that penalizes people for specific choices. We differ in that our focus is on attendance
at university, with steep and enforced penalties for absenteeism, and that we show that such policies can be very costly for
students.
9For some of the many examples, see Romer (1993), Durden and Ellis (1995), Kirby and McElroy (2003), Stanca
(2006), Lin and Chen (2006), Marburger (2001), Martins and Walker (2006), Chen and Lin (2008), and Latif and Miles
(2013).
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This article contributes, more generally, to debates over the role of structure in higher education
(Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos, 2014; Scott-Clayton, 2011). Arguments for additional structure
usually focus on student predispositions towards non-academic activities, emanating from behavioral
biases such as impatience, or imperfect information about behaviors that engender success at univer-
sity. Our findings imply structure is detrimental to students with a GPA of 7, as well as to students
with a GPA around 7 (Cerulli et al., 2017); above-average students at a prominent university in the
Netherlands. From this perspective, our contribution is in showing that the cost of structure in higher
education is lower academic performance among relatively good students.
3.2 Context
Our venue is the economics undergraduate program at a large public university in the Netherlands.
The economics program itself is large - in the 2013-14 academic year alone, the program saw an influx
of approximately 700 students. Students have no discretion over the courses they take in the first two
years of the program, as all students follow the same ten courses per year, covering basic economics,
business economics, and econometrics (See Table A.3.1 in the Appendix). Students have discretion
over their courses in third year and, in line with this, declare a minor and major specialization (e.g.
Accounting and Finance) which they can subsequently continue through to a Masters program.10 The
economics program is given in both Dutch and English. The only difference between the programs is
that the Dutch program has approximately 2.5 times more students.
Academic years are divided into five blocks, of eight weeks each (seven weeks of teaching and
one week of exams). First- and second-year students have one light and one heavy course in each
block, where they get four credits for the light course, and eight for the heavy course.11 Heavy
courses have three large-scale lectures per week, while light courses have two. Lecture attendance is
always voluntary. Heavy courses have two small-scale tutorials (≈ 30 students) per week, while light
courses have one. Lectures and tutorials both last for 1 hour and 45 minutes. Unlike lectures, but
much like what may be found in structured college programs, tutorials require preparation and active
participation of the student, via e.g. discussions of assignments and related materials.
Second year courses each have several time slots for tutorials and students can choose the one
they wish to attend. Students register for slots a few weeks before the block begins. At the time of
10The Dutch and North American systems differ in two important ways. First, majors are defined more narrowly, as
students decide to pursue economics, political science, sociology, and other social sciences before entering university.
Second, they do three rather than four years of bachelors before a Masters.
11In Europe study credits are denoted by ECTS, which is an abbreviation for European Transfer Credit System. This
is a common measure for student performance to accommodate the transfer of students and grades between European
Universities. One ECTS is supposed to be equivalent to roughly 28 hours of studying. 60 ECTS account for one year of
study.
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Completed GPA< 7 GPA ≥ 7
first year
Yes Forced Free
No Forced Forced
registration, students are unaware of the teaching assistant (TA) that will teach each tutorial group,
which are mostly senior-undergraduate and PhD students. Students cannot switch their tutorial group
after the registration period ends. All students must register for a tutorial, including the ones scored
above 7 in the first year. We observe for which group and at which time the student registered and can
evaluate whether there were systematic differences in registration patterns for forced and voluntary
students.
Grading is done on a scale that ranges from 1 to 10. Students fail a course if their grade is below
5.5. The average grade in the first year is weighted by the amount of credits the student gets for
completing the course.
3.2.1 University Policy
Second-year students must attend 70 percent of tutorials for all of their second-year courses if they:
1. had an average grade (weighted by course credits) of less than 7 in first year;
2. failed at least one of their 10 first year courses.12
The table summarizes the students who had to comply with the policy. Students were not allowed to
write the final exam and had to wait a full year before retaking the course if they failed to fulfill the
70 percent attendance requirement.
Our analysis focuses on the sample of students who completed the first year on time because first
year completion rates for students around the cutoff is 92 percent.13 In this our primary estimation
sample, the mean and standard deviation of first-year GPA are 6.99 and 0.70. The analogues in the un-
restricted sample are 6.65 and 0.79. The means imply that the university policy assigns above-average
students to forced attendance and, because the university is one of the more prominent universities in
the Netherlands, that our findings apply to populations of relatively good students.
12Courses are grouped (Table A.3.1) such that a student can compensate a failing grade of between 4.5 and 5.4 from one
course with a passing grade from another. This applies to all students, whether they are above or below the threshold of 7.
A student who receives an 8 in microeconomics and 4.5 in macroeconomics can, in effect, take 1 point from their micro
grade and use it towards their macro grade.
13In principle, one could estimate a local difference-in-difference, comparing changes in the grades of these students,
around the cutoff, with changes in the grades of students who did not complete the first year. We did not do this because
completion rates were so high near seven.
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The policy imposes sizeable time costs on students. Forced students must spend 26 hours per
block (3.5 hours per week) in tutorials.14 Once we account for the travel time of the average student,
about 45 minutes each way,15 forced students must spend 50 hours per block traveling to and attending
tutorials.16 All costs are in terms of time rather than money because student travel is fully subsidized
in the Netherlands.
Students were made aware of the policy in their first year. Incoming students are assigned to
tutors who, among other things, explain the policy to them. Student awareness facilitates adjustments
in anticipation of forced attendance in the second year. As we explain later, our identification strategy
is robust to anticipation effects as long as the average grade in first year is somewhat outside the
student’s control.
The introduction of the policy had nothing to do with the historical grade distribution of first-year
students. The policy was introduced as part of a university-wide initiative to personalize education
via small-scale tutorials. The initiative came about for three reasons: (i) the university had grown to
a scale that made education impersonal; (ii) tutorials encourage active participation; (iii) the tutorials
facilitate student involvement in the university community. Forced attendance was made part of the
initiative to ensure a return on the university’s sizeable investment in small-scale tutorials.
3.2.2 Course Policies
While the university forced the attendance of all below-7 students in all their second-year courses,
courses differed in how they dealt with above-7 students. Table 3.1 provides a detailed overview on
the courses and, in particular, on how they dealt with these students. Attendance was voluntary in two
of the courses. Three courses strongly encouraged these students to attend. Three courses penalized
them, and in fact also the below-7 students, for not attending. In this last set of courses, students had
to complete assignments at the tutorials that made up five to thirty percent of their final grade. By not
attending, students received a zero on this part of the course, meaning that at most they could obtain
a 7 to 9.5 (rather than 10). The remaining two courses had no tutorials, and the final grade (mostly)
consist of writing a research report in groups. Accordingly, these two courses are excluded from our
analysis.17
14This is based on the fact that there are 3 tutorials of 1.75 hour per week, 7 non-exam weeks in a block, and that students
must attend 70 percent of tutorials.
15The average student lives 22.9 kilometers from campus. From the Dutch student survey “Studenten Monitor” we ob-
serve that more than 70 percent of university students travel by public transport (http://www.studentenmonitor.
nl/). To get an idea of the travel time, we used the Dutch public transport website (http://9292.nl/) to check travel
times between the university and the few larger cities within a radius of 20 and 30 kilometers of the university.
1650 hours is a lower bound, as it ignores the preparation time for active participation in tutorials.
17There is no difference in grades near 7 for these two courses. Note that they do not provide credible placebo tests as
final grades are largely determined via group work.
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Note that because second-year students have no discretion over course choice, the pool of treated
(and control) students is the same across the three types of courses. The lack of choice leaves no
room for differential selection of voluntary students into one type of course or another.18 Ultimately,
the course policies provide us with three counterfactuals: the grades of students whose attendance is
voluntary, strongly-encouraged, and penalized. The three counterfactuals help us sort through various
mechanisms which can generate and foster a relationship between forced attendance and academic
performance.
3.2.3 Abolition
The policy lasted five years, starting in 2009-10 and ending 2013-14. Thus, the 2008-09 cohort was
the first to be subjected to the policy in their second year, while the 2012-13 cohort was the last. The
policy was abolished in 2014-15 because the student body and faculty, rightfully, as this paper shows,
lobbied against it. The abolition came as a surprise to the 2013-14 cohort, as they were only made
aware of it after their second-year had started, in the first block of the academic year 2014-15. They
had the same incentive to score above 7 in first year as earlier cohorts, even though below-7 students
were ultimately given discretion over their attendance in second year.
3.3 Data
Our main information source is the administrative data of the university. Our sample ranges from the
2008-09 academic year until 2014-15. We observe grades at the level of the student for all three of
their undergraduate years, tutorial attendance for the first two years, course evaluations, and various
personal characteristics. After restricting the sample to be within 0.5 grade points of 7, our main
estimation sample, we have 5000 course-student observations based on more than 700 students.
The university uses attendance lists to track the attendance of students at tutorials. Students must
sign in and teaching assistants must upload the attendance data to the university’s online portal. The
uploaded data is then used by the exam administration to verify that the attendance requirement is
met.19
Our attendance variable is the percentage of tutorials the student attends (per course). It was
measured quite accurately because teaching assistants were tasked with preventing fraudulent sign-
18Table 3.1 also shows multiple choice questions are used on the exams of all but one course. This precludes TAs from
having a direct effect on grades.
19While matching attendance with the administrative data (e.g. grades and demographics), we experienced a match rate
of 93 percent (in our main sample). We compared the matched observations with the non-matched observations and find
that: (i) grades do not differ between the two groups; (ii) the treatment effect on grades is not different between the two
groups; (iii) scoring below a seven in the first year could not explain whether or not a record is matched (See Table A.3.2
in the Appendix). Therefore we work with this 93-percent sample throughout the paper.
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ins, as instructors required them to count the number of students present. The attendance statistics
for voluntary students reinforces this point. On average these students attend tutorials 55 percent of
the time. We can show that they also attend roughly 55 percent of their lectures. The match between
tutorial and lecture attendance, together with the idea that students incur sunk costs of visiting campus,
suggests that tutorial attendance is measured accurately.
Our data includes information from course evaluations. One week before the exam, students are
invited by email to anonymously evaluate the course online at the university portal. They are reminded
of the evaluations shortly after the exam. All evaluations contain the same set of 21 core questions,
which are grouped into the general opinion of the course, structure, fairness, quality of lecturer and
tutor, and usefulness of the lectures. Importantly, students are asked about their attendance at lectures,
as well as the time they spend on their studies in total. Together with the data on tutorial attendance,
we can infer how students adjust their time use between classes and studying on their own in response
to forced attendance.20 Note that the evaluations are filled out by 20 percent of the students. Later we
will show that the response rate is the same just to the left and right of a first-year GPA of 7.
Our data on the personal characteristics of students includes information on their gender, age,
distance from their residence to the university (in kilometers), and whether they are from the European
Economic Area (EEA).21 For Dutch students we also have information on their performance in high
school. Their grade for each of their high school courses is a 50-50 weighted average of the grade
they earned in the course and the grade they earned on a nationwide exam for that course.
3.3.1 Basic Descriptives
Table 3.2 provides a basic summary of the data. The table compares students with an average first-
year grade between 6.5 and 7 to students whose average grade was between 7 and 7.5. The unit of
observation in the top panel is the student-course combination. The unit of observation in the bottom
panel is the student. Second-year grades are measured in standard deviations.
The top panel shows forced students score 0.42 standard deviations worse than their peers. This
is despite the fact that they attend tutorials 14 percentage points more of the time. The bottom panel
implies students on one side of the cutoff are roughly similar to students on the other. The main
difference being that poor performing students are likely to be over-represented to the left of 7 as
visualized by their GPA in high school. Accordingly, we will account for this in our more flexible
regression specifications by focusing on changes near 7.
20For comprehensive details of the course evaluations see Table A.3.3 in the Appendix.
21Tuition fees are based on the student’s EEA classification. Students who enroll in 2017-18, for example, pay e2,006 if
they are from inside the EEA and e8,900 if not.
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Table 3.2: Basic Descriptives (All 8 Eligible Courses)
Grade Range
[6.5-7) [7-7.5]
Course level (second year)
Observations 2610 2291
Grade (s.d.) -0.23 ∗∗∗ 0.19
Attendance tutorials 0.90 ∗∗∗ 0.76
Student level
Observations 386 331
Distance to university (km) 24.13 22.04
Age 20.28 20.23
Gender (1=female) 0.30 0.31
European Economic Area (1=yes) 0.93 0.93
High-School Grade (s.d.) -0.10 ∗∗∗ 0.12
Notes:
1. Each high-school grade is a 50-50 weighted average of the grade the
high school assigned and the grade the student received on a national
exam for the course.
2. s.d. denotes measurement in standard deviations.
3. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4. Stars denote the statistical significance for the difference in means,
standard errors are clustered on the student level.
3.3.2 Preview of Baseline Results
The leftmost column of Figure 3.1 examines the effect on attendance for the three types of courses. In
courses where above-7 students were given the option to attend, the difference in attendance between
students above and below 7 was more than 30 percentage points. This translates into five extra tuto-
rials for an eight credits course (three for a four credit course), or about 13 hours of extra schooling
per block. In courses where the above-7 students were encouraged to attend, the difference was 12
percentage points. There was no attendance difference in courses that had their own penalty for being
absent.
The middle column of Figure 3.1 examines the unconditional effect on grades. In courses where
above-7 students had the option to attend, grades decreased by 0.35 of a standard deviation. In the
other courses the effect on grades is a statistical zero. A grade comparison for attendance-voluntary
and attendance-encouraged courses suggests that grades might only decrease if the additional time
constraint is severe.
The figure at the bottom of the middle column shows a small grade decrease in absence-penalized
courses. Although this grade difference across the cutoff is small and statistically insignificant, it
appears to be puzzling at first sight as there is no attendance difference in these courses. Section 3.6
presents evidence against the decrease reflecting a direct effect of the university policy on grades
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Figure 3.1: Second Year Attendance and Grades, by Course Type. The Left and Middle Panel show Attendance and Grades
during the Policy (2009-14) respectively, Panel on the Right shows Grades after the Policy is Abolished (2014-15).
(a) Attendance is Forced to Left of 7, Voluntary to the Right
(b) Attendance is Forced to Left of 7, Strongly Encouraged to the Right
(c) Attendance is Forced to Left of 7, Absence is Penalized to the Right
Notes:
1. Locally linear, cubic and weighted scatterplots (lowess) for attendance or 2nd-year grade against average 1st-year
grade.
2. Dots are based on local averages for a binsize of 0.05. Dot sizes reflect the number of observations used to calculate
the average.
3. Linear and cubic fits are chosen according to our preferred specifications (see Section 3.4). Lowess makes no
assumption on functional form (estimated with a bandwidth of 0.8N ).
4. Binsizes for local averages are selected via F-tests for regressions of 2nd-year grades on K bin dummies and 2K
bin dummies for the average 1st year grade.
(e.g. via self perception of the student) together with across-course differences in the value of tuto-
rial attendance. Section 3.7 provides evidence that this difference reflects negative spillovers from
adjacent courses where above-7 students have discretion over their attendance. This suggests that the
university policy does not operate through attendance alone.
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3.3.3 Abolition Results
The rightmost column of Figure 3.1 plots grade distributions in the abolition year, 2014-15. The fig-
ures show little to no difference in grades around the cutoff for the three types of courses. We observe
that both the direct (top right) and spillover (bottom right) effects of the university policy have disap-
peared. Appendix Table A.3.4 shows formally that the differences are all statistically insignificant.22
Appendix Table A.3.5 compares mean grades above and below 7, before and after the abolition, in
attendance-voluntary courses alone. The table shows that the unstandardized grades of students who
expected to be forced in 2014-15, but ultimately were not, are 0.35 points (on a 10-point scale) higher
than the grades of forced students from earlier cohorts. It also shows that this across-cohort difference
is similar to the within-cohort difference of 0.37. In addition to providing further evidence that it is the
forced attendance which decreases grades, Table A.3.5 implies that our estimates are being generated
by lower performance of forced students, rather than by better performance of unforced students.
3.4 Empirical Specification
The second-year grade g(2)ijc of student i in course j and cohort c is given by
g
(2)
ijc = β0 + β1Dic + f(g¯
(1)
ic − 7) + f(g¯(1)ic − 7)Dic + C(2)jc + XiΓ + ε(2)ijc (3.1)
whereDic equals 1 if first-year GPA is below 7, g¯
(1)
ic is their GPA in first year, f(·) is some polynomial
expansion in g¯(1)ic , C
(2)
jc are course-cohort fixed effects, and Xi includes personal characteristics such
as age. We allow the polynomial to differ from the left to the right of 7 (see the discussion in Lee and
Lemieux (2010)), in part because it allows us to later analyze the external validity of our estimates
(Cerulli et al., 2017). Our primary interest is β1, the effect of forced attendance near 7. The adoption
and use of the forced attendance policy suggests β1 > 0. The constraint it imposes on choices
suggests β1 < 0.
We can interpret estimates of β1 causally if (Lee, 2008):
Identifying Assumption: Students have imprecise control over their average grade in the
first year, meaning that conditional on their characteristics, the distribution for average
grades is continuous around 7.
Because students were made aware of the policy early on and throughout their first year, they could
try to take actions to avoid forced attendance in the second year. Our identification strategy will still
work as long as first-year grades are at least somewhat outside of the student’s control.
22We cannot plot attendance because the university stopped registering attendance in the abolition year.
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The above is generally a weak identifying assumption (Lee, 2008) and is reasonable in our setting.
The assignment to forced attendance is based on the student’s average grade. As students accumulate
grades they lose control over the average. Importantly, first-year adjustments to the threat of second-
year forced attendance, such as the practice of asking professors for grade increases,23 have less of
an effect on first-year GPA than on the grade of any one course.24 The lack of control, together with
the presence of aggregate shocks to the first-year performance of the individual student, should be
enough for generating random assignment around 7.
To gain intuition for the identification argument, let
g
(1)
ijc = e
(1)
ijc + aijc + δ
(1)
jc + η
(1)
ijc
denote the student’s grade in first-year course j, aijc is their ability, δ
(1)
jc is something particular
about the course-cohort combination (such as the professor or teaching assistant), and η(1)ijc is the
idiosyncratic component of the first-year grade. e(1)ijc encapsulates any choice that affects grades,
including the intensity of effort, study hours, tutorial and class attendance, or requests for grade
increases. Second-year tutorial attendance is mandatory if:
e¯
(1)
ic + a¯ic + δ¯
(1)
c + η¯
(1)
ic < 7
where the bars indicate that the variable is averaged over all first-year courses j.
The argument has three parts. The first is the student has limited control, e¯(1)ic , over their average
performance, as the effect of e.g. grade manipulation is smaller in the aggregate. The second is
that there are aggregate shocks to first-year performance, η¯(1)ic , such as bad luck across the exams
they wrote that year. Shocks like these ensure that two students, with similar ability and average
effort, end up on either side of the cutoff. As a result, the conditional distribution of first-year GPA is
continuous and the variation in treatment status will be random in a neighborhood of 7. The third is
that randomization near the cutoff takes place cohort by cohort. The student pool near 7 in one cohort
may differ from the student pool near 7 in another. The presence of δ¯(1)c suggests we should control
for differences across cohorts.
23Asking professors for grade increases, or any other such practice, can effect treatment assignment only when cumulative
GPA is very close to 7.
24We are developing a companion article that studies adjustments to the threat of forced attendance. Our evidence
shows that the threat does elicit a response but that, as expected, the response is almost never enough to get out of forced
attendance. This claim is supported by various randomization and McCrary tests, as well as the null effects for abolition
year. Nonetheless, because of this concern, we will use models that exclude potentially problematic neighbourhoods around
7 (donut-hole RD models) to demonstrate the robustness of our results.
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3.4.1 Continuity Near the Cutoff
Local randomization of the treatment near the cutoff gives us two testable implications: (i) observed
characteristics are identical from one side of the cutoff to the other; (ii) the probability density for
GPA is continuous. We evaluate the implications one by one.
Table 3.3 presents estimates of our main empirical specification (Equation (3.1)) where instead of
grades the dependent variables are student characteristics. The table presents results for local linear
regressions (panel A) and a third order polynomial for f(·), with our main estimation sample (panel
B) and the full sample (panel C).
Students to the left and right of the cutoff are similar in whether they come from the European
Economic Area, age, distance from the university (in kilometers), and in their performance in high
school (level, track, and average grade).25 This conclusion holds if we select the bandwidth opti-
mally for each background characteristic (Appendix Table A.3.6). It also holds if we consider grade
differences for various high school courses (Appendix Table A.3.7). Although much of the evidence
supports the local randomization interpretation, in two of the three specifications of Table 3.3 the
estimates indicate that women are underrepresented just to the right of the cutoff, consistent with the
idea that women are manipulating grades less than men. The gender imbalance near 7, and resid-
ual concerns for grade manipulation more generally, further motivates estimation of donut-hole RD
models.
We examine whether the probability density for GPA is continuous around 7 (McCrary, 2008).
If students can manipulate their GPA here, then we could observe bunching just above 7. To check
we estimated Equation (3.1) using normalized counts of the number of students as the dependent
variable.26 Figure 3.2 summarizes the results, showing no evidence of bunching above the threshold.
Table A.3.8 in the Appendix verifies this, formally showing that we are unable to reject the null of
continuity near the cutoff.
3.4.2 Sample Attrition
The policy may have incentivized students to drop courses if and once they fail the 70 percent at-
tendance requirement. Attrition of this sort could threaten identification because dropouts are not
graded. Accordingly, we test for a policy effect on the number of second year courses for which a
student obtained a valid grade. The results in Appendix Table A.3.9 (Columns 1-3) imply the policy
25A Dutch high school student might have followed two different levels before enrolling at university (easy=0, diffi-
cult=1). They might have followed one of 4 tracks within each level (1=least prestigious, 4=most prestigious). For the latter
track variable, the results are unchanged if we account for the ordered nature of the variable.
26To count the number of students we select bin sizes in accordance with the proposed strategy of McCrary (2008). The
results are robust to the bin size.
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Figure 3.2: No Bunching Just Above 7. RD plot of the density for the number of students.
has no effect on the number of completed courses. The intercepts support this conclusion, as they
show students near the cutoff complete almost every course (nine out of ten).
Students near 7 may differ in their propensity to complete course evaluations and thus compromise
the use of course evaluations in our analysis. Appendix Table A.3.9 (Columns 4-7) reports estimates
of the policy effect on an indicator for whether students completed the course evaluation, for all eight
courses, and separately for attendance-voluntary courses. We find no statistical differences in the
propensity to complete the evaluation near 7. As with course completion, our evidence suggests no
differential selection into course evaluations.
3.4.3 Estimation and Inference
While discussing the results we present two specifications for Equation (3.1): a linear and third order
polynomial for f(·) with bandwidths of 0.2 (6.8 to 7.2) and 0.5 (6.5 to 7.5) respectively. For all
specifications we cluster standard errors at the level of the student.27
27We do not cluster on the tutorial group because peer composition differs from course to course. However, we show
that our results are robust to including tutorial fixed-effects.
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We elaborate on how we settled on our preferred specifications. Because local randomization im-
plies that local comparisons provide an unbiased estimate of β1, our starting point will almost always
be specifications with a narrow bandwidth, where f(·) is taken to be linear. We follow Imbens and
Lemieux (2008) and refer to these as locally linear regressions. For these specifications, we use a
bandwidth of 0.2 because it is optimal according to the cross-validation method, and confirmed via
the various bandwidth selectors provided by Calonico et al. (2016). Our second set of specifications
use a wider bandwidth of 0.5 together with the third-order polynomial for f(·). A wider bandwidth
and flexible functional form lets us use more data and approximate what a locally-randomized exper-
iment would have shown (Van der Klaauw, 2002). To select f(·) for this larger estimation sample,
we estimated Equation (3.1) while adding equal-sized bin dummies of GPA and including higher-
order polynomials until the bin dummies were jointly insignificant.28 We did this for multiple band-
width choices. To select the 0.5 bandwidth, we again made use of the various bandwidth selectors of
Calonico et al. (2016).29
One remaining concern relates to whether GPA has enough mass points to warrant a continuity-
based RD design, which allows for the possibility that average potential outcomes vary with the
running variable (GPA). To this end, note that there are 228 unique GPA values for the 717 students in
our estimation sample of 6.5 to 7.5, amounting to approximately one GPA value for every 3 students.
This amount of coverage of the support for GPA is usually sufficient for a continuity-based design.30
3.5 Baseline Results
Table 3.4 reports estimates that are based on pooled data from the 8 affected courses. Basing estimates
on the pooled data allows us to account for across-course error correlation within students. Estimates
of the average effect are found in Columns (1) and (2). Panels A and B report the estimated effects
for attendance and grades.
The university-wide policy increases the attendance of forced students by 15 percentage points
(p < 0.01). It decreases their grades by 0.15 standard deviations. While we are unable to reject the
null hypothesis of no average effect on grades, we are able to reject null hypotheses of positive effects
of 0.05 and 0.1 standard deviations, with p-values of 0.09 and 0.03, respectively.
28We ran various regressions while changing the number of bins, but our preferred specification includes the number of
bins (8) for which we first stopped rejecting the small (few dummies) versus the big model while choosing the binsize for
the local averages for the RD graphs (see Figure 3.1).
29See Appendix Figure A.3.1 and Table A.3.10 for more details on the optimal bandwidth selection. Note that we use
the equation between student grades and first-year GPA for selecting the bandwidth and polynomial order. This seems
reasonable as the relationship between attendance and first-year GPA is relatively flat to left and right of 7. In the latter case
we would expect the polynomial to be linear and the optimal bandwidth to be wide.
30Cattaneo, Idrobo and Titiunik (2018) analyze an example where for every 110 observations one unique value for the
running variable is observed. They conclude that continuity-based analysis might be possible in this context.
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Table 3.4: RD for All 8 Eligible Courses
Average Effect Marginal Effects
by Course Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Attendance (% Tutorials Attended)
Average 1st-year 0.151∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
Grade is Below 7 (4.30) (4.28) (2.96) (2.94)
Attendance is Voluntary 0.193∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
× Treatment (3.91) (3.96)
Absence is Penalized -0.151∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗
× Treatment (-2.99) (-2.97)
Adjusted R2 0.306 0.311 0.365 0.370
B: Grade (Standardized)
Average 1st-year -0.153 -0.154 0.0293 0.0262
Grade is Below 7 (-1.26) (-1.28) (0.18) (0.16)
Attendance is Voluntary -0.451∗∗ -0.447∗∗
× Treatment (-2.36) (-2.35)
Absence is Penalized -0.188 -0.185
× Treatment (-1.07) (-1.06)
Observations 4901 4901 4901 4901
Adjusted R2 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.210
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes:
1. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects.
2. Controls include distance to the university, age, gender, and European Economic
Area.
3. All regressions use a third-order polynomial, as well as their interactions with the
treatment, with a bandwidth of 0.5.
4. t- statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.5.1 Course-Level Attendance Policies
Table 3.5 evaluates the policy effect on attendance for the three types of courses. Columns (1) and (2)
of Table 3.5 report estimated effects on attendance in courses which gave above-7 students the option
to attend, (3) and (4) report effects for courses where attendance was strongly encouraged, and (5)
and (6) report effects for courses where everyone was penalized for being absent.
Forced students attended 29 to 34 percentage points more tutorials than above-7 students in
attendance-voluntary courses (p < 0.01). They attended 11 to 15 percentage points more in attendance-
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Table 3.5: Forced Students Attend More Often
Attendance (% Tutorials Attended)
Courses where Attendance is Forced
to the Left of 7 and where to the Right
Attendance is Attendance is Absence is
Voluntary Encouraged Penalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Local linear regression
Average 1st-year 0.296∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.002 0.000
Grade is Below 7 (6.25) (6.21) (3.01) (2.78) (0.10) (0.01)
Observations 547 547 847 847 742 742
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.376 0.153 0.174 0.154 0.180
B: Third order polynomial
Average 1st-year 0.344∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.000
Grade is Below 7 (5.79) (5.72) (2.97) (2.92) (0.01) (-0.01)
Observations 1275 1275 1965 1965 1661 1661
Adjusted R2 0.408 0.412 0.172 0.184 0.146 0.151
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes:
1. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects.
2. Controls include distance to the university, age, gender, and European Economic Area.
3. Top panel uses a bandwidth of 0.2 around a first-year grade of 7. Bottom panel uses a bandwidth
of 0.5. Polynomial is interacted with the treatment.
4. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
encouraged courses (p < 0.01). They had the same attendance as above-7 students in absence-
penalized courses.
Analogous estimates for grades are found in Table 3.6. Columns (1) and (2) show forced students
have grades which are 0.34 to 0.43 standard deviations lower in attendance-voluntary courses (p <
0.01). Columns (3) and (4) shows little to no grade difference in attendance-encouraged courses.
Columns (5) and (6) show the grades of forced students are 0.14 to 0.17 standard deviations lower
in absence-penalized courses, though these differences are statistically insignificant at the 10 percent
level. Note that columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.4 show the estimates in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are similar
to the estimates we would obtain with pooled data and interactions between the treatment variable
and course type.
Students can actually be better off with lower grades if their goal is to pass and forced attendance
makes passing equally or more likely, perhaps because tutorials give students a better overview of the
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Table 3.6: Forced Students Perform Worse in courses where attendance is voluntary for students scoring above 7 in first
year.
Grade (Standardized)
Courses where Attendance is Forced
to the Left of 7 and where to the Right
Attendance is Attendance is Absence is
Voluntary Encouraged Penalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Local linear regression
Average 1st-year -0.349∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.011 0.010 -0.143 -0.164
Grade is Below 7 (-2.80) (-2.77) (-0.09) (0.08) (-1.12) (-1.27)
Observations 547 547 847 847 742 742
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.174 0.201 0.200 0.096 0.099
B: Third order polynomial
Average 1st-year -0.422∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ 0.029 0.041 -0.158 -0.169
Grade is Below 7 (-2.65) (-2.74) (0.18) (0.26) (-0.97) (-1.02)
Observations 1275 1275 1965 1965 1661 1661
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.216 0.251 0.250 0.156 0.158
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes:
1. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects.
2. Controls include distance to the university, age, gender, and European Economic Area.
3. Top panel uses a bandwidth of 0.2 around a first-year grade of 7. Bottom panel uses a
bandwidth of 0.5. Polynomial is interacted with the treatment.
4. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
minimum they need to know. They may, in other words, achieve their desired result (passing) with
less effort.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.7 suggest this is not the case. Forced attendance decreases the
probability of passing by 10 to 13 percentage points. The narrow-bandwidth estimates are statis-
tically significant at the 5 percent level. The wide-bandwidth estimates have p-values which are a
bit above 10 percent.31 Columns (3) and (4) show there is effectively no difference in passing rates
for attendance-encouraged courses. Columns (5) and (6) show passing rates which are 7 percentage
points lower, with p-values which fluctuate around 10 percent.
31A probit analysis with a third-order polynomial yields similar but stronger (statistically) results.
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Table 3.7: Forced Students are Less Likely to Pass
Passes the Course
Courses where Attendance is Forced
to the Left of 7 and where to the Right
Attendance is Attendance is Absence is
Voluntary Encouraged Penalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Local linear regression
Average 1st-year -0.125∗∗ -0.117∗∗ 0.000 0.003 -0.066 -0.072∗
Grade is Below 7 (-2.16) (-2.02) (0.01) (0.05) (-1.56) (-1.74)
Observations 547 547 847 847 742 742
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.070 0.093 0.088 0.050 0.051
B: Third order polynomial
Average 1st-year -0.106 -0.103 0.029 0.034 -0.070 -0.071
Grade is Below 7 (-1.47) (-1.45) (0.40) (0.47) (-1.29) (-1.33)
Observations 1275 1275 1965 1965 1661 1661
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.082 0.120 0.118 0.092 0.097
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes:
1. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects.
2. Controls include distance to the university, age, gender, and European Economic Area.
3. Top panel uses a bandwidth of 0.2 around a first-year grade of 7. Bottom panel uses a
bandwidth of 0.5. Polynomial is interacted with the treatment.
4. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.5.2 Robustness
We analyzed the robustness of the result that forced attendance lowers grades in courses where at-
tendance was voluntary for students to the right of 7. We estimated Equation (3.1) with the third
order polynomial while varying the size of the bandwidth from 0.3 until 1.0. Appendix Figure A.3.2
shows the estimates hover around -0.4 and -0.3 and are significant across the whole range of optimal
bandwidths using the various bandwidth selectors of Calonico et al. (2016).
We tested for significance at fake cutoffs. We estimated our main specification using the third
order polynomial and a bandwidth of 0.5, while implementing fake cutoffs at every 0.005 points for
GPA between 6.5 and 7.5, where the true cutoff is at 7. Appendix Figure A.3.3 presents a histogram
and probability density of the β1 estimates. The distribution mean is 0.02. The estimate at the true
cutoff is extreme relative to the mean, having an empirical p-value that ranges between 3 and 6 percent
(depending on whether normality is assumed).
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We used donut-hole RD models to address concerns about the potential for manipulation and
gender imbalance near the cutoff. Appendix Figure A.3.4 shows the effect on grades is more negative
as observations near 7 are removed. Note that this is consistent with forced attendance being relatively
more costly to students who try to avoid it.32
We tested whether our results change if we restrict the linear polynomial f(·) to be the same on
both sides of the cutoff. Appendix Table A.3.11 shows our results, where the estimates are virtually
unchanged for all groups of courses. Finally, the robustness is supported by negligible effects in the
abolition year. See the right panel of Figure 3.1 and Appendix Table A.3.4 for details.
3.5.3 External Validity
Our RD estimates apply to students with a GPA of 7. A valid question relates to the applicability
of the estimates to students with a GPA other than 7. To speak to this question, Cerulli et al. (2017)
recommend examining the coefficient on the interaction of the linear polynomial term and the treat-
ment ((g¯(1)ic − 7)
1
Dic in Equation (3.1)). A non-zero coefficient implies that students with a GPA just
around, but not equal to, 7 can expect different treatment effects. It is effectively the Treatment Effect
Derivative (TED) at 7.
We examine the TEDs for attendance and grades in Appendix Table A.3.12, for all 8 courses, as
well as for attendance-voluntary courses, where the effect sizes are largest. We find that the TED
estimates are all statistically insignificant. Similar implications follow from Figure 3.1, as it shows
similar curves to the left and right of 7, especially in the case where attendance is the dependent
variable. We also follow the suggestion of Cerulli et al. (2017) to consider the relative TED, i.e. the
treatment effect divided by the TED and multiplied by the bandwidth. If the relative TED is less than
one in absolute value, then the treatment effect changes sign somewhere in the estimation sample
defined by the bandwidth. Appendix Table A.3.12 shows the relative TEDs have values which are
above one for five out of the eight specifications. For the remaining three specifications we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the relative TED is equal to one. This suggests that our RD estimates
apply to students whose GPA differs slightly from 7.
3.6 Baseline Mechanisms
We explore several potential mechanisms behind lower grades and passing rates in courses where
attendance was voluntary for above-7 students.
32We consider donut holes with a maximum size of 6.95-7.05. To see why, suppose the GPA of the student is 6.95. To
get to 7 they would need to receive a grade increase of more than 0.376 (0.752) for an eight (four) credits course. These
sorts of increases are large and unlikely.
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3.6.1 Peer Effects
If the performance decline is driven by lower quality peers and TAs, then we would expect a more
moderate or negligible decline if our estimates were based on comparisons of forced and voluntary
students who attend the same tutorial. Appendix Table A.3.13 considers these comparisons, present-
ing treatment effect estimates for grades which are conditional on fixed effects for the tutorial group.
The estimates are similar to our baseline estimates, suggesting that peer and TA quality are relatively
unimportant for the effect of forced tutorial attendance on performance.
Appendix Table A.3.13 also evaluates peer effects more specifically, using the most common peer
effects specifications in the literature (Booij, Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2017), and focusing on whether
the policy effect differs depending on the peer. The table reports effects of treatment interactions with
the average 1st-year grade for the peer group, as well as interaction effects for the average peer
registration time for tutorials, measured in differences in days from the course mean registration time.
The interaction effects account for the possibility that students coordinate tutorial times with their
most preferred peers, which for forced students might very well include other low achievers. It also
helps with the possibility that weak students coalesce simply because registration is left to the last
minute.
The effects of treatment interactions with peer quality are modest. All the estimates are statisti-
cally insignificant at conventional significance levels, while the main treatment estimate is unchanged
compared to our baseline specifications. Negligible peer effects are unsurprising given recent discus-
sions and results in the literature (Sacerdote, 2014).33
3.6.2 Attendance is Useful in Some Courses, but not Others?
The effectiveness of tutorials provides another alternative explanation for why performance is worse
in attendance-voluntary courses. To justify our thought process on this, we will draw on estimates
from the attendance-encouraged and absence-penalized courses. Notice that the grades of forced stu-
dents were about 0.15 standard deviations lower in courses where all students were penalized for
missing tutorials. There was no grade difference in attendance-encouraged courses. The patterns
may reflect the combined influence of a direct effect of the university policy (e.g. via self percep-
tion) and course-specific heterogeneity in the usefulness of attendance. Grades may be similar in
attendance-encouraged courses because attendance is useful which cancels out the 0.15 reduction in
grades. Students may have lower grades in attendance-voluntary courses because attendance is use-
33Feld and Zo¨litz (2017) is especially relevant. They estimate positive but small peer effects in tutorials for economics
students at another Dutch university.
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less. Useless attendance can reinforce the 0.15 reduction from the direct effect, taking it down to the
0.35 reduction we observe in the data.
If our results are driven by differences in the usefulness of attendance, then TA and Lecturer qual-
ity should be highest in attendance-encouraged courses. Appendix Table A.3.14 uses data from the
abolition year to investigate this possibility, reporting estimates of the relationship between perceived
TA/Lecturer quality and fixed effects for the different types of courses, the baseline being the courses
where students to right of 7 were encouraged. Data from the abolition year circumvents concerns
about whether the course evaluations are contaminated by participation in forced attendance.
Appendix Table A.3.14 suggests, if anything, that TA quality is lowest in courses where atten-
dance was encouraged (the base group). It also shows no statistical difference in lecturer quality
across the three types of courses. The evidence suggests our results are not explained by a direct
negative effect combined with course-specific heterogeneity in the usefulness of attendance.
3.6.3 It’s About Time
If the policy has its largest effects on students who pay a high price for or derive little additional
utility from attendance, then our results would be consistent with a model where students care about
grades, where they think carefully about their attendance, and, importantly, where their time is being
constrained by the policy. These students are really forced, being pushed further away from the
choices they would make in the absence of the policy.
We estimate
A
(2)
ijc = γ0 + γ1icDic + ε
(2)
ijc (3.2)
where A(2)ijc is the percentage of tutorials attended. If γ1ic is large then the student’s desired atten-
dance is low, such that they would have attended far fewer tutorials in the absence of forced atten-
dance. Alternatively, a small γ1ic implies attendance is desirable, such that the student attends the
same number of tutorials with or without forced attendance. In the parlance of the treatment effects
literature (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), students who otherwise prefer not to attend (large γ1ic) are
compliers. Students who would attend anyways (small γ1ic) are always takers. There are no never
takers or defiers by the very definition of the policy, as it leaves students with no choice but to attend
tutorials when their first-year GPA is below 7. Indeed, of the courses from students with a first-year
GPA below 7, we observe only 0.44 percent with an attendance rate below 70 percent.34
34One might argue that the grade for never takers are never observed, as they cannot write the exam. However, in
Section 3.4.2 we showed students generally participate in every second-year course, and that their near-perfect course
participation is unaffected by the treatment (leaving no room for never takers).
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Table 3.8: Differential Effects on Attendance
Attendance (% Tutorials Attended)
(1) (2) (3)
Average 1st-year 0.337∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗
Grade is Below 7 (5.83) (7.15) (7.27)
Distance to University -0.040∗∗ -0.013 -0.036∗∗
(-2.43) (-1.59) (-2.26)
Distance×Treatment 0.044∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(2.61) (2.51)
Attendance in First Year 0.152∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(Standardized) (8.39) (8.43)
Attendance in First Year × -0.133∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗
Treatment (-7.24) (-7.21)
Observations 1275 1275 1275
Adjusted R2 0.417 0.485 0.490
Notes:
1. Courses where attendance was voluntary for students scoring above 7 in
first year.
2. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects, a polynomial in first-year
grade, its interaction with the treatment, distance to university, age, gender,
and European Economic Area.
3. Distance and attendance in first year are standardized, where the standard
deviations are 30.9 kilometers for distance and 0.102 for attendance (on a scale
from 0 to 1).
4. Bandwidth is 0.5.
5. t statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
We operationalize γ1ic via treatment interactions with proxies for the price of and additional
utility from attendance. Our price proxy is distance to the university. Distant students pay a higher
price for attendance because they have to spend more time travelling to campus. Our proxy for the
additional utility of attendance is students’ average tutorial attendance in first year. Students with a
high propensity to attend in first year presumably derive additional utility from attendance in second
year.35
Estimates are found in Table 3.8. From left to right the panel reports interaction effects for dis-
tance to the university, average attendance in the first year, and both together. Distance and first-year
attendance are standardized, where the standard deviations are 30.9 kilometers for distance and 0.102
for attendance (on a scale from 0 to 1).
35This proxy is implied by the assumption that preferences over tutorial attendance are stable from first to second year.
Our results are consistent with the assumption.
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Three patterns stand out. First, the direct effect of the characteristic is always opposite, but similar
in magnitude, to the effect of its interaction with the treatment. This suggests the interactions pick up
the student’s counterfactual attendance had the policy not been in place. Second, Column (1) indicates
the policy had a larger effect on students who live far from campus. The effect on attendance increases
by 4.4 percentage points for students that live one standard deviation further from campus. This
suggests distant students have a greater propensity to attend less in the absence of forced attendance.
Third, Column (2) shows the policy had a smaller effect on students who have a higher attendance
propensity. The effect on attendance decreases by 13 percentage points for students that attended one
standard deviation more tutorials in first year. The results are fairly stable when both interactions are
included together (Column (3)).
3.6.4 Less Time for Leisure
Table 3.9 uses data from course evaluations to provide more direct evidence of the effect on time use.
The left panel reports the effect on an indicator for whether the student attended lectures. The right
panel reports the effect on total study time (lectures+tutorials+self study).36 Note that the distance
control accounts for direct influences of travel time on student responses.
Columns (1) to (2) show forced students are 28 to 45 percentage points more likely to attend
lectures. The estimates, while marginally insignificant, are in line with the increases in tutorial at-
tendance. The intercept and slope in the lecture attendance regressions are similar to the intercepts
and slopes in the tutorial attendance regressions. This suggests the policy forces students to pay a
time cost that becomes sunk after they arrive at campus, such that lecture attendance is relatively
cheap when the student is already there. The sunk cost interpretation is reinforced when analyzing
the lecture attendance for courses that penalize all students for absence. The average student, forced
or otherwise, will attend 90 percent of lectures and 90 percent of tutorials for this group of courses.
Columns (3) to (4) shows results for total study time. We refrain from interpreting the exact
magnitudes of the estimates, as our study-time measure is discrete with bins of 5 hours. The signs
suggest, however, that forced attendance increases total study time. While the statistical significance
is marginal, the estimates are consistent with reduced time for other courses and leisure. Later, when
we investigate spillovers across courses, we will show estimates which are in fact consistent with
reduced time for leisure. Lower grades and less leisure implies students are worse off under forced
attendance.
36Total study time is measured in 10 categories (1=0 hours, 2=1 to 5 hours, and 10=more than 40 hours). We used
the maximum for the interval to convert the categories into hours, where the category 10 is assigned 45 hours. Only the
intercepts change if we use the minimum or the mean.
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Table 3.9: Less Time for Leisure or Non-Academic Activities?
Attended Lectures Total Study Time
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average 1st-year 0.282 0.455 5.170 8.391∗
Grade is Below 7 (1.21) (1.47) (1.60) (1.81)
Intercept 0.575∗∗∗ 0.435∗∗ 8.726∗∗∗ 5.720∗
(3.27) (2.08) (3.04) (1.68)
Polynomial 1st 3rd 1st 3rd
Bandwidth 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Observations 89 235 89 235
Adjusted R2 -0.093 0.045 0.404 0.315
Notes:
1. Courses where attendance was voluntary for students scoring above 7
in first year.
2. The dependent variable in the left panel is the answer to the question
“Have you attended lectures?”. The dependent variable on the right is
the answer to the question “Average study time (hours) for this course
per week (lectures+tutorials+self study)?” where we used the maximum
for the interval to convert the categories into hours.
3. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects, a polynomial in first-
year grade, its interaction with the treatment, distance to university, age,
gender, and European Economic Area.
4. The intercepts are calculated via regressions which exclude course-
cohort fixed effects and controls. They approximate the outcome mean
near the threshold of students right of seven.
5. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student
level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
3.6.5 Self-Study Time and Efficiency
Given our results, we feel that a reduction in self-study time or efficiency is the most reasonable
explanation for the performance decline in attendance-voluntary courses. If the production function
for grades is increasing in attendance, self-study hours, as well as self-study efficiency, and the policy
increases attendance, then the only way for grades to decrease is if students spend less time on self
study or become less efficient at it. If students were studying less or less efficiently, then our results
would be consistent with a model where students care about their grades and leisure, where they
think about attendance and self study carefully, and where the policy constrains self study indirectly
via the additional constraint on attendance. Note, however, that our data does not allow us to show
this explicitly.
Our argument fits well with the discussion of higher-education production in the careful time use
study of Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008). They show that one additional hour of study (in the
first semester) causes GPA to increase by 0.36 points. Our results are consistent with this mechanism,
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but also with a mechanism where there is a decline in study efficiency, and quite possibly with other
mechanisms that fall outside the traditional scope of education production.
3.7 Spillovers Across Courses
The estimates for absence-penalized courses support the idea that the policy has effects outside of
its direct influence on attendance. There is no attendance difference in these courses, yet there are
differences in grades and passing rates. Why would this be the case? The results in Section 3.6 show
peer effects and other direct impacts of the policy, such as adverse influences on self perception or
identity that discourage students from doing their best, are unimportant for the effect on performance.
In addition, Appendix Table A.3.15 uses our data on course evaluations to evaluate the effect of the
policy on student perceptions of course attributes such as course structure and fairness. It shows no
evidence of differential perceptions around the cutoff.
Another explanation is that the grade decrease in absence-penalized courses reflects negative
spillovers from other courses. Being forced to spend extra time on one course could come at the
cost of performance in another course situated in the same block.
Recall that the students in our setting all take the same 10 courses, in pairs of two, with one heavy
(8 credit) and one light (4 credit) course in each block. While the three absence-penalized courses
eliminate the disadvantage of forced students, they are adjacent to courses where forced students
are disadvantaged. In Block 1 the heavy course is International Economics and the light course is
Ageing and Fiscal Economics. The light course, Ageing and Fiscal Economics, penalizes absenteeism
indiscriminately, whereas the heavy course, International Economics, encourages but does not force
the attendance of above-7 students. The same scenario plays out in Block 2, but with Finance I as
the heavy course, and Applied Statistics II as the light course. In Block 4 the scenario is slightly
different. The heavy course is Methods and Techniques and penalizes absenteeism indiscriminately,
where the light course is Behavioral Economics in which above-7 attendance is voluntary.37 The extra
time forced students spend on adjacent courses (International Economics, Finance I, and Behavioral
Economics) should eat into the time they have for absence-penalized courses. This would provide an
explanation for the small grade decrease observed in absence-penalized courses.
We look for further evidence of spillovers of this sort. To do this we investigate how self-
reported total study hours differs depending on the course and block. If additional time on attendance-
encouraged or attendance-voluntary courses crowds out self-study time for adjacent absence-penalized
courses, and since absence-penalized courses have the same class attendance across the 7-threshold,
37Block 3 and 5 both contain one course without tutorials. Grades for these courses cannot be credibly analyzed as they
are largely determined via group work.
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then we should observe an increase in total study hours for forced students in courses where atten-
dance is voluntary or encouraged and a decrease in total study hours in the adjacent absence-penalized
courses.
Estimates are found in Table 3.10. The table organizes the estimates by block (1 to 5) and then
by the course weight (light or heavy). Our hypothesis stipulates that (i) we should observe positive
effects in Columns (3) and (4) for Blocks 1 and 2, as well as in Columns (1) and (2) for Block 4, and
(ii) negative effects in Columns (1) and (2) for Blocks 1 and 2, as well as in Columns (3) and (4) for
Block 4.
From Table 3.10 we find evidence supporting the first hypothesis. Columns (3) and (4) of Block
1 and 2 document positive effects on total study hours for forced students. While the estimates are
borderline significant, the patterns support an increase in total study hours.38 Columns (1) and (2) of
Block 4 are somewhat inconclusive, the estimates are positive but imprecise. Support for the second
hypothesis is moderate, as the increase in total study time does not seem to crowd out study hours for
the adjacent courses. The estimates in Columns (1) and (2) for Blocks 1 and 2 and Columns (3) and
(4) for Block 4 are statistical zeros. While the zeros do not provide strong evidence for a crowding-out
of study hours in absence-penalized courses, the contrast with the positive estimates in the adjacent
attendance-voluntary and attendance-encouraged courses is notable.
A couple of factors can explain the lack of support for the crowding-out of study hours. One is
that our measure of total study hours is too imprecise from the perspective of identifying spillovers
from other courses. Another more economically substantive factor is that crowding-out may operate
along another margin such as study efficiency. Our view is that this mechanism is consistent with
the fairly stable patterns observed in Columns (3) and (4) of Block 1, 2, 3, and 5 and Columns (1)
and (2) of Block 4, namely that forced students spend more time on their courses where attendance
was voluntary or encouraged for above-7 students. This increase in total study time might make the
remaining study time in the adjacent absence-penalized course less effective.
Our analysis here warrants further comment. First, to properly quantify spillover effects it would
have been useful to have adjacent courses which are identical, with credit weights of 6 and 6 rather
than 8 and 4, apart from their attendance policies for above-7 students. Second, whether the decrease
in absence-penalized courses is generated by spillovers or not has no bearing on our capacity to
answer our research question, i.e. to quantify the effect of a full year of forced attendance on academic
performance. Third, the estimates in Table 3.10 imply that forced students enjoy less leisure under the
38To this end we can show that pooling the data for these courses yields statistically significant increases in total study
time (for both bandwidths).
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Table 3.10: Total Study Time Across Courses
Total Study Time
Light Course Heavy Course
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Block 1: Absence-Penalized Light Course, Average 1st-year 2.945 -1.831 5.874 5.916
Attendance-Encouraged Heavy Course Grade is Below 7 (0.54) (-0.36) (1.31) (1.30)
Observations 42 94 59 160
Block 2: Absence-Penalized Light Course, Average 1st-year -1.368 1.021 8.023 12.04∗
Attendance-Encouraged Heavy Course Grade is Below 7 (-0.24) (0.20) (1.50) (1.96)
Observations 50 130 48 119
Block 3: No Tutorials for Light Course, Average 1st-year NA NA 1.854 8.995
Attendance-Encouraged Heavy Course Grade is Below 7 (0.28) (1.16)
Observations 50 121
Block 4: Attendance-Voluntary Light Course, Average 1st-year 0.832 5.117 0.169 4.723
Absence-Penalized Heavy Course Grade is Below 7 (0.19) (0.99) (0.03) (0.65)
Observations 43 115 61 146
Block 5: No Tutorials for Light Course, Average 1st-year NA NA 10.17∗ 10.93
Attendance-Voluntary Heavy Course Grade is Below 7 (1.91) (1.45)
Observations 46 120
Polynomial 1st 3rd 1st 3rd
Bandwidth 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is the answer to the question “Average study time (hours) for this course per week
(lectures+tutorials+self study)?” where we used the maximum for the interval to convert the categories into
hours.
2. Attendance-Encouraged, Absence-Penalized, Attendance-Voluntary refer to how courses treated above-7
students. Below-7 students are forced in all these courses.
2. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects, a polynomial in first-year grade, its interaction with the
treatment, distance to university, age, gender, and European Economic Area.
3. Columns with an odd number use a bandwidth of 0.2 around a first-year grade of 7 and the even columns
a bandwidth of 0.5. Polynomial is interacted with the treatment.
4. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
forced attendance policy. The estimates reinforce our earlier claim that students are worse off under
forced attendance.
3.8 Long-Run Performance
We investigate the effect of forced attendance in second year on performance in third year when,
according to the university, tutorial attendance was once again under the purview of the student.
Table 3.11 reports the effects of forced attendance on third-year grades. Columns (1) and (3) report
estimates without controlling for course-cohort fixed effects, where Columns (2) and (4) include them
as controls. Although we realize course-cohort fixed effects might potentially be bad controls, they
are informative about why the performance of forced students is worse in third year.
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Table 3.11: Performance Decline in Third Year
Grade (Standardized)
Local linear Third order
regression polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average 1st-year -0.247∗ -0.134 -0.176 -0.0750
Grade is Below 7 (-1.86) (-1.05) (-1.12) (-0.52)
Observations 1869 1869 4236 4236
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.223 0.022 0.254
Course-Cohort FE No Yes No Yes
Notes:
1. No student is required by the university to attend tutorials in third
year.
2. Regressions include a polynomial in first-year grade, its interaction
with the treatment, distance to university, age, gender, and European
Economic Area.
3. Column (1) and (2) use a bandwidth of 0.2 around 7, whereas col-
umn (3) and (4) use a bandwidth of 0.5.
4. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the stu-
dent level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Students who were forced in the past have lower grades on average. Column (1) shows a decline
of 0.25 standard deviations (p < 0.1) for students near 7. Column (3) shows the decline is 0.18
standard deviations (p > 0.1) if the larger bandwidth of 0.5 is used. Column (3) rejects a positive
effect of 0.1 with a p-value of 8 percent.
We find evidence that performance is worse even after students regain the right to decide their
attendance. Why would this be the case? One explanation relates to course choice and the grades
students expect to receive. In addition to retaining decision rights over attendance, students had the
right to pick their courses in third year. At the same time, they carry their second-year grades with
them. The historical grades in third-year courses and their own historical performance are information
they can use to select courses. The courses they select can drive down their third-year performance.
The estimates in Columns (2) and (4) are consistent with this, as they show course-cohort fixed effects
eliminate roughly half of the negative effect.
3.9 Conclusion
We estimate the causal effects of a full year of forced, frequent, and regular attendance on the aca-
demic performance of the above-average student at a large public university. Our estimates imply
that forced students, with a first-year GPA at or around (Cerulli et al., 2017) 7, can expect a GPA de-
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crease of 0.20 standard deviations over the remainder of their undergraduate degree.39 The aggregate
effect consists of a decrease of 0.15 standard deviations in second year, when attendance is forced,
and a decrease of 0.25 standard deviations in third year, when they regain discretion over their atten-
dance. While the negative effects on second and third year performance are marginally significant or
insignificant, we are able to rule out positive effects in the ranges of 0.05 and 0.1 standard deviations.
The effects on second-year performance are moderated by the attendance policies of individual
courses. The largest effects are in courses where the attendance advantage of above-7 students was
greatest, where they had full discretion over their attendance. Forced attendance decreases grades
in these courses by 0.35 standard deviations and the chances of passing by more than 10 percentage
points. The smallest, and statistically negligible, effects are in courses where the attendance of above-
7 students was strongly encouraged, suggesting the effects may depend on the degree of the attendance
disadvantage of forced students. We find intermediate effects in courses that eliminated the attendance
advantage of above-7 students via absenteeism penalties that applied equally to all students. We argue
that these intermediate effects reflect negative spillovers from adjacent courses where forced students
are disadvantaged.
Our evidence suggests forced students enjoy less leisure in second-year. We also showed that
grades are lower in third-year, when all students regain the right to decide their attendance. The de-
crease in grades in second and third year, together with the reduction in leisure, imply that the univer-
sity policy makes forced students worse off. The moderating-effects of course-level attendance poli-
cies suggests we are underestimating their loss relative to a counterfactual policy that leaves above-7
students with full discretion over attendance in all their courses.
3.A Appendix
39The decrease is a weighted average of the effect on all courses in the second year (Column (1) of Table 3.4) and third
year (Column (1) of Table 3.11). This point estimate is statistically significant at the 5%-level.
Table A.3.1: Overview of Program
Group First Year Courses Second Year Courses
Microeconomics Applied Microeconomics
A Macroeconomics International Economics
Organisation and Strategy History of Economic Thought
Financial Information Systems Intermediate Accounting
B Marketing Behavioral Economics
Financial Accounting Finance I
Mathematics I Methods & Techniques
Mathematics II Research Project
C Applied Statistics I Applied Statistics II
ICT Economics of Ageing (Eng) or
Fiscal Economics (Dutch)
Notes:
1. The Economics of Ageing is taught in the English program. The Dutch program
substitutes this for Fiscal Economics.
2. Students can compensate an insufficient grade (between a 4.5 and 5.4) with grades
from other courses in the same group if: the other grades are sufficient (above 5.5) and the
(weighted) average within the cluster is above 5.5. This applies to all students, whether
they are above or below the threshold for the forced attendance policy.
Table A.3.2: No Sample Selection when Matching Grades with Attendance
Grade (standardized) Matched
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Matched -0.0511 0.0219 0.491 0.628∗∗
(-0.88) (0.56) (1.17) (2.29)
Average 1st-year -0.132 -0.133 0.00161 0.00112
Grade is Below 7 (-0.98) (-0.98) (1.05) (0.47)
Their Interaction -0.0276 -0.0346
(Matched×Treatment) (-0.26) (-0.49)
Polynomial - - 1st 3rd 1st 3rd
Bandwidth 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Observations 2298 5297 2298 5297 2298 5297
Adjusted R2 -0.000 -0.000 0.168 0.211 0.994 0.984
Notes:
1. Matched is a variable which equals 1 if the grade record found a match with the attendance data and
0 otherwise.
2. Columns (1) and (2) regress second year grades on a constant and the matched-variable and shows
that grades are similar for matched and nonmatched records.
3. Columns (3) and (4) show the reduced-form effect is not different between matched and nonmatched
records (Matched×Treatment). The final two columns regress the matched-variable upon scoring below
7 in the first year and thereby show the policy is unable to explain whether or not a record is matched.
4. Columns (3) until (6) include course-cohort fixed effects.
5. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.3.3: Overview of Categories and Questions in Course Evaluations
Question Measurement Category
scale
Objectives of course are clear 1-5 General
Course is relevant for my studies 1-5 General
Course is interesting 1-5 General
Course is well organized 1-5 Structure
Course material is understandable 1-5 Structure
Can be completed within allocated study points 1-5 Fairness
Time needed to complete exam is enough 1-5 Fairness
Exam reflects course content 1-5 Fairness
Exam questions are clearly defined 1-5 Fairness
Total study time (lectures+tutorials+self study) 1-10 Total study time
Have you attended lectures? 0-1 Lecture attendance
Lectures are useful 1-5 Lectures useful
Lecturer is competent 1-5 Quality lecturer(s)
Lecturer makes you enthusiastic 1-5 Quality lecturer(s)
Lecturer has good command of English 1-5 Quality lecturer(s)
Lecturer can be easily contacted 1-5 Quality lecturer(s)
Lecturer provides sufficient assistance 1-5 Quality lecturer(s)
TA gives good tutorials 1-5 Quality TA
TA can be easily contacted 1-5 Quality TA
TA provides sufficient assistance 1-5 Quality TA
TA has good command of English 1-5 Quality TA
Notes:
1. Questions are measured on a Likert scale, where 1 equals strongly disagree and 5 equals strongly
agree, with the two exceptions being total study time (1 being 0 hours, 2 being [1 − 5] hours, 3 being
[6− 10] hours and 10 being ≥ 40 hours) and lecture attendance (1 being yes and 0 being no).
2. We take the mean for questions within a category, ignoring potential missing values within a category.
The more sophisticated approach of calculating the principal components gives qualitatively similar
results.
Table A.3.4: Negligible Effects when Forced Attendance is Abolished
Grade (Standardized)
Courses where Attendance was Previously Forced
to the Left of 7 and where to the Right
Attendance was Attendance was Absence was
Voluntary Encouraged Penalized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: Local linear regression
Average 1st-year 0.00815 -0.0355 -0.210 -0.299 -0.0746 -0.216
Grade is Below 7 (0.02) (-0.10) (-0.85) (-1.28) (-0.37) (-1.12)
Observations 190 190 292 292 292 292
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.167 0.025 0.060 0.208 0.242
B: Third order polynomial
Average 1st-year 7 -0.121 -0.141 -0.403 -0.428 -0.0665 -0.161
Grade is Below 7 (-0.28) (-0.31) (-1.30) (-1.43) (-0.27) (-0.64)
Observations 384 384 585 585 575 575
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.240 0.089 0.106 0.269 0.279
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes:
1. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects.
2. Controls include distance to the university, age, gender, and European Economic Area.
3. Top panel uses a bandwidth of 0.2 around a first-year grade of 7. Bottom panel uses a
bandwidth of 0.5. Polynomial is interacted with the treatment.
4. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.3.5: It is the Forcing that Worsens Performance
Cohort GPA∈ [6.9− 7.0) GPA ∈ [7.0− 7.1]
2009 - 2013 6.40 p = 0.004∗∗∗ 6.77
p = 0.126 p = 0.487
2014 6.75 p = 0.651 6.88
Notes:
1. Local averages of raw grades for a bandwidth of 0.1.
2. Courses where attendance was normally voluntary for students scoring above 7 in first
year.
3. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3.8: No Bunching Just Above 7. Tested through the method proposed by McCrary (2008).
Counts of Number of Students
Local linear Second order Third order
regression polynomial polynomial
(1) (2) (3)
A: Binsize as suggested by McCrary (2008)
Average 1st-year 0.000363 -0.00203 -0.00294
Grade is Below 7 (0.06) (-0.39) (-0.41)
Observations 20 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.211 0.203
B: Bins two times as small
Average 1st-year -0.0000178 -0.00119 -0.00205
Grade is Below 7 (-0.01) (-0.39) (-0.50)
Observations 40 100 100
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.088 0.078
C: Bins four times as small
Average 1st-year -0.0000519 -0.000632 -0.00108
Grade is Below 7 (-0.03) (-0.39) (-0.51)
Observations 80 200 200
Adjusted R2 -0.009 0.032 0.026
Notes:
1. The local linear regression is estimated on the optimal bandwidth of 0.2
around a first-year grade of 7, whereas the second- and third order polynomial
is estimated on the optimal bandwidth of 0.5. Polynomial is interacted with
the treatment.
2. The panels refer to the different binsize as to compute the histogram for the
number of students. Panel A uses the plug-in estimate of McCrary (2008),
panel B and C subsequently undersmooth and compute bins two and four
times as small respectively. Results are robust to the binsize.
3. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are robust.
4. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure A.3.1: Selection of Optimal Bandwidth for the Local Linear Regression
Notes: We follow Imbens and Lemieux (2008) to obtain predicted grades on either side of the cutoff and use the predictions
to define a cross-validation criterion for selecting the bandwidth. δ denotes the distance from the grade of the student
to cutoff and appears in the criterion function. δ equal to 0.1 and 0.2 roughly correspond to 10 and 20 percent of the
observations at both sides of the cutoff. For both values the criterion is minimized at a bandwidth of 0.2.
Table A.3.10: Calculations of the Optimal Bandwidth Using Methods of Calonico et al. (2016)
First order polynomial Third order polynomial
Left of 7 Right of 7 Left of 7 Right of 7
MSE rd 0.220 0.220 0.413 0.413
Mean MSE two 0.226 0.226 0.437 0.639
squared MSE sum 0.327 0.327 0.491 0.491
error MSE comb1 0.220 0.220 0.423 0.413
MSE comb2 0.226 0.327 0.437 0.491
CER rd 0.139 0.139 0.248 0.248
Coverage CER two 0.168 0.263 0.263 0.384
error CER sum 0.207 0.207 0.295 0.295
rate CER comb1 0.139 0.139 0.248 0.248
CER comb2 0.168 0.207 0.263 0.295
Notes:
1. Optimal bandwidth sizes for both the local linear regressions and the third order polyno-
mial.
2. For the local linear regression the result corresponds with the cross-validation method
depicted in Figure A.3.1, the desired bandwidth hovers around 0.2 for both MSE- and CER
methods.
3. For the third order polynomial the optimal bandwidth is between 0.4 and 0.6 for the MSE
methods, while being significantly smaller for the CER methods. As such, for the third order
polynomial we start out with a bandwidth of 0.5, but check for robustness.
Figure A.3.2: Estimate Insensitive to Bandwidth Choice. Courses where attendance was voluntary above 7.
Notes:
1. The figure plots the estimates of the policy effect on grades for different bandwidths, against the band-
width used to estimate the treatment effect.
2. The estimates are saddled by their confidence intervals.
3. The bandwidth ranges from 0.3 until 1.0.
4. Estimates based on specifications that control for a third order polynomial in the first year grade, its
interactions with a treatment dummy at the cutoff, fixed effects for the course-cohort combination,
distance to university, age, gender, and European Economic Area.
Figure A.3.3: Fake Cutoffs
Notes:
1. Histogram for the estimates of the policy on grades at cutoffs that are arbitrarily assigned by us to every 0.005-points
for GPA between 6.5 and 7.5.
2. Estimates use the sample of courses where attendance was voluntary for students scoring above 7 in first year.
3. Estimates based on specifications that control for a third order polynomial in the first year grade, its interactions
with a treatment dummy at the fake cutoff, fixed effects for the course-cohort combination, distance to university,
age, gender, and European Economic Area.
4. Vertical red line identifies the estimate at the true cutoff of 7.
5. Bandwidth for estimation is 0.5.
Figure A.3.4: Robustness of Estimate Against a Donut Hole RD
Notes:
1. The figure plots the estimates of the policy effect on grades for different ranges of removed observations near the
cutoff (the donut hole), against the size of the donut hole.
2. The estimates are saddled by their confidence intervals.
3. The donut hole ranges from 0 unto 0.1.
4. Estimates based on specifications that control for a third order polynomial in the first year grade, its interactions
with a treatment dummy at the cutoff, fixed effects for the course-cohort combination, distance to university, age,
gender, and European Economic Area.
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Table A.3.12: Testing the External Validity of the RD Estimate. Using the Method of Cerulli et al. (2017).
All Courses Courses Where
Attendance to the
Right is Voluntary
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Attendance (% Tutorials Attended)
Average 1st-year 0.118∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
Grade is Below 7 (4.48) (4.28) (6.21) (5.72)
Treatment Effect -0.127 -0.255 -0.427 -1.190
Derivative (TED) (-0.56) (-0.40) (-1.09) (-1.09)
|Relative TED| 4.67 1.16 3.33 0.56
P-value of: |Relative TED|=1 0.338
Observations 2136 4901 547 1275
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.311 0.376 0.412
B: Grade (Standardized)
Average 1st-year -0.139 -0.154 -0.342∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗
Grade is Below 7 (-1.49) (-1.28) (-2.77) (-2.74)
Treatment Effect 0.825 1.112 0.523 0.719
Derivative (TED) (0.93) (0.49) (0.47) (0.24)
|Relative TED| 0.84 0.28 3.27 1.19
P-value of: |Relative TED|=1 0.892 0.272
Observations 2136 4901 547 1275
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.210 0.174 0.216
Polynomial 1st 3rd 1st 3rd
Bandwidth 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Notes:
1. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects, a polynomial in first-year grade, its in-
teraction with the treatment, distance to the university, age, gender, and European Economic
Area.
2. Columns with an odd number use a bandwidth of 0.2 around a first-year grade of 7 and the
even columns a bandwidth of 0.5. Polynomial is interacted with the treatment.
3. The TED is defined as the linear term on the running variable that is interacted with the
treatment variable. It measures whether the treatment effect changes while moving away from
the cutoff.
4. The relative TED divides the treatment effect by the absolute TED, while multiplying
the TED with the size of the bandwidth. If the absolute value is smaller than 1, it means
that the treatment effect changes sign somewhere in the estimation sample considered by the
bandwidth.
5. t- statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.3.13: Negligible Effects of Low-Achieving Peers
Grade (Standardized)
(1) (2) (3)
Average 1st-year -0.401∗∗ -0.423∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗
Grade is Below 7 (-2.46) (-2.30) (-2.75)
Average 1st-year 0.087
Grade Among Peers (0.81)
Their Interaction 0.008
(Treatment×Peers) (0.05)
Average Registration 0.002
Time Among Peers (0.30)
Its Interaction 0.001
with Treatment (0.13)
Observations 1275 1275 1275
Adjusted R2 0.209 0.215 0.215
Notes:
1. Courses where attendance was voluntary for students scoring
above 7 in first year.
2. Column (1) includes tutorial fixed effects. The remaining re-
gressions include course-cohort fixed effects.
3. Regressions use a third order polynomial in first-year grade, as
well as their interactions with the treatment and include distance to
the university, age, gender, and European Economic Area.
4. The peer group average is the leave-out mean.
5. Bandwidth is 0.5.
6. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the
student level.
7. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.3.14: Attendance is Useful in Some Courses, but Not Others? Evidence from the Abolition Year
TA Quality Lecturer Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Courses where Attendance 0.187 -0.021 -0.122 -0.012
was Voluntary (Right of 7) (0.63) (-0.08) (-0.46) (-0.08)
Courses where Absence 0.135 0.271∗ -0.133 0.024
was Penalized (Right of 7) (0.84) (1.96) (-0.84) (0.25)
Intercept 4.165∗∗∗ 4.094∗∗∗ 3.837∗∗∗ 3.826∗∗∗
(33.90) (36.23) (35.43) (49.80)
Bandwidth 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
Observations 94 199 89 184
Adjusted R2 -0.011 0.015 -0.014 -0.011
P-value for Difference 0.866 0.239 0.955 0.777
Between Rows 1 and 2
Notes:
1. Sample is from year when forced attendance was abolished.
2. TA and Lecturer Quality are the averages of questions which are measured on a 5-
point likert scale (1 equals strongly disagree and 5 equals strongly agree). Questions
include, for example, ”Lecturer is competent”. See Appendix Table A.3.3 for detailed
definitions of the dependent variables.
3. The p-value indicates whether the course dummies are significantly different from
each other.
4. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
5. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.3.15: Absence of Other Channels. Using All 8 Eligible Courses.
General Structure Fairness Usefulness
Lectures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average 1st-year -0.118 -0.340 -0.334 -0.0618
Grade is Below 7 (-0.58) (-1.53) (-1.39) (-0.13)
Constant 4.064∗∗∗ 3.963∗∗∗ 3.698∗∗∗ 3.483∗∗∗
(22.43) (27.76) (17.47) (15.28)
Observations 1003 1005 910 603
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.243 0.244 0.041
Notes:
1. The dependent variables are drawn from the course evaluations using all
8 eligible courses. See Table A.3.3 for detailed definitions of the dependent
variables.
2. Regressions include course-cohort fixed effects, a third order polynomial in
first-year grade, its interaction with the treatment, distance to university, age,
gender, and European Economic Area.
3. Bandwidth is 0.5 around first-year grade of 7.
4. The intercepts are calculated via regressions which exclude course-cohort
fixed effects and controls. They approximate the outcome mean near the thresh-
old of students right of seven.
4. t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered on the student level.
6. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

Chapter 4
Wait and See: Gender Differences in
Performance on Cognitive Tests
Joint work with Pau Balart
4.1 Introduction
Gender differences in cognitive skills have been studied by psychologists and economists for decades.
On average, females outperform males in verbal and reading tasks, while males perform better than
females in math and science; see, for example, Hyde and Linn (1988), Hyde et al. (1990), Caplan
et al. (1997), Kimura (2004), Dee (2007), Fryer Jr and Levitt (2010), Cornwell et al. (2013), and
Quinn and Cooc (2015).1 Hyde and Mertz (2009) have debated the size of the gender gap in math,
claiming that in the U.S. females have reached parity with males in math performance. A simi-
lar conclusion was reached in the meta-study by Lindberg et al. (2010), with an exception for high
school-aged students.2 Math and science classes at high school have been found to be important for
predicting college attendance, college completion, occupational choices, and wages (Goldin et al.,
2006; Joensen and Nielsen, 2009), and they have been related to the STEM gender gap.3 The results
of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) confirm that gender gaps during sec-
ondary school persist in many OECD countries, with males performing better in math and science
and females performing better in reading.
1The gender gap in mathematics has received special attention because of its importance for male-female differences in
economic outcomes. Its root causes are highly debated. Some explanations include the role of culture (Hyde and Mertz,
2009; Sapienza et al., 2010; Nollenberger et al., 2016), larger male test score variability (Machin and Pekkarinen, 2008),
and the stereotype threat (Steele, 1997; Brown and Josephs, 1999; Johns et al., 2005).
2Lindberg et al. (2010) have also shown the presence of larger gender gaps when evaluating deeper levels of mathemat-
ical knowledge and in more selective samples (the gender gap persists for white students).
3See Wang and Degol (2017) for a review on competing explanations for the origins of the STEM gender gap.
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The present study provides new insights on gender gaps in the test scores of 15 to 16 year-old
students participating in the PISA. In this article, we explore how gender gaps in test scores change
throughout the test, finding that females are better able to sustain their performance. Extending the
approach proposed by Borghans and Schils (2012), we compare the performance of males and females
at the beginning of and during the test, and we do so separately for math and science questions
(topics favorable to males) and reading questions (the topic favorable to females). Our main finding
is that females experience a lower decline in performance during the test regardless of the topic being
assessed. Countries from around the world participate in the PISA, which varies the order of test
questions among test booklets and randomly allocates the booklets to students. Our results can be
considered to come from a worldwide experiment: by country, we compare the performance of males
and females on the same test question at different positions in the test booklet.
Of the 74 countries that participated in the PISA 2009, we first found that in 71 of them, females
were better able to sustain their performance during the test than males (statistically significant for 58
countries at the 10% level and for 56 countries at the 5% level).4 Secondly, we found that for reading
questions at the beginning of the test, the gender gap favored females in 73 countries (statistically
significant in 66 countries at the 10% level and in 64 countries at the 5% level) and that during the
test, this advantage became more pronounced in 68 countries (40 statistically significant at the 10%
level, 37 at the 5% level). In contrast, for math and science questions there was an initial gap in
test scores that favored males in 68 countries (62 statistically significant at the 10% level, 59 at the
5% level), but during the test this advantage shrank in 68 countries (46 statistically significant at
the 10% level, 42 at the 5% level). Consequently, 20 countries saw the highly studied gender gap
in mathematics and science completely offset or even reversed after two hours of test taking. In 42
countries females decreased their initial disadvantage in math and science by at least 50 percent by
the end of the test. There was no single country or topic in which males exhibited a statistically
significant lower level of decline in performance during the test than females.
These findings stood up to numerous checks. We considered different PISA waves (2006 to 2015),
an increase in the number of questions to measure the gender gaps at the start of the test, alternative
codification of questions that were not reached, different methods of computing performance during
the test, various estimation methods, and different units of analysis. An additional set of analyses
showed that testing strategies (e.g., doing the easier questions first or going back and forth between
items), being stumped on difficult questions, or the presence of a short break of 5 minutes in the
4We use 10% as the conventional minimum level of statistical significance when displaying figures that provide infor-
mation on our results (two-tailed test). We also discuss the main results at the 5% level throughout the text and report the
specific p-values of our main estimates in the tables in the Supplementary Material.
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middle of the test were not driving our results. These findings are shown in the Supplementary
Material.
If the identified gender difference in participants’ ability to sustain performance was driven by
cognitive skills or by the stereotype threat associated with them (Steele, 1997; Brown and Josephs,
1999; Johns et al., 2005), then it should mimic the gender gaps in topics being assessed. This is
in stark contrast to our findings: females are better able to sustain their performance regardless of
the topic being tested. Consequently, the observed gender difference could not have been driven by
cognitive skills.
We studied the relationship between the gender difference in performance during the test and
well-known noncognitive skills that (i) have been shown by previous literature to be important for
test scores and (ii) were measured via the PISA student questionnaires. We found that noncognitive
skills, such as conscientiousness and locus of control, were unable to explain our findings. Next we
drew on the PISA 2015, which was computer based and has detailed data on the number of actions
performed (e.g., mouse clicks and key presses) and the time spent on each question, to investigate
how these two inputs changed during the test. We found that both declined during the test, but there
was no difference in the patterns between males and females. This suggests that our findings are not
driven by a difference in effort, but rather by the efficacy of the mental processes that translate these
inputs into a correct answer. This explanation of our findings is consistent with gender differences in
boredom: males have been found to experience higher levels of boredom when performing activities
that have a long duration, and individuals who experience boredom have impaired performance on
various tasks (Zuckerman et al., 1978; Vodanovich and Kass, 1990a; Fisher, 1993; Vodanovich et al.,
2005; Kass et al., 2010; Eastwood et al., 2012). However, our data does not allow us to empirically
test this relationship.
The present study contributes to the literature on gender differences in testing behavior. Will-
ingham and Cole (2013) found that males have an advantage on multiple choice questions. In an
experimental setting, Baldiga (2013) have shown that females have a lower willingness to guess on
multiple choice tests that penalize wrong answers. As the expected value of guessing is generally
positive, this negatively affects females’ scores.5 This literature concludes that evaluating knowledge
with a multiple-choice test is favorable to males. Our study suggests a new implication in terms of
test design: shorter tests are favorable to males and longer tests are favorable to females.
We drew on a dataset from Lindberg et al. (2010) and found empirical support for this suggestion.
In their meta-analysis, Lindberg et al. (2010) amassed information on male and female performance
5Tannenbaum (2012), Pekkarinen (2015), and Akyol et al. (2016) obtained similar results using data on real tests, while
Espinosa and Gardeazabal (2013) used data from a field experiment.
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on more than 400 different math tests worldwide. We extended upon this dataset using the number of
questions on the test as a measure of test length. Regressing the math gender gap on the number of
questions, we found that longer tests are significantly associated with females decreasing the gender
gap in math. Recently, Oxford University also provided evidence that longer tests decrease the gender
gap on math and computer science exams. After extending the exam time by 15 minutes, exam
administrators found that the relative performance of females increased. Besides time pressure, our
results suggest that an alternative explanation could be that females are more productive during the
extra 15 minutes.67 Terrier (2016) documented that increasing the relative grades of females, due to
teacher favoritism, increases the likelihood of females to select a science track in high school. Our
results raise the question of whether test design, and in particular test duration, could play a role in
further promoting gender equality in participation in math and sciences.
As the PISA is a low-stakes test, it is ex-ante unclear whether our findings can be extrapolated
to high-stakes contexts. Considering country differences in testing cultures and motivation (Gneezy
et al., 2017; Sjøberg, 2007), we conclude that females’ ability to better sustain their performance
could still occur in situations with higher stakes, but perhaps to a lesser degree.
4.2 The PISA Test
The PISA is a triennial international survey that aims to evaluate the skills and knowledge of 15-year-
old students worldwide in math, science, and reading. Every three years the PISA focuses on one of
these topics, meaning that roughly half of the questions on the test pertain to that specific topic. For
our baseline results we use microdata from the 74 countries participating in the PISA 2009. This was
the most recent wave that provides a balanced distribution between topics in which females perform
better (reading) and topics in which males perform better (mathematics and science). Hereafter, we
briefly mention two relevant aspects of the test design for our analysis. Detailed information can be
found in the Supplementary Material and the corresponding technical reports (OECD, 2009, 2012,
2014, 2015).
First, the PISA 2009 had 13 different versions of the test (booklets). Each specific question
appeared in four different positions of four different booklets. The test lasted for two hours and con-
tained approximately 60 test items. Secondly, these booklets were randomly handed out to students.
The random assignment of booklets to students ensures that the variation of the position of a ques-
6http://www.businessinsider.com/oxford-university-gives-students-extra-time-to-
finish-exams-2018-1?international=true&r=US&IR=T.
7Our results do not distinguish between a scenario where both the time of the test and number of questions increase and
a scenario where the time of the test increases while keeping the number of questions fixed. We refer to longer tests as both
having more questions and more time.
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Figure 4.1: Performance throughout the test for males and females in Ireland
Notes: The figure is based on the PISA 2009 and uses LOWESS to visualize the relationship
between the probability to answer a question correct and the position of the question in the
test. We use a bandwidth of 0.8N , the program default.
tion in the test is unrelated to students’ characteristics or question difficulty. Balancing tests in the
Supplementary Material confirm this random allocation.
4.3 Baseline Results
Figure 4.1 illustrates the main idea of our analysis. It shows the proportion of correct answers against
the position of that question in the PISA test for males and females separately. Data are presented
for Ireland, because in that country males and females had identical performance at the start of the
test. The proportion of males and females that correctly answer the first question was equal, while a
higher share of females answered the questions correctly when they were positioned later in the test.
Figure 4.1 also shows that for both sexes, questions had a lower probability of being answered cor-
rectly when they occupied a position further towards the end of the test. Borghans and Schils (2012)
and Torija (2012) have been the pioneers in documenting this pattern, which the former referred to as
“the performance decline”.8 The key message of Figure 4.1, however, is that the performance decline
is less strong for females.
8In a similar vein, Sievertsen et al. (2016) documented that test performance decreases if the test takes place later on the
school day for pupils aged between 6 and 16 in Denmark.
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Formally, we used ordinary least squares to explain whether a student answered a question cor-
rectly (1 denoting a correct answer and 0 an incorrect answer) with the position of the question in the
test (normalized between 0 and 1 for the first and the last question, respectively). The difference in
the regressions’ intercept for males and females is informative of the gender gap at the beginning of
the test, whereas the difference in the coefficients on the question ordering measures the gender gap
in students’ ability to sustain performance (the difference in the slope between males and females in
Figure 4.1). Our main aim is to analyze these gender differences across topics.
4.3.1 Gender Differences
Figure 4.2 shows the first step in our study. It reports the estimated gender differences in ability
to sustain performance across countries and their corresponding 90% confidence intervals. In other
words, it displays the linear estimates of the gender differences in slopes –which for Ireland are shown
in Figure 4.1– for each participating country. Positive values indicate countries in which females were
better able to sustain their performance during the test than males. Figure 4.2 shows that this was the
case for all participating countries, except for Kazakhstan, Miranda (a state in Venezuela), and Macao
(China). In none of these three exceptions was the gender difference statistically significant. In
contrast, the lower decline in performance experienced by females was statistically significant at the
10% level in 58 out of the 74 participating countries (in 56 if we set the significance level at 5%).9
To illustrate the interpretation of the results, the point estimate of 0.05 for Slovenia implies that, if we
assume males and females will perform similarly on the first question of the test, the probability of
answering the last question correctly is five percentage point higher for Slovenian females.
4.3.2 Gender Differences per Topic
The second step, and the main aim of our study, was to analyze gender differences in performance
at the start of and during the test, both in topics favorable to males (math and science) and topics
favorable to females (reading).
The estimates for reading questions are displayed in the top panel of Figure 4.3, while math and
science questions are displayed in the bottom panel. We have plotted point estimates as well as the
corresponding 90% confidence interval for each country. Grey lines (with squares representing point
estimates) represent the female-male gap at the beginning of the test in each country. Black lines
(with dots representing point estimates) represent the female-male gap in terms of ability to sustain
9The precise estimates for the gender differences per country and their corresponding p-values can be found in Ta-
ble A.4.1 of the Supplementary Material.
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Figure 4.2: Gender differences in performance during the test. PISA 2009
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Notes: The figure plots the point estimate, together with its 90% confidence interval, of the
gender difference in performance during the test for each country participating in the PISA
2009. Positive values indicate countries in which females experienced a lower decline over
the course of the test than males.
performance during the test. Countries are ordered according to the size of the latter metric. Positive
values indicate countries in which females showed an advantage.
When looking at the reading questions (top panel in Figure 4.3), 66 out of the 74 grey confidence
intervals are strictly positive. Consistent with previous research documenting that females perform
better in reading than males, we found that they outperformed males in this topic at the beginning
of the test. At the same time, females were better able to sustain their performance in reading in 68
countries. The lower decline in performance for females is statistically significant at the 10% level in
40 countries (and in 37 at the 5% level). On reading questions, females performed better both at the
beginning of the test and in sustaining their performance during the test.
In line with the previous literature on gender gaps in math and science, for 62 out of the 74
participating countries, the grey confidence intervals are strictly negative (bottom panel in Figure 4.3),
indicating that males outperformed females in initial performance in math and science. In contrast,
in most of the countries the black confidence intervals exhibit positive values, indicating that females
were better at sustaining performance during the test in math and science. Point estimates have a
positive value in 68 countries and are statistically significant at the 10% level in 46 of them (and in
42 at the 5% level). Despite males having an initial advantage in these topics, there was not a single
country in which they were significantly better able to sustain this performance during the test.10
10The numerical estimates per country and the corresponding p-values can be found in Table A.4.2 of the Supplementary
Material.
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Figure 4.3: Gender differences in initial performance and performance during the test by topic. PISA 2009
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Notes: The figure plots the point estimate, along with its 90% confidence interval, of the gen-
der gap in initial performance and the decline in performance for each country participating
in the PISA 2009. Positive values indicate the gender gap favors females.
This finding suggests that longer cognitive tests exacerbate the gender gap in reading and shrink it
in math and science. In line with the literature on the gender gap in math and science, females scored
lower at the beginning of the math and science test by a statistically significant degree in 62 countries.
According to our estimates, however, this gender gap was completely offset or even reversed in 20
countries after two hours of test taking. In 42 countries females decreased their initial disadvantage
by at least 50 percent at the end of the test. Table A.4.5 of the Supplementary Material provides a
country-by-country overview of the point in the test at which females closed the gender gap in math
and science.
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4.4 Potential Determinants of the Gender Difference in Ability to Sus-
tain Performance
The combination of the two graphs in Figure 4.3 provides evidence of the existence of a gender
difference in ability to sustain performance that does not depend on knowledge of or ability in the
topic being assessed. Hereafter, we explore other potential determinants.
We started out by investigating the role of well-known noncognitive skills. An increasing body
of literature has reported gender differences in noncognitive skills that are favorable to females in
various dimensions and are relevant for test performance.11 Most importantly, agreeableness, open-
ness (Duckworth et al., 2010), self-concept (Eklo¨f, 2007), locus of control, self-discipline (Borghans
et al., 2008b), and conscientiousness (Heckman and Kautz, 2012) have been related to test scores.12
The PISA student questionnaires contain several questions that are direct measures of these specific
noncognitive skills.13 For example, the PISA 2012 contained the proposition “Sometimes I am just
unlucky” as a measure for locus of control. Using various measures for these noncognitive skills, we
found that they were unable to mediate the gender difference in ability to sustain performance.
Next, we repeated the analysis in Section 4.3 using data from the most recent PISA wave (2015).
The PISA 2015 test was given on the computer and navigation across question units was restricted.
This allowed us to investigate whether our results were driven by test taking strategies, which we
define as any strategy that leads a student to answer the questions in a different order than the one
proposed. The results are shown in the Supplementary Material. We found identical gender differ-
ences for this PISA wave and therefore disregarded the possibility that test taking strategies were a
determinant for the gender differences in performance during the test.
Conceptually, knowledge is a static input that remains fixed during a test. In contrast there could
have been other test inputs that may have changed during the test. We refer to the latter as dynamic
inputs. The PISA 2015 also contained information on two dynamic test inputs: time spent per ques-
11Females have been found to have more self-discipline (Duckworth and Seligman, 2006), have less behavioral problems
(Jacob, 2002), be less overconfident (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), show more developed attitudes towards learning
(Cornwell et al., 2013), and report higher levels of extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Schmitt et al., 2008;
Chapman et al., 2007)
12The main evidence that test scores also depend upon noncognitive skills arises from (i) the finding that under low-
stakes testing conditions, scores of low performers can be substantially improved by offering a reward or other forms of
extrinsic motivation (Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), Duckworth et al. (2011), and Segal (2012)); (ii) the existence of a
direct relationship between measures of noncognitive skills and test scores (Borghans et al. (2008b), Heckman and Kautz
(2012), and Borghans et al. (2011)); and (iii) grades and achievement tests being better predictors of life outcomes than
“pure” measures of intelligence (Borghans et al., 2016).
13The questions included are referred to by the PISA as measures for a specific noncognitive skill or are similar to the
validated measures of the Big Five Inventory (John and Srivastava, 1999), the grit scale (Duckworth et al., 2007), Rotter’s
locus-of-control scale (Rotter, 1966), the self-control scale (Tangney et al., 2004), and the Motivated Strategies for Learning
Questionnaire (MSQL) (Duncan and McKeachie, 2005).
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Figure 4.4: Gender differences in the decline of time spent per question and number of actions per question during the test.
PISA 2015
(a) Time spent per question
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(b) Number of actions per question
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Notes: The figure plots the point estimate, together with its 90% confidence interval, of
the gender gap in decline of (a) time spent per question and (b) the number of actions per
question for each country participating in the PISA 2015. Positive values indicate countries
in which females experienced less of a decline than males.
tion and the number of actions per question.14 We applied the method used in Section 4.3 while
considering these two measures as outcome variables to test whether females were better able keep
up their test inputs. Figure 4.4a shows that the time spent per question during the test did not show
an obvious pattern between sexes. Depending on the country, either females or males decreased the
14The actions that were counted were clicks, double-clicks, key presses, and drag/drop events. The PISA test contains
open questions and its interface has tools to generate an answer, e.g., a calculator, which makes the number of actions taken
a good measure of test input. For 48 out of 58 countries we found a statistically significant positive correlation between the
number of actions and answering a question correctly. OECD (2015) stated that more able students generally take more
time to complete the test. In analyzing these two additional inputs, we found that both the number of actions and time spent
per question decreased as the test went on.
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amount of time spent per question more quickly, with most of the estimates not being statistically
significant. This finding also goes against the possibility that females having better time-management
skills (Misra and McKean, 2000; Trueman and Hartley, 1996) could explain our result. Figure 4.4b
reveals that for most of the countries the number of actions per question during the test decreased
more quickly for females than for males.
In light of these results, the gender difference in ability to sustain performance does not seem to
be driven by a difference in the inputs used to provide correct answers (i.e., cognitive ability in a topic,
time spent on an item, and actions taken to answer an item), but rather by the efficacy of the mental
process that translates these inputs into a correct answer. Although we are not able to empirically test
this hypothesis with the available data, it is consistent with the existence of a gender difference that
arises when considering the temporal dimension of performance: boredom. Males have been found to
experience higher levels of boredom on activities with a long duration, which might cause impaired
performance after some time of test taking (Zuckerman et al., 1978; Vodanovich and Kass, 1990a;
Fisher, 1993; Vodanovich et al., 2005; Kass et al., 2010; Eastwood et al., 2012).15
4.5 Longer Tests and the Math Gender Gap
Our baseline finding suggests that longer tests favor females and shorter tests favor males. We tested
this implication by making use of a dataset put together by Lindberg et al. (2010), who performed a
meta-analysis to investigate gender differences in recent studies of mathematics performance. After
extensive identification of literature on mathematics tests, they recorded the performance of males
and females on 441 such tests. We expanded upon their dataset and were able to collect the number
of questions for 203 of them, which we used as a proxy for test length.
Table 4.1 shows the estimates of regressing the math gender gap on a constant and the num-
ber of questions in a test. It confirms that longer tests are associated with a smaller gender gap in
math.16 Column (1) suggests that males perform roughly 0.2 standard deviations better than females
on shorter tests. However, females are on par with males if the test reaches 125 questions. Column
(2) shows that this result is robust to excluding an extreme test with 240 questions. While these two
columns directly use the data from Lindberg et al. (2010), we compiled information on the perfor-
mance of males and females on the tests. In columns (3) and (4) we can see that the results are robust
to our own calculation of the math gender gap and to reducing the weight to one-half for studies
15See the Supplementary Material for detailed results and further discussion on the two test inputs and noncognitive
skills.
16This analysis simply compares the mean of the gender gap across tests with different numbers of questions. While it
explains the low R2 in the regressions, it is sufficient to study the existing correlation between the two.
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Table 4.1: Relationship between the gender gap in math and the number of questions in a specific test
Whole Exclude Recalculated Weighted
sample outlier gender gap regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of -0.00159∗∗ -0.00188∗∗ -0.00152∗ -0.00149∗
questions (-2.06) (-2.10) (-1.97) (-1.94)
Constant 0.200∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(4.59) (4.48) (4.40) (4.33)
N 203 202 203 203
Adj. R2 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.010
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The gender gap is measured by subtracting the mean performance of girls from
the mean performance of boys and dividing this by the pooled standard devi-
ation. The equations estimated are as follows: mathgendergapi = α0 +
α1numberofquestionsi + i, where i is a subscript for test i.
(observations) that we coded differently than Lindberg et al. (2010). The Supplementary Material
provides information on the data collection, additional robustness checks, and results when using the
maximum time to complete the test as a measure for test length.
4.6 Conclusion
In this article, we present a gender difference in test performance that has been overlooked: females
are better able to sustain their performance during test taking. In our preferred specification, for 20
out of the 74 participating countries, this gender difference offsets or even reverses the highly studied
gender gap in mathematics and science after two hours of test taking. Our findings suggest that longer
tests are favorable to females. This, in turn, raises the question of whether test design could play a
role in increasing the propensity of females to take intensive math and science courses. Our study also
contributes to the debate on the size and existence of the gender gap in mathematics. For instance,
while some studies (Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2010) found that a gender gap in mathematics is present at
the elementary school-level, others did not (Hyde et al., 1990; Lindberg et al., 2010). According to
our findings, the length of a test may help to explain these differences in previous research.
PISA scores receive an enormous amount of attention from policymakers. In many countries
they are considered key indicators for the design and evaluation of educational policies. These facts
highlight the importance of our findings despite the low-stakes nature of the tests analyzed. However,
4.7 Supplementary Material 133
a natural question to ask is whether the gender difference in maintaining performance is also present
in settings with higher stakes; a question we feel should drive future experimental research.
In the Supplementary Material we aim to begin to answer this question and provide three pieces
of preliminary evidence suggesting that our finding is still present when higher stakes are at play.
First, in the data from Lindberg et al. (2010), we found that the significant negative relationship be-
tween the math gender gap and length of the test persists even if we only consider tests with stakes.
Secondly, we considered country differences in testing culture. Gneezy et al. (2017) found that test
takers in Shanghai have higher intrinsic motivation than in the U.S., while Sjøberg (2007) observed
that institutional promotion and motivational messages regarding international standardized tests are
more prevalent in Asian countries. If higher stakes reduce gender differences when it comes to sus-
taining performance, we should observe less of a gender difference in Asian countries. We found
this is indeed the case, but the gender difference is not entirely eliminated; in 60 percent of the Asian
countries it is present and statistically significant. Considering the specific case of Shanghai studied
by Gneezy et al. (2017), we found that Shanghai males significantly outperform females at the be-
ginning of the test in math and science by more than 3 percentage points, but females significantly
reduce this gender gap as the test goes on, making it negligible by the end of the test. Thirdly, with
the PISA data, we constructed a measure of subjective stakes by calculating the average number of
unanswered questions per country, which we expected to be high if the test were considered to have
low stakes.17 By doing so, we did not find that the gender difference in ability to sustain performance
throughout the test is larger in countries where the incidence of non-response is higher.
4.7 Supplementary Material
4.7.1 Data and Methodology
Data: The PISA Test
The PISA is a triennial international test administered by the OECD and aims to evaluate skills and
knowledge of 15-year-old students in math, science, and reading. Every three years the PISA is
focused on one of these three topics, implying that around one half of the questions in the test are
from that specific topic. For our baseline results we used microdata of the 74 countries participating
in the PISA 2009, for which the main topic of evaluation was reading. This provides a quite balanced
distribution between topics in which females perform better (reading) and topics in which males
17The PISA does not penalize incorrect answers. This implies that not giving an answer to a question is a strictly
dominated strategy for an individual interested in performing well on the test. Higher (subjective) stakes should reduce this
type of careless testing behavior.
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perform better (mathematics and science). Therefore, it allowed us to analyze gender differences in
performance during the test per topic. We used microdata on each students’ answer to every single
administered question. Using the codebooks, we could retrieve which question the student had to
answer on each position of the test. We also use the PISA 2006, 2012, and 2015, which focus on
science, math, and science respectively.18 All four PISA waves share two main characteristics that
are important for investigating the gender difference in performance during the test.
First, the PISA uses multiple versions of the test (booklets). As shown in Table A.4.3, the PISA
2009 has 20 different booklets: 13 “standard” booklets and 13 “easier” booklets, with 6 booklets
belonging to both categories. Each country opts for either the set of 13 standard or 13 easier booklets,
we included all of them in our analysis.19 All booklets contain four clusters of questions (test items),
where the total test consists of approximately 60 test items. Each cluster of questions represents 30
minutes of testing time, which meant each student undertakes two hours of testing. Students take a
short break after one hour, typically of 5 minutes. For both the set of standard and easier booklets,
there are 13 clusters of test items (7 reading, 3 science, and 3 mathematics) and they are distributed
over the different set of 13 booklets according to a rotation scheme. Each cluster appeared in each
of the four possible positions within a booklet once (OECD, 2012). This meant that one specific test
item appeared in four different positions of four different booklets.20
Second, these booklets are randomly assigned to students (OECD, 2012). This random assign-
ment ensures that the variation in question numbers, that results from the ordering of clusters, is unre-
lated to characteristics of students. Balancing tests for the four waves confirm this random allocation
of booklets. Table A.4.4 shows results of separate regressions where background characteristics are
regressed upon booklet and country dummies for the PISA 2009 (country dummies are included as
only within a country the same set of booklets are being randomized). Almost all booklet dummies
enter these regressions insignificant and for all regressions the F-test for joint significance of the
booklet dummies does not reject the null-hypothesis.21 In our estimation we included question fixed
effects to exploit the exogenous variation in item ordering within a question across students.
18For the PISA 2012 the codebooks do not contain this information, the OECD provided them to us.
19The PISA 2009 is the first wave where countries with a previous PISA score below 450 had the possibility to opt for
a subset of seven easier booklets. Similar to countries with standard booklets, the 30 countries that opted for the easier set
also got 13 booklets. The subset of seven easier booklets are identical to the first seven standard booklets, but each had a
reading cluster replaced (3A and 4A) with an easier reading cluster (3B and 4B). This does not pose any threat to our main
analysis, as we are comparing students within a country and an absolute comparison between countries is not our main
interest.
20For the PISA 2015 the rotation scheme is somewhat more complicated, but the two characteristics necessary for iden-
tification remained. We will come back to this shortly when using this wave in Section 2.
21Results for the PISA 2006, 2012, and 2015 are similar (joint insignificance of the booklet dummies) and are available
upon request.
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Two other important characteristics of the PISA are its worldwide country participation and its
sampling procedure. First, international country participation allowed us to analyze whether the gen-
der difference is systematically present across countries and to investigate the external validity of our
results. Second, the PISA used a two-stage stratified sample design. The first-stage sampling units
consisted of individual schools being sampled from a comprehensive national list of all PISA-eligible
schools.22 The second-stage sampling units were the students. Once schools are selected, a complete
list of all 15-year-old students within the school is prepared. If this list contained more than 35 stu-
dents, 35 of them are randomly selected.23 All of them are selected if this list contained less than 35
students (OECD, 2012). Although gender is exogenous by nature, due to the PISA sampling process
it might be the case that males and females are not equally represented across schools with similar
quality. In our estimations we controlled for the quality of the school via the inclusion of school fixed
effects.
Data: Lindberg et al. (2010)
To explore the implication that longer tests favor females, we extended the database by Lindberg et al.
(2010). They performed a meta-analysis to investigate the existence of gender differences in mathe-
matics performance. This involved the identification of possible studies that investigated performance
at math tests. Using computerized database searches, they generated a pool of potential articles. After
careful selection, the final sample of studies included data from 441 mathematics tests (see Lindberg
et al. (2010) for further details). They coded these tests according to several characteristics, the most
important one being the performance of females and males. For every test they calculated the gen-
der gap according to Cohen’s d, which is equal to the difference in the mean performance of males
and females divided by the pooled standard deviation (Xmales−Xfemalesσp ). It can be interpreted as a
standardized gender gap. They found the gender difference in mathematics to be negligible.
For every test in their dataset we tried to collect the following information from the original
articles: number of questions, maximum time allowed to complete the test, and the stakes of the
exam. If this information was not available in the original studies, we sent the authors an email
asking for the information. The dataset of Lindberg et al. (2010) contains 441 exams. For 243 of
these tests we found evidence that they had to be completed within a certain time limit. Only these
are of interest, without a limit of time there is no reason a test should measure sustained performance.
Tests without a limit of time are, for example, tests that are done at home or out of academic time.
For 203 of those 243 tests we were able to collect the number of questions and for 175 exams we
22Schools are sampled with probabilities proportional to a measure of school size. Prior to sampling, schools on the
national list are being assigned to explicit strata where the aim is adequate representation of the 15-year-old population.
23For the PISA 2015 this number was equal to 42 students.
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collected the maximum time allowed to complete the test. Sample attrition does not seem to be a
problem as the average size of the gender gap is similar for tests with and without time limit.
Methodology
To better understand the relevance of this article’s research contribution, we first discuss the relevant
previous research by Torija (2012) and Borghans and Schils (2012). They showed that questions
have a lower probability of being answered correctly when they occupy a position further towards the
end of the test. Whereas Torija (2012) compared the performance on a single question at different
positions for the PISA 2000, Borghans and Schils (2012) used the PISA 2003 and 2006 and estimated
the following equation for each country separately (we refrain from using country subscripts in the
whole paper):
yij = α0 + α1Qij + uij (4.1)
Where yij is a dummy for whether student i answered question j correctly and Qij is the position of
question j in the version of the test answered by student i and is normalized between 0 and 1, respec-
tively denoting the first and last question of the test. α1 tells us whether the probability to answer a
question correctly is affected by the position of that question in the test. They estimated Equation (4.1)
and showed that α1 is negative for each country, which they denoted as the “performance decline”
and interpreted as a measure for noncognitive skills. The constant of Equation (4.1) represents the
score of the average student at the start of the test (Qij = 0). Borghans and Schils (2012) showed the
decline in performance is related to personality traits, mainly agreeableness and motivation towards
learning, and predicts later life outcomes above and beyond the pure test score. Previous research has
exploited this finding to investigate the relationship between social gender norms and gender gaps in
test scores (Rodriguez-Planas and Nollenberger, 2018) and the variation between noncognitive skills
and test scores (Zamarro et al., 2016).
Gender Differences
We investigate gender differences in performance during the test while also making a distinction
between the topic that favors females (reading) and the topics that favor males (math and science).
The PISA 2009 turns out to be an optimal test for doing this, as (i) clusters of questions varied in
order between booklets, (ii) booklets are randomly handed out to students, and (iii) it had an equal
division between reading questions Rj , females’ favorable topic, and math-science questions Nj
(non-reading), males’ favorable topic (see Section 4.7.1).24 Given these three conditions we propose
24To create the 20 booklets it has in total 130 reading questions and 89 non-reading (math-science) questions. The
number of reading questions is less than one third in the PISA waves that focused on mathematics or science.
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to estimate the following two models per country:
yhij = β0 + β1 Fi + β2Qij + β3Qij Fi +Jj+Hh+hij (4.2)
︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷ ︷ ︸︸ ︷
yhij = γ
R
0 Rj+γ
N
0 Nj+γ
R
1 Rj Fi+γ
N
1 Nj Fi+γ
R
2 Rj Qij+γ
N
2 Nj Qij+γ
R
3 Rj FiQij+γ
N
3 Nj FiQij+Jj+Hh+vhij (4.3)
Where h is a subscript for the school, Fi is a gender dummy which equals 1 if student i is a female
and Jj and Hh are question- and school fixed effects respectively. Focusing on Equation (4.2), our
estimate of interest is β3, which tells us whether the performance of females develops differently
during the test than those of males. Figure 4.1 in the main text indicated β3 is bigger than zero:
females are better able to sustain their performance during the test.
Gender Gaps during the Test
Equation (4.3) introduces and interacts topic dummies with the variables for the question order and the
gender dummy. It has the exact same interpretation as Equation (4.2) with the coefficients separated
by topic Rj and Nj .25 γR1 and γ
N
1 measure gender differences at the start of the test in reading and
non-reading questions respectively, whereas γR3 and γ
N
3 measure gender differences in the ability to
sustain performance per topic. As the gender dummy takes value 1 for females, positive values of
γT1 and γ
T
3 indicate that females, respectively, have an initial advantage and a higher ability to sustain
their performance in topic T .
Equation (4.3) delivers the main insights of our paper. It allows us to analyze the impact of gender
differences in performance during the test on the widely studied gender gaps. In particular, to evaluate
the gender gaps at the beginning, during, and end of the test, we define the following:
• Gender gap at the start of the test = E[y|female, start of test, topic=T ] -
E[y|male, start of test, topic=T ] = (γT0 + γT1 )− γT0 = γT1
• Gender gap at the end of the test = E[y|female, end of test, topic=T ] -
E[y|male, end of test, topic=T ] = (γT0 + γT1 + γT2 + γT3 )− (γT0 + γT2 ) = γT1 + γT3
Estimation and Inference
Both equations include question- and school fixed effects. As described in Section 4.7.1, the order
of (clusters of) questions differ between booklets and booklets are randomly handed out to students.
Conditional on question fixed effects, our strategy exploits within question variation across students.
25Note that Equation (4.3) does not include a constant or a separate coefficient for Qij , as the variables Rj and Nj
include all questions in the PISA test.
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As such, the identifying assumption becomes random variation in the position of a question across
different students. This assumption is likely to hold due to the random allocation of booklets to
students. Moreover, by including school fixed effects we are controlling for school quality. As the
PISA first sampled schools and then randomly sampled students within schools, it might be the case
that males and females are not equally represented across schools with similar quality. Imagine a
country having two schools: the first has 80% males and is of high quality and the second has 80%
females and is of low quality. We would find that males performed better in the PISA test. In our view
this is actually a school characteristic, which we partial out by the inclusion of school fixed effects.
Our baseline results are estimated on the item level, but we also estimated Equation (4.2) on the
cluster level while excluding the question fixed effects. As such, the unit of analysis exactly matches
the unit of randomization: yhij represents the average performance within a cluster j and Qij is
the position of the cluster in the test. In our main specification we considered skipped questions
as incorrectly answered and unreached questions as missing. We will perform robustness checks
concerning the way we deal with unreached questions in Section 4.7.6.26 We used OLS to estimate
Equation (4.2) and (4.3) and checked for robustness with probit. Throughout the paper we clustered
standard errors at the student level and present the results without using PISA sample weights.2728
4.7.2 Baseline Results for the Different PISA Waves
PISA 2009
In Figure 4.2 and 4.3 of the main article we estimated Equation (4.2) on the item level. In this
section we estimate it on the cluster level. As such, the unit of analysis exactly matches the unit of
randomization: yhij measures the number of correct responses divided by the number of questions
within a cluster and Qij represents the position of the cluster within the test (0, 13 ,
2
3 , 1). Figure A.4.1
shows that the pattern is identical to our baseline results. For 70 out of the 74 participating countries,
we found females are better able to sustain their performance, where we did lose some power as for
50 countries it is statistically significant at the 10%-level. This is most likely the consequence of a
reduction in both the number of observations and variation in Qij .
26Across the PISA waves males have slightly more unreached questions than females, our results are thus not explained
by females spending more time on each question trying to provide an accurate answer. Section 4.7.6 confirms this.
27This immediately corrected for heteroscedasticity that arises due to the binary nature of a dependent variable. For the
baseline results we also clustered standard errors on the cluster level of the booklets, the item level (the PISA 2009 contains
220 unique items), and on the school level. Significance is virtually identical for all three levels of clustering (available
upon request).
28Absolute comparisons between countries are not our main interest, as such we did not use the PISA weights to adjust
the estimate from the PISA sample to an estimate for the population or the 80 replicates of the weights for its corresponding
standard error. Moreover, the weights no longer correctly adjust the sample to the population as our outcome variable is on
the item level and not at the student level. We did verify, however, that our baseline results are unchanged when using the
weights (available upon request).
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Using the definitions in Section 4.7.1 we can make precise statements on the gender gaps at the
beginning and end of the test. According to our baseline estimates, in math and science the gender gap
favored males in 68 countries at the beginning of the test. This widely studied gender gap, however,
was completely offset or even reversed in 20 countries after two hours of test taking. In other words,
at the end of the test females had an equal or higher probability of answering math-science questions
correctly for these 20 countries, whereas this was not the case at the beginning of the test. In 42
countries females have decreased the gender gap at the start by at least 50 percent at the end of the
test. Table A.4.5 provides an overview when in the test females close the gender gap in math and
science per country. For reading, the gender gap at the beginning of the test was favorable to females
in 73 countries, where at the end females’ advantage has increased by at least 50 percent for 39
countries.
PISA 2006 and 2012
In the main text we displayed the results for the PISA 2009. This section continues by applying a
similar analysis to the PISA 2006 and 2012. Our purpose is twofold. First, we can test whether our
results are robust to the use of different PISA waves. Second, the PISA 2006 focused on science and
the PISA 2012 on math, which assured that the distribution of science and non-science questions for
the PISA 2006 and math and non-math questions for the PISA 2012 is quite balanced. This allows us
to study the gender differences for math and science separately.
Figure A.4.2 first shows the estimates for the complete test, estimated with Equation (4.2). It
indicates that our previous results are present across the PISA waves. For all three waves we found
that for more than 96 percent of the countries females were better able to sustain their performance
than males, being statistically significant for more than 77 percent of the countries (at the 10%-level).
There is not a single country for which the gender difference during the test significantly favored
males. We can also see that gender differences are quite stable over time. The correlation of β3 across
the three PISA waves is around 0.45.29
Figure A.4.3 separates the analysis per topic. The upper panel displays the results for science (the
PISA 2006) and the lower panel displays the estimates for math (the PISA 2012).30 We found that for
both topics males performed better at the beginning of the test and females were better able to sustain
their performance during the test. For science (math) performance during the test favored females for
29Slovenia is the country for which females’ advantage in performance during the test is greatest across all three PISA
waves. Two other countries that exhibited large gender differences favoring females are Norway and Poland, whereas Asian
countries like Kyrgyzstan, Taiwan or Macao (China) have a smaller females’ advantage in performance during the test.
30For the PISA 2006 we combined the math and reading questions into one non-science dummy and for PISA 2012 we
combined the science and reading questions into one non-math dummy. We did not show figures for these estimates, which
are available upon request.
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52 (59) out of 57 (68) countries, being statistically significant for 34 (31) of them at the 10%-level. In
contrast, males only provided a statistically significant smaller decline in Montenegro at the 5%-level
when evaluating science questions separately. This confirms that, separately for math and science,
the gender gap at the beginning of the test favored males, but this advantage was smaller, offset, or
reversed at the end of the test.
PISA 2015
We continue our analysis by using the most recent PISA wave (2015). For 58 out of 73 participat-
ing countries this test was made on the computer, which provided us with additional information
to investigate potential determinants in the next section. Together with the implementation of the
computer-based test, the PISA introduced a few other changes to the test design.31 The characteristics
necessary for identification remained: clusters of questions vary between the booklets and booklets
are randomly assigned to students. Using the same strategy as in Section 4.3, Figure A.4.4 and A.4.5
show our baseline results from the previous waves carry over to the PISA 2015. The (seemingly)
smaller estimated gender differences in performance during the test for PISA 2015 can be explained
by the sample of countries that administered the computer-based test.
4.7.3 Potential Determinants of the Gender Difference in Ability to Sustain Perfor-
mance
As the gender difference is unrelated to the topic being assessed on a test, we have argued that our
findings cannot be driven by cognitive skills. In this section, we investigate various other potential
determinants.
Well-known Noncognitive Skills
Previous literature has shown that noncognitive skills are an important determinant of test scores
(Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Borghans et al., 2008b; Duckworth et al., 2011; Segal, 2012) and that
gender differences in noncognitive skills favor females in various dimensions (Jacob, 2002; Duck-
worth and Seligman, 2006; Chapman et al., 2007; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Schmitt et al., 2008;
31Three changes were implemented. First, next to science, math, and reading the PISA 2015 introduced a new domain
called collaborative problem solving. As not all countries participated with this new domain and it was not represented in
previous waves, we only use in our analysis the booklets that do not contain the clusters related to collaborative problem
solving. Second, the PISA used 35 different booklets per country, which is substantially more than the 13 booklets in
previous waves. Third, a somewhat more sophisticated rotation design made it possible for a cluster of questions to be at
the same position in more than one booklet. A student was randomly assigned to one of the 35 booklets, this determined
the position of the science clusters and the position and exact id of the math and reading clusters. A second random number
for the student combined with his or her booklet number determined the exact id of the science clusters. See OECD (2015)
for more details.
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Cornwell et al., 2013). The PISA includes student questionnaires that contain several questions that
serve either as direct measures or proxies for various types of noncognitive skills. We tested whether
certain specific noncognitive skills could affect our findings by estimating Equation (4.2) while sepa-
rately including each of these noncognitive skills (NC) and their interaction with the position of the
question: y = β0 + β1F + β2Q+ β3QF + β4NC + β5QNC + .
We considered questions that were specifically designed to measure noncognitive skills that have
been shown to be important for test scores in previous studies: agreeableness, openness (Duckworth
et al., 2010), self-concept (Eklo¨f, 2007), locus of control, self-discipline (Borghans et al., 2008b),
and conscientiousness (Heckman and Kautz, 2012). The questions included are referred to by the
PISA as measures for a specific noncognitive skill or are similar to the validated measures of the Big
Five Inventory (John and Srivastava, 1999), the grit scale (Duckworth et al., 2007), Rotter’s locus-of-
control scale (Rotter, 1966), the self-control scale (Tangney et al., 2004), and the Motivated Strategies
for Learning Questionnaire (MSQL) (Duncan and McKeachie, 2005). We also included several other
questions that could be seen as proxies for other well-known noncognitive skills, such as neuroticism.
Table A.4.6 provides an overview of the exact questions used, associated noncognitive skills, and for
some questions references to similar questions on the validated scales. Two examples are “Sometimes
I am just unlucky” and “I continue working on tasks until everything is perfect” to measure locus of
control and conscientiousness, respectively.
Our results show that these noncognitive skills cannot parse out the gender difference in per-
formance during the test. Across all the waves and measures we still found that females were sig-
nificantly better at being able to sustain their performance in at least 70 percent of the countries
considered.
Recent research proposes and validates an alternative measure for noncognitive skills; careless
answering behavior in surveys (Zamarro et al., 2017, 2018; Cheng et al., 2018). Following this re-
search, we calculated the non-response (number of unanswered questions divided by the total number
of questions) in the student questionnaire that accompanies the PISA test to construct a non self-
reported measure of noncognitive skills.32 Similarly, we included this measure and its interaction
with the question ordering in Equation (4.2) and found that it cannot parse out the gender differ-
ence.33
32Cheng et al. (2018) found that careless answering patterns are associated with conscientiousness and neuroticism.
33Similar to our baseline results, we found females were significantly better at being able to sustain their performance in
58 countries. The precise results for the analyses with all the measures of noncognitive skills are available upon request.
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Test Taking Strategies
Our baseline results could be explained by gender differences in test taking strategies, which we
defined as any deviation in response patterns from the actual ordering of questions. For example,
females might be more inclined to first take a quick look at every question on the test and answer
the ones that they think are easy. Alternatively, at the end of the test females might have a greater
propensity to check their answers.
To investigate these types of explanations, we took advantage of the fact that on the computer-
based PISA 2015 test, students were not allowed to go back and forth among units of questions
(OECD, 2015). We should note that questions on the PISA tests are organized into units. Reading
units contain 3.5 questions on average while math and science units contain on average 1.6 questions.
We estimated Equation (4.2) for the PISA 2015 at the unit level, where yhij represents the average
performance within a unit j, Qij is the position of the unit within the test, and question fixed effects
are replaced by unit fixed effects. To identify the gender difference, we only used the variation in unit
ordering across students. As students could not go back and forth between units, we can be sure that
the position of the unit in the test is the actual position in which the unit was answered. Figure A.4.6
shows an identical pattern to our baseline results, removing the possibility that gender differences in
test taking strategies drove our results. We did, however, lose significance for six countries, which is
most likely the consequence of a reduction in the number of observations and in the variation in Qij .
Dynamic Test Inputs
Conceptually, students’ knowledge is fixed throughout the test. In contrast, there are other test inputs
that may change during the test. We refer to the latter as dynamic inputs. Because of the computer-
based nature of the PISA 2015, we can get information on two of these inputs: time spent per question
(TQ) and actions per question (AQ).34 We use the subscript Q to highlight that these two inputs may
change depending on the position of the question in the test. Consider a production function where
these inputs are used to generate correct answers (YQ):
YQ = θQg(C, TQ, AQ)
θQ is interpreted as a “total factor productivity” parameter, which we view as the efficacy of the mental
process that transforms inputs into correct answers. Importantly, it can also vary inQ. This parameter
may account for mental fatigue or any other element not fully captured by TQ and AQ. Regarding the
34The number of actions in the PISA test does not simply mean filling in an item. The PISA interface contains open
questions as well as a calculator which allowed us to consider the number of actions as an input.
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role of the two dynamic inputs, the OECD (2015) has stated that better performing students generally
take more time to complete the test, and in 48 out of 58 countries we found a statistically significant
positive correlation between the number of actions and answering a question correctly. These findings
indicate that, consistent with the definition of an input, the first partial derivatives of YQ with respect
to AQ and TQ are positive. The derivative of YQ with respect to Q can be expressed as:
∂YQ
∂Q
=
∂θQ
∂Q
g(C, TQ, AQ) + θQ
∂g(C, TQ, AQ)
∂TQ
∂TQ
∂Q
+ θQ
∂g(C, TQ, AQ)
∂AQ
∂AQ
∂Q
One explanation for the gender difference in performance decline is that females might be better able
to keep up their levels of dynamic inputs during the test.35 This would be the case if ∂TQ∂Q and/or
∂AQ
∂Q were greater for females than for males. We tested this possibility by estimating Equation (4.2),
replacing the outcome variable with TQ and AQ. The former is measured in seconds, while the latter
is a composite measure of the number of clicks, double-clicks, key presses, and drag/drop events.
We found that the number of actions and time spent per question also declined during the test. On
average, students used fewer actions and spent less time per question at the end of the test than at the
beginning. This finding is consistent with the existence of a decline in performance. However, can
the dynamic inputs explain the gender difference? Figure 4.4a shows that the time spent per question
during the test did not show an obvious pattern by gender. Depending on the country, either females
or males decrease the amount of time spent per question more quickly, but the estimate is mostly in-
significant. This finding also rejects the possibility that females having better time management skills
(Misra and McKean, 2000; Trueman and Hartley, 1996) could explain our baseline result. Figure 4.4b
reveals that for most countries the number of actions per question during the test dropped faster for
females. The pattern was not as strong as our baseline result; we found this in 45 out of 58 countries,
being statistically significant for 24 of them at the 10% level.36
We conclude that dynamic inputs cannot explain the gender difference in performance during
the test. This is confirmed by augmenting Equation (4.2) with the two measures and estimating
y = β0 + β1F + β2Q + β3QF + β4T + β5QT + β6A + β7QA + . By doing this, we still
found that females were better able to sustain their performance during the test; see Figure A.4.7.
One possible interpretation of our findings can be made in terms of effort. The dynamic inputs are
interpreted as proxies of observable effort. As shown above, they declined as the test went on but
were not capable of capturing gender differences in ability to sustain performance. Thus, we attribute
this gender difference to θQ. To make this explicit within our framework, we estimated a linear
35By definition, knowledge (C) is constant during the test ( ∂C
∂Q
= 0).
36For two countries we found that males decreased their number of actions significantly faster during the test at the 10%
level.
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approximation of the relationship between the gender differences in ability to sustain performance
and gender differences in dynamic inputs during the test across countries (c):
∂YQ
∂Q
∣∣∣
f
− ∂YQ
∂Q
∣∣∣
m︸ ︷︷ ︸ =
[∂θQ
∂Q
∣∣∣
f
− ∂θQ
∂Q
∣∣∣
m
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸+
[∂TQ
∂Q
∣∣∣
f
− ∂TQ
∂Q
∣∣∣
m
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸+
[∂AQ
∂Q
∣∣∣
f
− ∂AQ
∂Q
∣∣∣
m
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
β̂Y3c = δ0 + δ1β̂
T
3c + δ2β̂
A
3c + c
The intercept of this regression captures the gender differences in performance during the test
that could not be explained by the dynamic inputs, but might be related to differences in total factor
productivity (∂θQ∂Q ). A positive intercept is consistent with females being better able to transform in-
puts into correct answers as the test goes on. Figure A.4.8 displays these two regressions visually and
clearly shows that the intercept is positive for both dynamic inputs. Also note that, as expected, the
gender differences in performance decline and dynamic inputs during the test show a significant pos-
itive relationship.37 Table A.4.7 shows the estimates of the corresponding regressions and confirms
the visual results, where columns (1), (3), and (5) display the results for time, number of actions, and
both inputs combined. Columns (2), (4), and (6) include an interaction between the gender difference
in dynamic inputs during the test and at the start of the test, which controls for the notion that a drop
in dynamic inputs might have a larger effect if the starting level of dynamic inputs were lower.38
Consistent with diminishing marginal returns to these dynamic inputs, we found this interaction was
negative: females’ ability to better keep up their inputs during the test leads to a smaller gender dif-
ference in performance during the test for females that have a higher baseline level of dynamic inputs.
However, the coefficients on the interaction terms are insignificant and do not change the magnitude
or significance of the positive intercept.
We view θQ as the efficacy of the mental process that translates test inputs into answers. What
does this mental process entail? As it cannot be observed in our dataset, we cannot provide a conclu-
sive answer to this question. However, we speculate that our finding is related to the literature that has
documented a gender difference that arises when considering the temporal dimension in performance,
i.e., boredom.
Previous research has found that females experience lower levels of boredom when performing
activities with a long duration (Vodanovich et al., 2005; Vodanovich and Kass, 1990a; Zuckerman
et al., 1978). Eastwood et al. (2012) argued that a definition for boredom could be given in terms
37Countries for which the decline in the number of actions and time spent per question is stronger for females show a
smaller gender difference in ability to sustain performance and vice versa.
38This notion of nonlinearity is captured by the conceptual framework as the drop in dynamic inputs ( ∂TQ
∂Q
) is multiplied
by the change in the production function ( ∂g(·)
∂TQ
).
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of attention, as performance on sustained attention tasks (so-called vigilance tasks) associated with
common measures of boredom.39 Individuals who experience boredom have impaired performance
on various tasks (Eastwood et al., 2012; Kass et al., 2010; Fisher, 1993). This literature argues that
the response to boredom is different between people who seek external stimulation (agitated bore-
dom) versus internal stimulation (apathetic boredom) (Malkovsky et al., 2012; Vodanovich and Kass,
1990b). Our results fit well with an agitated type of boredom, where a common response is to force
oneself to pay attention to the task at hand (Malkovsky et al., 2012; Eastwood et al., 2012; Harris,
2000; Fisher, 1993). However, our data does not allow us to provide conclusive evidence in favor of
this hypothesis or to rule out other competing explanations.
Being Stumped
Alternatively, one might think that the ability to sustain performance is about dealing with difficult
questions during the test. Students might get demotivated by certain questions, causing them to
perform poorly thereafter. This might eliminate the gender difference if males suffered more greatly
from this phenomenon.40 Measuring whether a student got stumped on a question is not easy, but by
means of the PISA 2015 we can conceptualize it as the question in which a student put forth more
effort (the maximum number of actions) while answering it wrong.41 We re-estimated Equation (4.2)
while including a dummy S, which equaled 1 after such a question, and interacted it with Q: y =
β0 + β1F + β2Q+ β3QF + β4S+ β5QS+ . We found our results to be unchanged (Figure A.4.9).
4.7.4 Longer Tests and the Math Gender Gap
Our results in the main text reveal a negative association between the math gender gap and test length
via the use of an extended version of the dataset from Lindberg et al. (2010). In this section we
investigate the robustness of this finding.
Column (1) of Table A.4.8 displays the original estimates of Table 4.1. The constant reveals
that on very short tests, males perform 0.2 standard deviations better than females, but females fully
close this gap on a test with 125 questions. Table 4.1 has already shown three checks to confirm
the robustness of this pattern. First, we collected information on the gender gap of the tests, where
the results did not change if we consider the gender gap we calculated. Moreover, we excluded one
39More specifically, the definition has two components: (i) not being able to successfully pay the attention required to
participate in a satisfying activity and (ii) being aware of this, resulting in either an attempt to engage with the task at hand
or awareness of engagement in matters unrelated to the task.
40Buser and Yuan (2016) found that females were more likely to stop competing if they lost, suggesting that females
would suffer more from being stumped.
41We also used our data from the PISA 2009 and measured being stumped as the first question that students were expected
to answer but did not give an actual answer to (skipped questions). The student is expected to have read these questions but
not to have answered. Results are identical (available upon request).
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extreme test with 240 questions42 and gave a weight of one-half to studies that we coded differently
than Lindberg et al. (2010). This did not change our results.
The statistically significant negative association notwithstanding, there does appear to be a lot
of noise in the math gender gap as displayed by the low adjusted R2. A substantial part of the
tests in our sample contained few questions; they were the ones that also introduced a large part of the
unexplained variance. In columns (2) and (3) of Table A.4.8 we trimmed our sample and excluded the
exams with fewer than 10 and 40 questions, respectively. The fit increased while excluding shorter
tests. Possible explanations for this are that short tests are subject to more noise (when measuring
ability) or that the number of questions is a worse proxy for test length when there are fewer questions.
An alternative measure for the length of the test is the maximum time allowed to complete the
exam. We preferred to use the number of questions to measure test length for three reasons. First,
in our experience (while collecting the data), the maximum time often did not correspond to the
actual length of the test. A short test in practice might have a long maximum time limit.43 Secondly,
information about the number of questions was available for more tests than the maximum time limit.
Thirdly, this measure coincides with our analysis and the PISA data where we used the position of
the question in the test to explain whether a question was answered correctly.
Nevertheless, we performed the basic analysis again and regressed the math gender gap on a
constant and the maximum time allowed to complete the test in column (4) of Table A.4.8. The
maximum time was also negatively associated with the gender gap, but insignificantly so (p-value
= 0.30). We redid the analysis in Table 4.1 and used our own recalculated gender gap and gave
a weight of one-half to tests that we coded differently (columns (5) and (6)). This did not change
our results. Next, we trimmed our sample for the same reasons as with the number of questions: to
exclude extremely long tests and to remove short tests that might include more noise concerning the
measured gender gap. Column (7) removes five extreme tests that took longer than 170 minutes and
reports a significant negative estimate for the coefficient of maximum time allowed to complete the
test at the 1% level.44 Columns (8) and (9) also exclude tests with a time limit shorter than 5 and 20
minutes, respectively, and also find significant negative effects.
Next, we investigated whether the relationship between the math gender gap and the length of the
test was related to gender differences in performance during the test that were found with the PISA.
The previous regressions did not exploit exogenous variation in the length of tests. A competing
explanation might be that long and short tests simply differ in other characteristics that correlate with
42The second longest test contained 135 questions.
43For example, one article (Murphy and Ross, 1990) noted that on a short exam of 8 questions, students could take a
maximum of 50 minutes.
44The sixth longest test had a maximum time of 135 minutes.
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the gender gap as well. Columns (2) and (3) of Table A.4.9 provide evidence against this competing
explanation. By using information on the world region in which the test was given, the columns split
the sample into world regions for which the relationship between the math gender gap and number of
questions is strongly present (Europe, Australia, and the Middle East) and for which it is not present at
all (Asia). Column (1) shows the estimate for the whole sample as a comparison. If gender differences
in performance during the test that were found with the PISA drove this relationship, we expect that
differences between males and females would be larger in Europe, Australia, and the Middle East than
in Asia. Using our baseline results, we observe that the gender difference is indeed two times as small
in Asian countries. A regression of the size of the gender difference (β3) on a dummy that equals
0 if the country is Asian and 1 if its European, Australia, or in the Middle East reveals a significant
positive estimate with a t-statistic of 4.00 (robust standard errors).
4.7.5 Low Stakes versus High Stakes
Many studies have found the existence of gender differences in performance when under pressure and
in competitive environments (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini,
2004). Azmat et al. (2016) and Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2018) showed that females perform relatively
worse as the stakes on a test increase. Ors et al. (2013) showed that males get better test scores when
they are competing for college seats than what would be predicted by their previous grades, while the
opposite is true for females. In contrast to this latter branch of literature, in our setting the test takers
did not face competition or pressure. In fact, final scores of the PISA test are not communicated to
the test takers.
Is the low stakes nature of the PISA test responsible for the observed gender difference in ability
to sustain performance? Given the discussion on the possible determinants in Section 4.7.3, one might
expect it to be smaller (or even absent) in a high-stakes context. If this were true, our results might
provide an additional explanation to the findings of Azmat et al. (2016) and Iriberri and Rey-Biel
(2018), as they found that females perform relatively better on low-stakes tests than on high-stakes
ones. In this section we investigate the possible influence of stakes in our results.
First, we tested whether the relationship between the math gender gap and length of the test was
also present on tests with stakes. To do so we coded whether tests included in Lindberg et al. (2010)
had any stakes. While this information was unavailable for 90 studies, column (4) of Table A.4.9
shows that the same negative relationship is found when restricting the regression to tests with stakes.
Secondly, we took advantage of country differences in testing culture. Gneezy et al. (2017) found
that students in Shanghai have higher test motivation than U.S. students. They showed that, in re-
sponse to financial incentives, performance among Shanghai students did not change, while the test
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scores of U.S. students increased substantially. According to Sjøberg (2007) test takers in Singapore
saw the PISA test as a relatively high-stakes test compared to, for example, European countries. If
the stronger test taking culture found in these two articles extends to other Asian countries, it could
explain the lower gender difference that we found in Asian countries. Then, higher stakes may re-
duce the gender differences in ability to sustain performance throughout the test. Note, however,
that for 60 percent of the Asian countries, the gender difference in performance during the test is
present and statistically significant. Relating our results to Sjøberg (2007), in both PISA waves in
which Singapore participated (2009 and 2012) we found a significantly lower decline for females at
the 10% level. With respect to Gneezy et al. (2017), the PISA 2009 only sampled Chinese test takers
from Shanghai. Table A.4.5 shows that in Shanghai, males significantly outperform females at the
beginning of the test in math and science by more than 3 percentage points, but females significantly
reduce the gender gap as the test goes on. The gap is exactly offset at the end of the test. To sum up,
by considering cross country differences in testing cultures, we conclude that the gender difference in
ability to sustain performance might be lower but not absent in the presence of stakes.
Ultimately, we would like to have a measure of motivation in the PISA test per country and study
its association with the size of the gender difference in ability to sustain performance. To construct
such a measure, we used the average number of unanswered questions per student as a measure of
test motivation. The idea being that, as the PISA test has no penalty for incorrect answers, not giving
an answer to a question is a strictly dominated strategy. We expect that this type of careless testing
behavior would occur less often if the perceived stakes were high. We regressed the size of the gender
difference in ability to sustain performance on our measure for the stakes of the PISA test. By doing
so, we did not find that the gender difference is larger in countries where the incidence of non-response
is higher. To the contrary, we found that countries with a low non-response rate (i.e. high subjective
stakes) had a somewhat larger gender difference in their ability to sustain performance. Similar to
before, this result suggests that the gender difference in sustaining performance throughout the test is
not absent in a high-stakes context.
4.7.6 Robustness
This section analyzes the robustness of our baseline results. In particular, we consider nonlinearity
in three different ways, analyze unreached questions, use a different definition for the performance at
the start of the test, and analyze the potential effects of the small break halfway during the PISA test.
Unless noted otherwise, we will use the PISA 2009 throughout this section.
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Probit
Our main estimates were computed using OLS. As the dependent variable is binary, we replicated
our baseline results making use of a probit model. The results for the complete test and per topic are
shown in Figure A.4.10 and A.4.11 respectively, which are very similar to the ones obtained by OLS.
Despite the sign of these coefficients being sufficient to inform us about the direction of the marginal
effects, it does not necessarily do so about its statistical significance. For the complete test we also
tested the significance of the marginal effects by using a Welsch t-test, where the results are virtually
identical to directly testing the coefficients, see Table A.4.10. We provide technical details on the
Welsch t-test below.
Technical Details on the Welsch t-test
We used the following procedure to test for differences in marginal effects. After estimating the probit
model, we took the derivative of Equation (4.2) with respect to Q: f(·)(β2 + β3F ) (suppressing
subscripts). Subsequently we evaluated this expression for males at F = 0, Q = 0.5, and Q ∗ F = 0
and for females at F = 1, Q = 0.5, and Q ∗ F = 0.5. As such, we had a value for the average
marginal effects of males ( 1N
∑N
n=1 f(·)
∣∣
males
β2) and females ( 1N
∑N
n=1 f(·)
∣∣
females
(β2 + β3)). In
practice, these marginal effects are tested through standard z-tests. Therefore, we performed a simple
Welsch t-test on the significant difference of them. More specifically, we applied the Welsch t-test as
follows (omitting the summations):
f(·)
∣∣
males
β2 − (f(·)
∣∣
females
β2 + f(·)
∣∣
females
β3)√
V ar[f(·)
∣∣
males
β2] + V ar[f(·)
∣∣
females
β2] + V ar[f(·)
∣∣
females
β3)] + 2Cov[f(·)
∣∣
females
β2, f(·)
∣∣
females
β3)]
∼ tk
(4.4)
Where k are the degrees of freedom of a t-distribution using the Satterthwaite approximation. Note
that this procedure does not explicitly has two independent samples. Alternatively, we could repeat
this procedure and estimate separate probit models for males and females and compare their marginal
effects through the Welsch t-test. However, the disadvantage of this is that the marginal effects do
not match the coefficients we present in the paper. Therefore, we opted for the procedure above. See
Table A.4.10 for the results.
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Nonlinear in Q
The models in Equation (4.2) and (4.3) assume a linear relationship between the answer to a question
and the position of the question in the test. This is a rather strong assumption, as estimating y =
β0 + β1Q+ β2Q
2 +  does show the presence of nonlinear effects.45
Despite the deviations from linear appear to be small and not homogeneous across countries, we
also tested whether allowing for nonlinear effects has consequences for the gender difference.46 First,
estimating Equation (4.2) while adding a quadratic term, y = β0 + β1F + β2Q+ β3QF + β4Q2 + ,
gave us identical results to Section 4.3.1. Second, we estimated Equation (4.2) while including an
interaction between the quadratic term and the female dummy: y = β0 + β1F + β2Q + β3QF +
β4Q
2+β5Q
2F+. The marginal effect of Q in this case equals β2+β3F+2β4Q+2β5QF . As such,
the relevant test for the gender difference in performance during the test becomes β3+2β5Q 6= 0. The
difference between males and females depends on the position of the question in the test. We tested
for the presence of a gender difference at every possible value of Q, which also provided insides in
the distribution of the gender difference throughout the test. Note that for 36 countries the estimate
for β5 was significantly negative at the 10%-level, which implies that for some countries the gender
difference in performance during the test decreases as the test goes on.47
Figure A.4.14 graphs the number of countries for which the gender difference (β3 + 2β5Q) is
significantly different from zero at the 10%-level at each position of the test. The black bars indicate
females were better able to sustain their performance, whereas the grey bars do this for males. Until
halfway the test (Q = 0.5) there is strong support that females were better able to sustain their
performance. Thereafter the gender difference decreases, but up until the end of the test there are
more countries for which females were better able to sustain their performance than males (18 versus
12). We found strong evidence for the gender difference, but the size seems to decrease towards the
end of the test.
45The results for the linear coefficient in Q (β1) showed the estimate is significantly negative for 63 of the 74 countries
at the 10%-level. In zero cases it was significantly positive. The quadratic estimate in Q (β2) was significantly negative
(positive) for 58 (3) countries at the 10%-level. As such, for most countries the decline in performance increased during the
test. Note that for all 74 participating countries we found either a significant negative estimate for β1 or for β2.
46Figure A.4.12 shows the fitted values for a linear and quadratic estimate of the decline in performance for the median
country in terms of the nonlinear effect size (Italy). The linear line seems to approximate the quadratic line relatively well.
Figure A.4.13 visualizes that the exact shape of the decline differs per country, by showing the fitted values of the quadratic
performance decline for the five countries with the most extreme nonlinear shapes.
47For the other 38 countries we could not reject the null hypothesis of β5 = 0 at the 10%-level. When we did not reject
the null hypothesis of β3 = 0 or β5 = 0 we did set the estimate equal to zero while calculating the marginal effects.
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A Relative Measure
One might argue that a relative version of the decline in performance is a more comprehensive mea-
sure. Imagine a simple version of Equation (4.1) represented by y = α+βQ. Test takers with gender
A score 1 at the beginning of the test and 12 at the end of the test, where test takers with gender B
score, respectively, 12 and
1
4 at the beginning and end of the test. The linear equation representing the
probability of a correct answer is y = 1− 12Q for gender A and y = 12 − 14Q for gender B, where the
decline in performance is −12 for A and −14 for B. However, as for both sexes the score at the end of
the test is half the score at the beginning of the test, one might prefer a measure that shows a similar
decline in performance. In other words, as gender A started off at a higher level compared to gender
B, it is also allowed to have a larger absolute deterioration in performance during the test.48
Note that such an alternative relative measure does not have qualitative consequences for our
results, females’ higher ability to sustain their performance is unrelated to whether they score better
or worse at the beginning of the test. However, this relative measure might capture why the gender
difference in performance during the test was more significant in math and science compared to
reading.
A relative measure can be obtained by computing the ratio between the slope and the constant.
Note that by implementing this correction, the above example would exhibit the same decline for A
and B, that is: βAαA =
βB
αB
= −12 . The proposed correction for the complete test can be analyzed by
the following nonlinear Wald test:
H0 :
β2
β0
= β2+β3β0+β1
H1 :
β2
β0
6= β2+β3β0+β1
Like in our baseline results, there are only three countries in which the relative decline in perfor-
mance was smaller for males and in none of these countries the difference is statistically significant.49
Moreover, the number of countries for which females were significantly better able to sustain their
performance notably increases from the 58 found in our baseline results to 67. This relative measure
reinforces our baseline results.
When analyzing gender differences in performance during the test per topic T we implement the
following test:
Ho :
γT2
γT0
=
γT2 +γ
T
3
γT0 +γ
T
1
H1 :
γT2
γT0
6= γT2 +γT3
γT0 +γ
T
1
48A usual way of dealing with this type of concern consists of taking the logarithm of the dependent variable and
interpreting the coefficients as a rate rather than as a slope (semi-elasticity). This is not possible in our setup given the
presence of zeros in the dependent variable.
49The precise results can be found in Table A.4.11.
152 Wait and See: Gender Differences in Performance on Cognitive Tests
Using this approach, there are 72 out of 74 countries for which females were better able to sustain
their performance in reading, where the statistical significance increases from 40 countries in Sec-
tion 4.3.2 to 61. This result follows from the fact that in most countries females experienced a higher
performance at the start of the test in reading.
In the case of math and science questions males started off from a higher level. Despite this, the
results are very similar to the ones obtained in Section 4.3.2. The number of countries in which fe-
males were significantly better able to sustain their performance is 39, compared to 46 in our baseline
results. There is one additional country for which the performance during the test favored males,
seven in total. In none of these seven countries the difference is statistically significant.
Details on Non-Linear Wald Test
As we wanted to test whether students with a higher starting level also have a larger decline in per-
formance, we specified the following nonlinear test (coefficients from Equation (4.2)): β2β0 =
β2+β3
β0+β1
.
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) explained the nonlinear Wald test is invariant to algebraically equiva-
lent ways of writing the nonlinear combinations of coefficients. As such, they suggested testing the
combination in multiple algebraically equivalent ways. Our results did not change if we tested the
following mathematically equivalent combination of coefficients: β2(β0 + β1) = β0(β2 + β3).
Note that the nonlinear combination of coefficients can be interpreted in terms of whether the
ratio P [Q1=1]P [Q0=1] is equal between males and females. If we follow Equation (4.2), we see that this ratio
for males equals β0+β2β0 and for females this ratio is
β0+β1+β2+β3
β0+β1
. If we want to test whether these
ratios are equal, we test: 1 + β2β0 = 1 +
β2+β3
β0+β1
. This exactly matches the test that we started with
above.
Unreached Questions
In our main specification unreached questions were coded as missing. Although on average males had
slightly more unreached questions than females (respectively 0.763 and 0.755 unreached questions on
a test with roughly 60 questions), one might be worried that our baseline results partially pick up that
females spent more time on each question trying to provide an accurate answer. In this section, we
investigate the robustness of our findings by considering the case in which unreached questions are
coded as wrong answers. The most suitable PISA wave to carry out this analysis is the PISA 2015,
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because it minimizes possible mistakes in the classification of unreached items.50 Figure A.4.15
documents our results are unchanged.
Increasing the Number of Questions to Measure Performance at the Start
Using the performance on the first question as a measure for the gender gaps at the beginning of the
test might be too restrictive. At the same time, one might think the decline in performance is not
severe at the first items of the test. We test for the robustness of our results by increasing the number
of questions that are considered to be at the beginning. We re-estimated Equation (4.2) and (4.3)
while coding the first five questions as the initial ones by setting a value of Qij = 0 for any item j
that was ordered in any of the first five positions in the test. By doing so the results were virtually
identical to our baseline results, see Figure A.4.16 and A.4.17.
Short Break after one Hour
The PISA test takers had a short break of typically 5 minutes after one hour of test taking. We tested
whether this short break affects the gender difference by making use of the halfway dummy H and
re-estimated Equation (4.2) as follows: y = β0+β1F +β2Q+β3QF +β4H+β5QH+. We do not
know at which item the student exactly was when they were allowed to have the short break, therefore
we simply conceptualized H to be equal to 1 if the student was halfway during the test (Q ≥ 0.5)
and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of this break does not affect the gender difference, our results were
identical to those reported in Section 4.3.1 (see Figure A.4.18).
4.A Appendix
50Unreached items are defined as all the successive unanswered questions clustered at the end of a test, except for the
first missing answer (OECD, 2012). The possibility of going back and forth across test items makes the pen-and-paper
based PISA waves prone to an incorrect categorization of unreached items.
Figure A.4.1: Gender differences in performance during the test on the cluster level. PISA 2009
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Figure A.4.2: Gender differences in performance during the test. PISA 2006 and PISA 2012
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All questions (PISA 2006)
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Figure A.4.3: Gender differences in initial performance and performance during the test by topic. PISA 2006 (science)
and PISA 2012 (math)
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Figure A.4.4: Gender differences in performance during the test. PISA 2015
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Figure A.4.5: Gender differences in initial performance and performance during the test by topic. PISA 2015 (science)
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Figure A.4.6: Gender differences in performance during the test on the unit level. PISA 2015
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Figure A.4.7: Gender differences in performance during the test while controlling for number of actions and time spent
per question. PISA 2015
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Figure A.4.8: Positive intercept and slope when regressing the gender difference in performance decline upon the gender
difference during the test in time spent and number of actions per question. See Table A.4.7 for the regression results.
Notes: The figures are based upon the PISA 2015 and display a scatter plot and a linear
OLS regression line between the gender difference in performance decline and the gender
difference during the test in time spent per question (upper graph) and number of actions per
question (bottom graph).
Figure A.4.9: Gender differences in performance during the test controlling for stumping. PISA 2015
F
IN
H
U
N
T
U
R
Q
A
T
A
R
E
IT
A
S
V
N
L
V
A
T
U
N
H
R
V
C
H
L
IS
L
K
O
R
S
V
K
G
R
C
Q
U
E
S
W
E
P
O
L
J
P
N
N
Z
L
H
K
G
IR
L
M
N
E
A
U
T
G
B
R
B
G
R
C
R
I
M
E
X
P
R
T
C
H
E
L
T
U
U
S
A
B
R
A
A
U
S
B
E
L
U
R
Y
F
R
A
Q
E
S
C
Z
E
Q
C
H
D
O
M
C
O
L
D
N
K
D
E
U
R
U
S
T
A
P
P
E
R
E
S
P
N
L
D
C
A
N
L
U
X
T
H
A
E
S
T
S
G
P
IS
R
M
A
C
Q
U
C
N
O
R
−0.06
−0.04
−0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Figure A.4.10: Gender differences in performance during the test, probit estimation. PISA 2009
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Figure A.4.11: Gender differences in initial performance and performance during the test by topic, probit. PISA 2009
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Figure A.4.12: Linear and nonlinear estimate of the decline in performance during the test for Italy
Notes: The figure is based upon the PISA 2009 and displays fitted values for a linear and
quadratic estimate of the performance decline.
Figure A.4.13: Nonlinear estimates of the decline in performance during the test for the five countries with the most
extreme nonlinear shape
Notes: The figure is based upon the PISA 2009 and displays fitted values for the quadratic es-
timate of the performance decline. For Turkey, Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica the decline
increases as the test continues, where the opposite is true for Azerbaijan.
Figure A.4.14: Testing for gender differences in the decline in performance at different positions of the test. PISA 2009
Notes: The figure displays the number of countries for which the gender difference in the
decline in performance is significantly different at each position of the test.
Figure A.4.15: Gender differences in performance during the test coding unreached questions as wrong. PISA 2015
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Figure A.4.16: Gender differences in performance during the test, first five questions included in Q = 0. PISA 2009
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Figure A.4.17: Gender differences in initial performance and performance during the test by topic, first five questions
included in Q = 0. PISA 2009
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Figure A.4.18: Gender differences in performance during the test controlling for the short break in the middle of the test.
PISA 2009
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Table A.4.1: Gender differences in performance during the test. PISA 2009
Country Gender diff. p-value Country Gender diff. p-value Country Gender diff. p-value
during during during
the test the test the test
ALB 0.0097 (0.0074) 0.1887 HRV 0.0299 (0.0064) 3.06e-06 NZL 0.0335 (0.0065) 2.96e-07
ARE 0.0311 (0.0045) 6.60e-12 HUN 0.0295 (0.0065) 6.50e-06 PAN 0.0070 (0.0077) 0.3622
ARG 0.0076 (0.0080) 0.3384 IDN 0.0150 (0.0067) 0.0250 PER 0.0005 (0.0073) 0.9437
AUS 0.0388 (0.0038) 0.0000 IRL 0.0476 (0.0074) 1.43e-10 POL 0.0275 (0.0067) 0.0000
AUT 0.0365 (0.0057) 2.09e-10 ISL 0.0160 (0.0078) 0.0398 PRT 0.0315 (0.0058) 4.62e-08
AZE 0.0117 (0.0072) 0.1026 ISR 0.0218 (0.0069) 0.0016 QAT 0.0352 (0.0049) 1.09e-12
BEL 0.0254 (0.0049) 2.30e-07 ITA 0.0325 (0.0027) 0.0000 QCN 0.0263 (0.0057) 4.17e-06
BGR 0.0089 (0.0075) 0.2335 JOR 0.0506 (0.0062) 2.22e-16 QHP 0.0349 (0.0113) 0.0019
BRA 0.0385 (0.0035) 0.0000 JPN 0.0150 (0.0059) 0.0118 QTN 0.0110 (0.0075) 0.1396
CAN 0.0379 (0.0030) 0.0000 KAZ -0.0016(0.0066) 0.8148 QVE -0.0039(0.0096) 0.6798
CHE 0.0328 (0.0042) 7.99e-15 KGZ 0.0043 (0.0075) 0.5639 ROU 0.0179 (0.0067) 0.0075
CHL 0.0285 (0.0063) 5.97e-06 KOR 0.0211 (0.0059) 0.0004 RUS 0.0147 (0.0070) 0.0358
COL 0.0212 (0.0058) 0.0002 LIE 0.0354 (0.0270) 0.1895 SGP 0.0113 (0.0060) 0.0599
CRI 0.0182 (0.0070) 0.0095 LTU 0.0267 (0.0067) 0.0001 SRB 0.0292 (0.0063) 4.00e-06
CZE 0.0368 (0.0060) 6.17e-10 LUX 0.0242 (0.0072) 0.0008 SVK 0.0195 (0.0070) 0.0050
DEU 0.0284 (0.0065) 0.0000 LVA 0.0366 (0.0068) 8.33e-08 SVN 0.0510 (0.0059) 0.0000
DNK 0.0342 (0.0059) 7.85e-09 MAC -0.0020(0.0061) 0.7423 SWE 0.0437 (0.0070) 4.63e-10
ESP 0.0226 (0.0030) 3.77e-14 MDA 0.0041 (0.0072) 0.5685 TAP 0.0075 (0.0058) 0.1944
EST 0.0101 (0.0063) 0.1110 MEX 0.0196 (0.0024) 8.88e-16 THA 0.0103 (0.0058) 0.0738
FIN 0.0279 (0.0057) 1.01e-06 MLT 0.0507 (0.0085) 2.94e-09 TTO 0.0356 (0.0077) 3.28e-06
FRA 0.0274 (0.0074) 0.0002 MNE 0.0270 (0.0068) 0.0001 TUN 0.0170 (0.0073) 0.0200
GBR 0.0315 (0.0041) 8.22e-15 MUS 0.0167 (0.0068) 0.0143 TUR 0.0188 (0.0066) 0.0044
GEO 0.0058 (0.0080) 0.4721 MYS 0.0142 (0.0069) 0.0406 URY 0.0241 (0.0071) 0.0007
GRC 0.0208 (0.0074) 0.0050 NLD 0.0229 (0.0062) 0.0002 USA 0.0297 (0.0062) 1.53e-06
HKG 0.0132 (0.0063) 0.0370 NOR 0.0465 (0.0068) 7.79e-12
Notes: Obtained by OLS estimations of Equation (4.2). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the student
level.
Table A.4.2: Gender differences in initial performance and performance during the test by topic. PISA 2009
Country Diff. in reading p-value Diff. in reading p-value Diff. in science p-value Diff. in science p-value
starting level during and math and math
the test starting level during the test
ALB 0.1104 (0.0078) 0.0000 0.0176 (0.0114) 0.1213 0.0308 (0.0071) 0.0000 -0.0059 (0.0107) 0.5840
ARE 0.0507 (0.0070) 4.28e-13 0.0359 (0.0069) 1.81e-07 -0.0104 (0.0072) 0.1460 0.0215 (0.0072) 0.0028
ARG 0.0244 (0.0072) 0.0007 0.0185 (0.0121) 0.1251 -0.0199 (0.0068) 0.0034 -0.0102 (0.0111) 0.3619
AUS 0.0400 (0.0045) 0.0000 0.0343 (0.0061) 2.42e-08 -0.0348 (0.0047) 1.71e-13 0.0389 (0.0068) 1.29e-08
AUT 0.0185 (0.0060) 0.0021 0.0387 (0.0086) 6.51e-06 -0.0841 (0.0064) 0.0000 0.0307 (0.0093) 0.0009
AZE 0.0321 (0.0070) 3.91e-06 -0.0025(0.0106) 0.8156 -0.0173 (0.0065) 0.0075 0.0277 (0.0103) 0.0074
BEL 0.0044 (0.0052) 0.3951 0.0295 (0.0074) 0.0001 -0.0597 (0.0055) 0.0000 0.0158 (0.0083) 0.0557
BGR 0.0791 (0.0077) 0.0000 0.0055 (0.0113) 0.6229 -0.0177 (0.0076) 0.0205 0.0080 (0.0112) 0.4755
BRA 0.0207 (0.0034) 8.20e-10 0.0425 (0.0053) 1.11e-15 -0.0368 (0.0031) 0.0000 0.0328 (0.0048) 7.59e-12
CAN 0.0413 (0.0033) 0.0000 0.0407 (0.0047) 0.0000 -0.0312 (0.0034) 0.0000 0.0294 (0.0053) 2.29e-08
CHE 0.0310 (0.0045) 7.83e-12 0.0385 (0.0066) 5.82e-09 -0.0482 (0.0047) 0.0000 0.0203 (0.0071) 0.0043
CHL 0.0068 (0.0061) 0.2626 0.0346 (0.0095) 0.0003 -0.0496 (0.0064) 6.88e-15 0.0186 (0.0095) 0.0509
COL 0.0064 (0.0053) 0.2325 0.0174 (0.0087) 0.0468 -0.0568 (0.0051) 0.0000 0.0247 (0.0084) 0.0032
CRI 0.0061 (0.0064) 0.3468 0.0162 (0.0104) 0.1169 -0.0535 (0.0065) 2.22e-16 0.0164 (0.0104) 0.1152
CZE 0.0306 (0.0061) 5.89e-07 0.0317 (0.0087) 0.0003 -0.0554 (0.0064) 0.0000 0.0355 (0.0097) 0.0002
DEU 0.0324 (0.0064) 4.44e-07 0.0254 (0.0095) 0.0075 -0.0612 (0.0067) 0.0000 0.0264 (0.0102) 0.0100
DNK 0.0269 (0.0064) 0.0000 0.0346 (0.0094) 0.0002 -0.0431 (0.0070) 6.71e-10 0.0308 (0.0105) 0.0032
ESP 0.0389 (0.0031) 0.0000 0.0225 (0.0046) 1.24e-06 -0.0360 (0.0033) 0.0000 0.0184 (0.0050) 0.0002
EST 0.0609 (0.0068) 0.0000 0.0157 (0.0098) 0.1074 -0.0163 (0.0072) 0.0234 -0.0010 (0.0108) 0.9268
FIN 0.0803 (0.0061) 0.0000 0.0353 (0.0089) 0.0001 0.0001 (0.0067) 0.9868 0.0133 (0.0102) 0.1932
FRA 0.0204 (0.0070) 0.0034 0.0371 (0.0109) 0.0007 -0.0534 (0.0070) 3.02e-14 0.0085 (0.0115) 0.4561
GBR 0.0260 (0.0047) 3.44e-08 0.0273 (0.0065) 0.0000 -0.0464 (0.0048) 0.0000 0.0323 (0.0070) 4.45e-06
GEO 0.1093 (0.0079) 0.0000 0.0000 (0.0122) 0.9974 0.0138 (0.0073) 0.0607 0.0143 (0.0111) 0.1971
GRC 0.0547 (0.0068) 1.33e-15 0.0122 (0.0109) 0.2618 -0.0404 (0.0073) 3.64e-08 0.0235 (0.0116) 0.0421
HKG 0.0218 (0.0064) 0.0006 0.0158 (0.0092) 0.0855 -0.0415 (0.0071) 4.60e-09 0.0067 (0.0105) 0.5231
HRV 0.0311 (0.0068) 4.85e-06 0.0429 (0.0094) 5.59e-06 -0.0515 (0.0075) 8.52e-12 0.0089 (0.0107) 0.4046
HUN 0.0183 (0.0062) 0.0033 0.0286 (0.0096) 0.0028 -0.0628 (0.0068) 0.0000 0.0267 (0.0103) 0.0097
IDN 0.0506 (0.0061) 0.0000 0.0014 (0.0097) 0.8868 -0.0207 (0.0057) 0.0003 0.0277 (0.0094) 0.0033
IRL 0.0251 (0.0097) 0.0100 0.0479 (0.0118) 0.0000 -0.0387 (0.0099) 0.0001 0.0416 (0.0126) 0.0010
ISL 0.0752 (0.0085) 0.0000 0.0105 (0.0126) 0.4021 -0.0131 (0.0090) 0.1443 0.0157 (0.0137) 0.2521
ISR 0.0448 (0.0073) 9.50e-10 0.0167 (0.0107) 0.1176 -0.0362 (0.0073) 6.11e-07 0.0176 (0.0104) 0.0912
ITA 0.0296 (0.0027) 0.0000 0.0328 (0.0040) 2.22e-16 -0.0669 (0.0029) 0.0000 0.0265 (0.0043) 9.37e-10
JOR 0.0256 (0.0170) 0.1336 0.0501 (0.0093) 6.86e-08 -0.0421 (0.0170) 0.0134 0.0468 (0.0092) 3.48e-07
JPN 0.0330 (0.0059) 2.48e-08 0.0121 (0.0087) 0.1656 -0.0296 (0.0060) 8.43e-07 0.0145 (0.0093) 0.1209
KAZ 0.0751 (0.0065) 0.0000 -0.0067(0.0100) 0.5041 0.0018 (0.0063) 0.7692 -0.0005 (0.0100) 0.9617
KGZ 0.0693 (0.0068) 0.0000 0.0005 (0.0115) 0.9685 0.0065 (0.0060) 0.2776 0.0059 (0.0102) 0.5616
KOR 0.0328 (0.0068) 1.63e-06 0.0163 (0.0086) 0.0578 -0.0255 (0.0077) 0.0009 0.0223 (0.0103) 0.0303
LIE -0.0042(0.0248) 0.8666 0.0357 (0.0401) 0.3732 -0.0833 (0.0271) 0.0021 0.0281 (0.0435) 0.5178
LTU 0.0850 (0.0071) 0.0000 0.0256 (0.0104) 0.0143 -0.0055 (0.0074) 0.4562 0.0233 (0.0111) 0.0354
LUX 0.0563 (0.0078) 4.40e-13 0.0078 (0.0115) 0.4965 -0.0541 (0.0078) 4.14e-12 0.0390 (0.0117) 0.0009
LVA 0.0589 (0.0070) 0.0000 0.0366 (0.0103) 0.0004 -0.0202 (0.0074) 0.0065 0.0331 (0.0113) 0.0034
MAC 0.0302 (0.0062) 1.26e-06 -0.0003(0.0089) 0.9710 -0.0341 (0.0067) 3.45e-07 -0.0082 (0.0101) 0.4171
MDA 0.0691 (0.0069) 0.0000 0.0058 (0.0105) 0.5781 0.0073 (0.0068) 0.2805 0.0003 (0.0107) 0.9757
MEX 0.0183 (0.0022) 2.22e-16 0.0111 (0.0036) 0.0018 -0.0499 (0.0023) 0.0000 0.0267 (0.0037) 6.39e-13
MLT 0.0491 (0.0223) 0.0276 0.0437 (0.0128) 0.0006 -0.0395 (0.0225) 0.0793 0.0550 (0.0141) 0.0001
MNE 0.0703 (0.0074) 0.0000 0.0115 (0.0105) 0.2732 -0.0377 (0.0071) 9.88e-08 0.0392 (0.0104) 0.0002
MUS 0.0265 (0.0078) 0.0007 0.0120 (0.0099) 0.2262 -0.0353 (0.0077) 4.40e-06 0.0186 (0.0105) 0.0755
MYS 0.0457 (0.0070) 5.63e-11 0.0128 (0.0106) 0.2279 -0.0128 (0.0065) 0.0503 0.0139 (0.0100) 0.1667
NLD 0.0088 (0.0059) 0.1372 0.0245 (0.0091) 0.0075 -0.0441 (0.0062) 1.08e-12 0.0169 (0.0098) 0.0847
NOR 0.0625 (0.0071) 0.0000 0.0509 (0.0107) 1.80e-06 -0.0201 (0.0079) 0.0113 0.0389 (0.0120) 0.0012
NZL 0.0570 (0.0082) 3.74e-12 0.0295 (0.0105) 0.0051 -0.0207 (0.0088) 0.0195 0.0336 (0.0121) 0.0055
PAN 0.0152 (0.0074) 0.0396 -0.0038(0.0117) 0.7418 -0.0446 (0.0066) 1.35e-11 0.0174 (0.0106) 0.1009
PER 0.0122 (0.0064) 0.0544 -0.0059(0.0109) 0.5865 -0.0388 (0.0058) 2.02e-11 0.0067 (0.0100) 0.5009
POL 0.0639 (0.0069) 0.0000 0.0313 (0.0105) 0.0028 -0.0152 (0.0077) 0.0475 0.0176 (0.0117) 0.1321
PRT 0.0406 (0.0060) 1.07e-11 0.0320 (0.0087) 0.0002 -0.0350 (0.0063) 2.95e-08 0.0256 (0.0096) 0.0077
QAT 0.0314 (0.0092) 0.0006 0.0442 (0.0077) 8.76e-09 -0.0159 (0.0094) 0.0917 0.0224 (0.0071) 0.0016
QCN 0.0304 (0.0056) 4.55e-08 0.0208 (0.0084) 0.0133 -0.0306 (0.0063) 1.16e-06 0.0296 (0.0097) 0.0022
QHP 0.0070 (0.0120) 0.5623 0.0081 (0.0182) 0.6572 -0.0564 (0.0095) 3.23e-09 0.0614 (0.0145) 0.0000
QTN 0.0174 (0.0087) 0.0442 0.0143 (0.0119) 0.2312 -0.0146 (0.0070) 0.0369 0.0061 (0.0097) 0.5294
QVE 0.0210 (0.0091) 0.0208 0.0039 (0.0144) 0.7854 -0.0297 (0.0088) 0.0007 -0.0170 (0.0141) 0.2271
ROU 0.0125 (0.0066) 0.0574 0.0138 (0.0099) 0.1656 -0.0688 (0.0066) 0.0000 0.0201 (0.0101) 0.0462
RUS 0.0655 (0.0069) 0.0000 0.0184 (0.0104) 0.0777 -0.0092 (0.0072) 0.2022 0.0080 (0.0113) 0.4767
SGP 0.0381 (0.0069) 3.49e-08 0.0043 (0.0094) 0.6442 -0.0215 (0.0075) 0.0040 0.0159 (0.0106) 0.1345
SRB 0.0399 (0.0061) 6.88e-11 0.0110 (0.0091) 0.2242 -0.0586 (0.0069) 0.0000 0.0467 (0.0102) 4.97e-06
SVK 0.0652 (0.0073) 0.0000 0.0146 (0.0103) 0.1562 -0.0337 (0.0077) 0.0000 0.0173 (0.0114) 0.1274
SVN 0.0276 (0.0060) 4.64e-06 0.0488 (0.0085) 9.34e-09 -0.0683 (0.0064) 0.0000 0.0491 (0.0094) 1.51e-07
SWE 0.0570 (0.0076) 4.37e-14 0.0406 (0.0112) 0.0003 -0.0155 (0.0081) 0.0564 0.0415 (0.0123) 0.0007
TAP 0.0610 (0.0065) 0.0000 0.0058 (0.0088) 0.5086 -0.0080 (0.0068) 0.2397 0.0050 (0.0098) 0.6139
THA 0.0602 (0.0058) 0.0000 0.0050 (0.0084) 0.5564 -0.0066 (0.0062) 0.2812 0.0109 (0.0094) 0.2439
TTO 0.0645 (0.0073) 0.0000 0.0298 (0.0113) 0.0086 -0.0177 (0.0069) 0.0101 0.0416 (0.0107) 0.0001
TUN 0.0251 (0.0068) 0.0002 0.0134 (0.0112) 0.2311 -0.0438 (0.0060) 2.96e-13 0.0211 (0.0098) 0.0316
TUR 0.0508 (0.0066) 1.11e-14 0.0098 (0.0097) 0.3130 -0.0334 (0.0066) 3.31e-07 0.0242 (0.0101) 0.0163
URY 0.0462 (0.0062) 8.08e-14 0.0205 (0.0105) 0.0502 -0.0420 (0.0066) 1.99e-10 0.0273 (0.0106) 0.0103
USA 0.0244 (0.0070) 0.0005 0.0284 (0.0100) 0.0043 -0.0376 (0.0071) 1.14e-07 0.0259 (0.0106) 0.0147
Notes: Obtained by OLS estimations of Equation (4.3). Standard errors (in parentheses) clustered at the student
level.
Table A.4.3: Rotation design of the 20 PISA booklets. PISA 2009
Booklet Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Standard Easy
booklet booklet
1 Math 1 Reading 1 Reading 3A Math 3 X
2 Reading 1 Science 1 Reading 4A Reading 7 X
3 Science 1 Reading 3A Math 2 Science 3 X
4 Reading 3A Reading 4A Science 2 Reading 2 X
5 Reading 4A Math 2 Reading 5 Math 1 X
6 Reading 5 Reading 6 Reading 7 Reading 3A X
7 Reading 6 Math 3 Science 3 Reading 4A X
8 Reading 2 Math 1 Science 1 Reading 6 X X
9 Math 2 Science 2 Reading 6 Reading 1 X X
10 Science 2 Reading 5 Math 3 Science 1 X X
11 Math 3 Reading 7 Reading 2 Math 2 X X
12 Reading 7 Science 3 Math 1 Science 2 X X
13 Science 3 Reading 2 Reading 1 Reading 5 X X
14 Math 1 Reading 1 Reading 3B Math 3 X
15 Reading 1 Science 1 Reading 4B Reading 7 X
16 Science 1 Reading 3B Math 2 Science 3 X
17 Reading 3B Reading 4B Science 2 Reading 2 X
18 Reading 4B Math 2 Reading 5 Math 1 X
19 Reading 5 Reading 6 Reading 7 Reading 3B X
20 Reading 6 Math 3 Science 3 Reading 4B X
Source: OECD (2012)
Table A.4.4: Randomization test. PISA 2009
Gender Mother Father Self Mother Father Language Possessions Possessions How many Age of
highest highest born in born in born in at home desk own room books student
schooling schooling country country country at home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Booklet=2 0.00794 0.00334 -0.0250 0.00291 0.00613 -0.00468 -0.00539 -0.00224 -0.00317 0.00143 0.00301
(0.72) (0.14) (-1.05) (0.63) (0.82) (-0.63) (-0.67) (-0.27) (-0.38) (0.04) (0.47)
Booklet=3 0.00439 0.0172 0.0186 -0.00323 -0.00140 -0.00698 -0.000346 0.00149 -0.0111 -0.0142 -0.000698
(0.40) (0.73) (0.75) (-0.73) (-0.19) (-0.93) (-0.04) (0.18) (-1.39) (-0.45) (-0.11)
Booklet=4 0.0117 0.000263 -0.00718 0.00160 0.00324 -0.00803 -0.0101 -0.00366 0.00676 0.0162 0.00872
(1.07) (0.01) (-0.30) (0.35) (0.44) (-1.09) (-1.25) (-0.45) (0.82) (0.53) (1.35)
Booklet=5 0.0114 0.00391 -0.00166 -0.000857 0.000863 -0.00269 -0.00484 -0.00651 -0.00344 -0.0165 0.00185
(1.03) (0.17) (-0.07) (-0.16) (0.11) (-0.34) (-0.58) (-0.81) (-0.42) (-0.52) (0.29)
Booklet=6 0.0217∗∗ -0.0101 0.000509 -0.000475 0.00190 -0.000299 0.00311 -0.00292 -0.0180∗∗ 0.0122 0.00410
(1.98) (-0.44) (0.02) (-0.10) (0.26) (-0.04) (0.38) (-0.36) (-2.27) (0.39) (0.64)
Booklet=7 -0.00131 0.0199 0.00347 0.0000170 0.00429 0.00278 0.00220 0.00548 -0.00509 -0.0189 -0.000367
(-0.12) (0.84) (0.14) (0.00) (0.57) (0.36) (0.26) (0.65) (-0.63) (-0.60) (-0.05)
Booklet=8 0.00208 -0.00763 -0.00756 0.00177 -0.00378 -0.00552 -0.000470 0.00390 -0.00960 -0.0312 0.000895
(0.21) (-0.35) (-0.34) (0.43) (-0.58) (-0.83) (-0.06) (0.51) (-1.28) (-1.10) (0.15)
Booklet=9 0.00432 -0.0159 0.00497 0.00103 -0.00364 -0.00882 -0.00105 0.00578 -0.00818 -0.0119 0.00527
(0.43) (-0.75) (0.22) (0.25) (-0.56) (-1.34) (-0.14) (0.74) (-1.09) (-0.42) (0.88)
Booklet=10 -0.00596 -0.000868 0.00947 -0.000346 -0.00139 -0.00567 0.00107 -0.00366 -0.00347 0.0296 0.00404
(-0.60) (-0.04) (0.42) (-0.09) (-0.21) (-0.85) (0.14) (-0.50) (-0.46) (1.04) (0.69)
Booklet=11 0.00889 -0.00605 0.00440 0.000531 -0.00311 -0.00455 -0.00606 0.00546 -0.00311 -0.0166 0.00177
(0.89) (-0.29) (0.20) (0.13) (-0.48) (-0.68) (-0.82) (0.72) (-0.42) (-0.58) (0.30)
Booklet=12 0.00553 0.0135 -0.0144 0.00339 0.00105 -0.000688 -0.00439 -0.00778 -0.00332 -0.00415 0.00403
(0.56) (0.63) (-0.64) (0.83) (0.16) (-0.10) (-0.59) (-1.06) (-0.44) (-0.15) (0.70)
Booklet=13 -0.00356 0.00992 0.000589 0.00158 -0.00142 -0.00236 0.000164 -0.000736 -0.00618 -0.0134 -0.00286
(-0.36) (0.46) (0.03) (0.39) (-0.22) (-0.35) (0.02) (-0.10) (-0.82) (-0.48) (-0.49)
Booklet=14 -0.000470 -0.0186 -0.00923 0.00275 0.000141 -0.00382 0.00466 -0.00288 -0.0221∗∗ -0.0260 0.00442
(-0.04) (-0.60) (-0.29) (0.69) (0.02) (-0.60) (0.61) (-0.28) (-2.17) (-0.84) (0.63)
Booklet=15 -0.00152 -0.0244 -0.0345 -0.000293 -0.00381 -0.00464 0.000911 -0.00628 -0.00794 -0.0278 0.00395
(-0.13) (-0.79) (-1.09) (-0.08) (-0.63) (-0.74) (0.12) (-0.61) (-0.77) (-0.91) (0.56)
Booklet=16 0.0100 -0.0191 -0.0488 0.00386 -0.00451 -0.00275 0.000977 0.00637 -0.00798 -0.0202 0.00402
(0.84) (-0.62) (-1.55) (0.92) (-0.75) (-0.43) (0.13) (0.63) (-0.78) (-0.66) (0.58)
Booklet=17 -0.000417 0.0183 -0.00197 0.000248 -0.00377 -0.00455 0.000704 0.00921 -0.0104 -0.0320 0.0000957
(-0.03) (0.60) (-0.06) (0.06) (-0.62) (-0.72) (0.09) (0.90) (-1.02) (-1.06) (0.01)
Booklet=18 0.00400 -0.0352 -0.0318 0.00196 0.00197 -0.000900 0.00388 0.00915 -0.0129 0.0303 0.000963
(0.33) (-1.16) (-1.02) (0.49) (0.30) (-0.14) (0.49) (0.90) (-1.26) (0.95) (0.14)
Booklet=19 -0.00614 -0.0413 -0.0261 0.00291 -0.00258 -0.00562 0.00205 -0.0100 -0.0111 0.0140 -0.00498
(-0.51) (-1.33) (-0.82) (0.72) (-0.43) (-0.91) (0.27) (-1.00) (-1.10) (0.45) (-0.72)
Booklet=20 0.00597 -0.0123 -0.00122 0.000691 -0.000498 -0.00226 -0.000666 -0.00227 0.00433 0.0218 -0.000613
(0.50) (-0.40) (-0.04) (0.18) (-0.08) (-0.35) (-0.09) (-0.23) (0.41) (0.70) (-0.09)
Constant 1.511∗∗∗ 2.114∗∗∗ 2.010∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 1.323∗∗∗ 2.178∗∗∗ 15.77∗∗∗
(121.81) (72.09) (68.51) (245.08) (169.31) (167.36) (149.79) (131.15) (123.59) (66.12) (2178.87)
Observations 514865 486133 473178 506007 502761 499261 495177 504103 505341 504108 514867
F-value 0.82 0.64 0.62 0.47 0.56 0.48 0.58 0.86 1.10 1.25 0.55
p-value 0.689 0.879 0.893 0.976 0.936 0.970 0.925 0.632 0.342 0.208 0.941
AdjustedR2 0.002 0.275 0.215 0.041 0.125 0.125 0.296 0.108 0.113 0.151 0.041
Notes: t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Regressions of background characteristics upon separate dummies for every booklet and country. We directly use the coding
of the answer categories from the PISA (e.g. in column (1) we have an outcome variable where 1=male and 2=female), this
only affects the interpretation of the constant. The columns F-value and p-value refer to the tests for joint significance of the
booklet-dummies. The PISA 2009 and PISA weights are used.
Table A.4.5: When in the test do girls close the gender gap in math and science? Data from PISA 2009
Country Gap at beginning After how long do boys
of test and girls perform equal?
India (Himachal Pradesh) -5.64++ 92 %
Malta -3.95++ 72 %
Slovenia -6.83++ 139 %
Jordan -4.21++ 90 %
Serbia -5.86++ 125 %
Ireland -3.87++ 93 %
Trinidad and Tobago -1.77++ 43 %
Sweden -1.55++ 37 %
Montenegro -3.77++ 96 %
Luxembourg -5.41++ 139 %
Australia -3.48++ 89 %
Norway -2.01++ 52 %
Czech Republic -5.54++ 156 %
New Zealand -2.07++ 62 %
Latvia -2.02++ 61 %
Brazil -3.68++ 112 %
United Kingdom -4.64++ 143 %
Denmark -4.31++ 140 %
Austria -8.41++ 274 %
China (Shanghai) -3.06++ 103 %
Canada -3.12++ 106 %
Liechtenstein -8.33+ 297 %
Azerbaijan -1.73++ 63 %
Indonesia -2.07++ 75 %
Uruguay -4.20++ 154 %
Hungary -6.28++ 235 %
Mexico -4.99++ 187 %
Italy -6.69++ 253 %
Germany -6.12++ 232 %
United States -3.76++ 145 %
Portugal -3.50++ 137 %
Colombia -5.68++ 230 %
Turkey -3.34++ 138 %
Greece -4.04++ 172 %
Lithuania -0.55 24 %
Qatar -1.59++ 71 %
Korea -2.55++ 114 %
United Arab Emirates -1.04 48 %
Tunisia -4.38++ 208 %
Switzerland -4.82++ 238 %
Romania -6.88++ 342 %
Mauritius -3.53++ 190 %
Chile -4.96++ 267 %
Spain -3.60++ 195 %
Israel -3.62++ 205 %
Poland -1.52+ 86 %
Panama -4.46++ 257 %
Slovak Republic -3.37+ 195 %
Netherlands -4.41++ 261 %
Costa Rica -5.35+ 326 %
Singapore -2.15+ 135 %
Belgium -5.97++ 378 %
Iceland -1.31 84 %
Japan -2.96+ 204 %
Malaysia -1.28+ 92 %
Thailand -.066 61 %
Croatia -5.15+ 576 %
France -5.34+ 626 %
Russian Federation -0.92 115 %
Bulgaria -1.77+ 221 %
Peru -3.88+ 578 %
China (Hong Kong) -4.15+ 622 %
India (Tamil Nadu) -1.46+ 239 %
Taiwan -0.80 161 %
Notes: + indicates a significant gender difference at the start of the test and ++ indicates both a signif-
icant gender difference at the start of and during the test (at the 10% level).
The gender gap at the beginning of the test can be interpreted as the percentage points difference to
answer the first question correct (the definition in Section 4.7.1 and subsequently multiplied by 100).
The table includes countries where boys score better at the beginning of the test and girls perform better
during the test in math and science.
Table A.4.6: Overview of all the PISA background questions used the analysis of Section 4.7.3.
Question Noncognitive skills
PISA 2012
In the last two full weeks of school, how many times did you arrive late for school? None - five or more
times.
Conscientiousness (dutifulness)
“People can count on me to keep on schedule.” Self-control, Tangney et al. (2004)
Using a train timetable to work out how long it would take to get from one place to another. Not confident -
very confident.
Self-concept
Understanding graphs presented in newspapers. Not confident - very confident. Self-concept
Solving an equation like 3x+5= 17. Not confident - very confident. Self-concept
I often worry that it will be difficult for me in mathematics classes. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Neuroticism (anxiety, vulnerability)
I get very tense when I have to do mathematics homework. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Neuroticism (anxiety, vulnerability)
I get very nervous doing mathematics problems. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Neuroticism (anxiety, vulnerability)
“Gets nervous easiliy.” Neuroticism, John and Srivastava (1999)
I worry that I will get poor grades in mathematics. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Neuroticism (anxiety, vulnerability)
If I put in enough effort I can succeed in mathematics. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
“If I try hard enough, then I will understand the course material.” MSQL (Motivation), Duncan and McKeachie
(2005)
Whether or not I do well in mathematics is completely up to me. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
If I had different teachers, I would try harder in mathematics. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
If I wanted to, I could do well in mathematics. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
I do badly in mathematics whether or not I study for my exams. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
I am not very good at solving mathematics problems. Not likely - very likely. Locus of control∗
My teacher did not explain the concepts well this week. Not likely - very likely. Locus of control∗
This week I made bad guesses on the quiz. Not likely - very likely. Locus of control∗
Sometimes the course material is too hard. Not likely - very likely. Locus of control∗
The teacher did not get students interested in the material. Not likely - very likely. Locus of control∗
Sometimes I am just unlucky. Not likely - very likely. Locus of control∗
“There is really no such thing as luck.” Locus of control, Rotter (1966)
I avoid distractions when I am studying mathematics. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Conscientiousness (self-discipline)
“Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done.” Self-control, Tangney et al. (2004)
I help my friends with mathematics. Never - almost always. Extraversion (warmth)
Most of my teachers really listen to what I have to say. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Agreeableness (compliance)
I make friends easily at school. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Extraversion (warmth)
“Is outgoing, sociable.” Extraversion, John and Srivastava (1999)
If I put in enough effort, I can succeed in school. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
It is completely my choice whether or not I do well at school. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
If I had different teachers, I would try harder at school. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
If I wanted to, I could perform well at school. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
I perform poorly at school whether or not I study for my exams. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Locus of control
Overview of all the PISA background questions (continued)
When confronted with a problem, I give up easily. Not like me - very much like me. Conscientiousness (perseverance)∗∗
“Setbacks do not discourage me.” Gritt, Duckworth et al. (2007)
I put off difficult problems. Not like me - very much like me. Conscientiousness (perseverance)∗∗
I remain interested in the tasks that I start. Not like me - very much like me. Conscientiousness (perseverance)∗∗
“I have difficulty maintaining my focus on projects that take more than a few months to complete.” Gritt, Duckworth et al. (2007)
I continue working on tasks until everything is perfect. Not like me - very much like me. Conscientiousness (perseverance)∗∗
“Perseveres until the task is finished.” Conscientiousness, John and Srivastava (1999)
When confronted with a problem, I do more than what is expected of me. Not like me - very much like me. Conscientiousness (perseverance)∗∗
I can handle a lot of information. Not like me - very much like me. Openness (actions)
I like to participate in host culture celebrations Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Openness (wide interests)
I like to participate in heritage culture celebrations. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Openness (wide interests)
Combined PISA score of the questions indicated by∗ Locus of control
Combined PISA score of the questions indicated by∗∗ Conscientiousness (perseverance)
PISA 2009
When I study, I try to memorize everything that is covered in the text. Almost never - almost always. Conscientiousness (self-discipline)
When I study, I start by figuring out what exactly I need to learn. Almost never - almost always. Conscientiousness (organized)
“When I study the readings for this course, I outline the material to help me organize my thoughts.” MSQL (Learning) Duncan and McKeachie (2005)
When I study, I try to memorize as many details as possible. Almost never - almost always. Conscientiousness (self-discipline)
When I study, I try to relate new information to prior knowledge acquired in other subjects. Almost never -
almost always.
Openness (fantasy)
“Likes to reflect, play with ideas.” Openness, John and Srivastava (1999)
School has been a waste of time. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Motivation towards school / learning
I get along well with most of my teachers. Strongly disagree - strongly agree. Agreeableness (compliance)
“Starts quarrels with others.” Agreeableness, John and Srivastava (1999)
I learn about things that are not course-related, such as sports, hobbies, people or music. Never - several times
a week.
Openness (actions)
“Is sophisticated in art, music, or literature.” Openness, John and Srivastava (1999)
Participate in online forums, virtual communities or spaces. Never - every day. Openness (actions)
PISA 2006
How informed are you about science-related careers available on the job market? Not informed at all - very
well informed.
Conscientiousness (striving)
Making an effort in my subject(s) is worth it because this will help me in the work I want to do later on.
Strongly disagree - strongly agree.
Motivation towards school / learning
Notes: The table displays the questions used in the analysis of Section 4.7.3 of the Supplementary Material, the
related noncognitive skills and facets in parentheses, and for some questions it shows related questions of scales
that have been validated by previous research.
Table A.4.7: Regression of the gender difference in performance during test on the gender difference in dynamic inputs
during test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Gender difference in 0.0843∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0666∗∗∗ 0.0892∗∗∗
time during test (4.44) (3.28) (2.88) (2.81)
Gender difference in 0.00174∗∗ 0.00398∗∗∗ 0.000986 0.00282∗∗
actions during test (2.62) (3.38) (1.30) (2.12)
Gender difference in 0.0134 0.0251
time at the start (0.31) (0.67)
Gender difference in 0.000162 -0.0000534
actions at the start (0.44) (-0.17)
Its interaction -0.258 -0.176
for time (-0.57) (-0.47)
Its interaction -0.000182 -0.000163
for actions (-1.52) (-1.31)
Constant 0.0167∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0194∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗
(17.29) (5.54) (14.36) (8.28) (12.87) (5.48)
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
Adj. R2 0.203 0.183 0.132 0.150 0.227 0.205
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The gender difference in ability to sustain performance is β3 of Equation (4.2). The equations estimated are as fol-
lows: βˆ3c = α0 + α1genderdifferencesinputsduringtestc + α2genderdifferencesinputsstartoftestc +
α3itsinteractoinc + c, where c is a subscript for country c.
Table A.4.8: Relationship between the gender gap in math and the length of a specific test, measured by number of
questions and maximum time allowed to complete the test
Whole Exclude Exclude Whole Recalculated Weighted Exclude Exclude Exclude
sample tests with tests with sample gender gap regression five extreme tests with tests with
noq≤ 10 noq≤ 40 long tests time≤ 5 time≤ 20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of -0.00159∗∗ -0.00347∗∗∗ -0.00339∗∗
questions (-2.06) (-3.34) (-2.09)
Maximum time -0.000761 -0.000719 -0.000941 -0.00214∗∗∗ -0.00244∗∗∗ -0.00281∗∗∗
allowed (-1.05) (-0.99) (-1.23) (-2.73) (-2.77) (-3.37)
Constant 0.200∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(4.59) (5.70) (3.02) (3.54) (3.38) (3.87) (4.27) (4.05) (4.59)
N 203 169 74 175 175 175 170 157 109
Adj. R2 0.012 0.069 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.026 0.033 0.057
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The gender gap is measured by subtracting the mean performance of girls from the mean performance of boys and dividing this by the
pooled standard deviation. The equations estimated are as follows: mathgendergapi = α0 + α1testlengthi + i, where i is a subscript
for test i.
Table A.4.9: Relationship between the gender gap in math and the number of questions in a specific test for certain
subsamples
Whole Australia, Europe Asia Only high-
sample and Middle East stakes tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of -0.00159∗∗ -0.00699∗∗∗ 0.00183 -0.00557∗
questions (-2.06) (-3.48) (0.91) (-1.87)
Constant 0.200∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.0907 0.192
(4.59) (4.36) (1.65) (1.10)
N 203 45 20 17
Adj. R2 0.012 0.303 0.005 0.151
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The gender gap is measured by subtracting the mean performance of girls from
the mean performance of boys and dividing this by the pooled standard devi-
ation. The equations estimated are as follows: mathgendergapi = α0 +
α1numberofquestionsi + i, where i is a subscript for test i.
Table A.4.10: Gender differences in performance during the test while using probit. Testing the marginal effects, no
distinction per topic. PISA 2009
Country Gender diff. Welsch Country Gender diff. Welsch Country Gender diff. Welsch
in marg. effects t-test in marg. effects t-test in marg. effects t-test
ALB 0.0099 1.3291 HRV 0.0285 4.3271 NZL 0.0337 5.0439
ARE 0.0340 7.3498 HUN 0.0301 4.4991 PAN 0.0092 1.1907
ARG 0.0081 1.0089 IDN 0.0159 2.3504 PER 0.0023 0.3177
AUS 0.0385 9.7755 IRL 0.0473 6.2153 POL 0.0266 3.8571
AUT 0.0372 6.3322 ISL 0.0164 2.0786 PRT 0.0308 5.2138
AZE 0.0101 1.3851 ISR 0.0236 3.3301 QAT 0.0389 7.7825
BEL 0.0237 4.7554 ITA 0.0324 11.6104 QCN 0.0245 4.2256
BGR 0.0102 1.3467 JOR 0.0562 8.8016 QHP 0.0333 2.9674
BRA 0.0380 10.7772 JPN 0.0138 2.2962 QTN 0.0138 1.8550
CAN 0.0377 12.1427 KAZ -0.0016 -0.2429 QVE -0.0059 -0.6024
CHE 0.0306 7.0960 KGZ 0.0041 0.5591 ROU 0.0216 3.1391
CHL 0.0279 4.3418 KOR 0.0214 3.5306 RUS 0.0143 1.9865
COL 0.0210 3.5763 LIE 0.0327 1.1886 SGP 0.0101 1.6584
CRI 0.0180 2.5292 LTU 0.0269 3.9264 SRB 0.0290 4.4584
CZE 0.0338 5.5494 LUX 0.0245 3.3317 SVK 0.0192 2.6880
DEU 0.0271 4.1157 LVA 0.0357 5.0938 SVN 0.0512 8.5132
DNK 0.0340 5.5929 MAC -0.0034 -0.5473 SWE 0.0442 6.1275
ESP 0.0224 7.3424 MDA 0.0043 0.5842 TAP 0.0071 1.1970
EST 0.0095 1.4582 MEX 0.0200 8.0478 THA 0.0103 1.7450
FIN 0.0267 4.5598 MLT 0.0586 6.6506 TTO 0.0370 4.7927
FRA 0.0266 3.5742 MNE 0.0279 4.0536 TUN 0.0211 2.8732
GBR 0.0312 7.5104 MUS 0.0192 2.8025 TUR 0.0194 2.8759
GEO 0.0044 0.5425 MYS 0.0147 2.0660 URY 0.0248 3.4295
GRC 0.0212 2.7607 NLD 0.0215 3.4182 USA 0.0300 4.7687
Notes: See the Supplementary Material for the exact procedure of testing the statistical significance of the marginal effects.
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Chapter 5
Test Scores, Noncognitive Skills and
Economic Growth
Joint work with Pau Balart and Dinand Webbink. Published in Economics of Education Review
5.1 Introduction
Many studies have found a strong association between the economic outcomes of nations and their
performance on international cognitive tests such as the PISA, TIMSS or PIRLS (see, for example,
Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008, 2012). This association is interpreted
as evidence that cognitive skills are an important determinant of productivity and economic growth.
However, the performance on cognitive tests is not only the result of cognitive ability, but is also
influenced by noncognitive skills. Pioneers in intelligence testing like Thorndike and Wechsler al-
ready recognized that test takers might not exert maximal effort (Wechsler, 1940). Duckworth et al.
(2011) found that under low-stakes testing conditions, such as in the international cognitive tests,
some individuals try harder than others. Moreover, scores of low performers can be substantially im-
proved by offering a reward (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Borghans et al., 2008b; Segal, 2012).
The noncognitive skills that are important for test scores have also been found to be important for
productivity and other social outcomes at the individual level (e.g. Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001;
Heckman et al., 2013). This suggests that noncognitive skills might be an important omitted variable
in the relationship between cognitive skills and the economic outcomes of nations. These two related
issues make it unclear to what extent the strong association between the performance on international
cognitive tests and economic growth should be interpreted as evidence on the importance of cognitive
versus noncognitive skills. Given the differences in policy interventions required to foster cognitive
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and noncognitive skills (Cunha et al., 2010), it is important to gain a better understanding of their
respective roles in fostering economic growth.1
In this paper, we explore the effects of cognitive versus noncognitive skills on economic growth.
We decompose the performance on an international test (PISA) into two components: the starting
performance and the decline in performance during the test. This decomposition, recently introduced
by Borghans and Schils (2012), exploits the random allocation of test booklets to students, which
generates exogenous variation in the position of questions in the test. This specific feature of the test
allows estimation of the decline in performance during the test that is not confounded by unobserved
characteristics of questions, such as the difficulty of the test items. Borghans and Schils (2012) show
that differences in the decline in performance during the test are related to noncognitive skills, such
as motivation and ambition. They argue that the starting performance of the test score is a measure of
cognitive skills that is not confounded by the personality factors that cause the decline in performance.
Countries differ in both the starting performance and the decline in performance during the test
and these differences are stable over time. We use the results of this decomposition to estimate the
association between the two components and economic growth, and compare these findings with
the estimated effect of test scores before the decomposition, which is the standard approach in the
previous literature. For the analysis, we stay as close as possible to the seminal paper by Hanushek and
Woessmann (2012), hereafter HW (2012). This study documented a strong association between test
scores and economic growth, and provided convincing evidence that supports a causal interpretation
of this relationship.
The exact interpretation of our findings critically depends upon which type of skills are measured
by the two components. We argue that, at a minimum, our study answers the question whether
noncognitive skills are partly responsible for the well-studied relationship between test scores and
economic growth. To this end, we need a measure of noncognitive skills that is not confounded with
cognitive skills. Most of our effort is therefore devoted to discussing the performance decline, which
lends itself to two different types of interpretations. Let us call interpretation A that “the performance
decline captures noncognitive skills and does not capture cognitive skills” while interpretation B
admits the possibility that “the performance decline captures both cognitive and noncognitive skills”.
As recognized by Borghans et al. (2008a), it is not only empirically, but also conceptually difficult to
separate cognitive ability from noncognitive skills.2 In fact, many aspects of personality and cognition
1Noncognitive skills have many different names in the literature. Soft skills, personality traits, character skills, noncog-
nitive ability and socioemotional skills are often used.
2They define cognitive skills as the “ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt effectively to the environment, to
learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought”. Noncognitive
skills are referred to as patterns of thoughts, feelings and behaviors.
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are closely related.3 Evidence presented in Section 5.3.1, however, supports interpretation A – that
the performance decline measures only noncognitive skills.
The results from our cross-country growth regressions indicate that both components of test scores
have a positive and statistically significant association with economic growth. In fact, their estimated
effects are very similar in terms of magnitude. Moreover, we find that the effect of cognitive skills is
approximately 40 percent smaller when we control for noncognitive skills, suggesting that noncogni-
tive skills are important for explaining the relationship between test scores and economic growth.
Reverse causality is an obvious concern if one is interested in putting a causal interpretation on the
results of macroeconomic growth regressions. In our study, we address the issue of reverse causality
by applying the decomposition method to an international test administered in 1991. We find that our
results are consistent with an effect of skills on growth and not vice versa.
To our knowledge, there are only two recent studies investigating the relationship between person-
ality traits (in the form of average measures of patience per country) and productivity at the macroe-
conomic level (Dohmen et al., 2016; Hu¨bner and Vannoorenberghe, 2015). Our main contribution is
to test whether the well-studied relationship between economic growth and test scores is mediated by
noncognitive skills and to provide estimates of the effect of noncognitive skills. The lack of works
studying the relationship between noncognitive skills and economic prosperity at the aggregate level
contrasts with the abundance of studies at the individual level. One reason for this might be the
lack of international comparable measures for noncognitive skills. Most studies on personality traits
rely on self-reports of individuals, which complicates international comparisons. Performance based
measures have the advantage that they do not suffer from the typical measurement issues related to
self-reports, such as reference bias (e.g. Paulhus, 1984; Kautz et al., 2014).
This study is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the previous literature on the effect of
cognitive skills on economic growth and the recent literature on the importance of noncognitive skills.
Section 5.3 and 5.4 explain the PISA-decomposition and the estimation of the cross-country growth
regressions. The data used in the analyses are described in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 shows the main
estimation results. Section 5.7 investigates the robustness of the results to using stricter measures of
the performance decline and addresses concerns of reverse causality. Section 5.8 concludes.
3Phelps (2006) argues that the mechanisms of emotion and cognition are intertwined from early perception to reasoning
and Cunha and Heckman (2008) and Cunha et al. (2010) show noncognitive skills are important for the development of
cognitive skills, but not vice versa.
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5.2 Previous Studies
5.2.1 The Relationship between Cognitive Test Scores and Economic Growth
A large empirical literature has studied the impact of human capital on economic growth. One of the
major challenges is to find a good proxy for human capital. As a consequence, many studies have
used average educational attainment as their measure (see, for example, Barro, 1991; Krueger and
Lindahl, 2001; Sala-i Martin et al., 2004; Dome´nech and De la Fuente, 2006; Cohen and Soto, 2007;
Sunde and Vischer, 2015). However, this proxy seems quite imperfect as it assumes that a year spent
in school produces the same amount of human capital across all countries. Therefore, Lee and Lee
(1995) and Hanushek and Kimko (2000) introduced a new approach that uses the performance on
international cognitive tests as a proxy for human capital. The main advantage of this approach is
that cognitive test scores can be considered as an output measure that captures what students have
learned inside and outside of school. The basic cross-country growth specification in Hanushek and
Kimko (2000) regresses the average economic growth of country c (Gc) for a specific period on their
measure of human capital (Hc), GDP per capita at the beginning of the period (GDP0c) and control
variables (Znc) such as years of schooling and population growth:
Gc = β0 + β1Hc + β2GDP0c +
∑
n
δnZnc + c (5.1)
This approach has been extended in a series of studies, which estimate Equation (1) and have very
similar results and interpretation (see Barro, 2001; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008, 2011b,c, 2012;
Hanushek, 2013; Bosworth and Collins, 2003; Jamison et al., 2007). Equation (5.1) is consistent with
the endogenous growth models of Romer (1990) and Nelson and Phelps (1966). In these models,
growth is attributed to the stock of human capital, which generates innovations or facilitates the
adoption and imitation of new technologies. We focus on the most recent paper, HW (2012), which
uses data on economic growth from 50 countries for the period 1960–2000 and cognitive test scores
for the period 1964–2003. The authors find consistent evidence that cognitive test scores are strongly
associated with economic growth and interpret this as indicating the importance of cognitive skills.
The estimated effects of cognitive skills are large: a one standard deviation increase in test scores
is associated with 1.25 to 2 percentage points higher average annual growth rate in GDP per capita
across 40 years.
An important question is to what extent the association between test scores and economic growth
reflects a causal effect of cognitive skills on economic performance. This is a difficult question
because it is very hard to address typical identification issues like omitted variables, reverse causality
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and measurement error. However, HW (2012) show that the estimated effects of cognitive test scores
on economic growth are robust to alternative estimation approaches, such as instrumental variables,
differences-in-differences and longitudinal analysis of changes in cognitive test scores and in growth
rates. Moreover, they argue that international test scores are not driven by differences in resources
across countries and note that their estimation relies upon the assumption that the average scores for a
country tend to be relatively stable over time. This leads them to conclude that differences in cognitive
skills lead to economically significant differences in economic growth.
Although several studies find a consistent positive relationship between cognitive test scores and
economic growth, a growing literature highlights the impact of noncognitive skills on test perfor-
mance, making it difficult to know how these results should be interpreted.
5.2.2 Noncognitive skills, Long-term Individual Outcomes and Cognitive Test Scores
Many studies in psychology and a more recent literature in economics have established the impor-
tance of noncognitive skills for individual socioeconomic outcomes. Noncognitive skills are defined
as relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings and behaviors that reflect the tendency to respond
in certain ways under certain circumstances (Roberts, 2009). These studies often use the Big Five
inventory as measures of noncognitive skills (Costa and McCrae, 1992; John and Srivastava, 1999)
and find that these measures are as predictive as cognitive measures for important outcomes such as
schooling, wages, crime, teenage pregnancy, and longevity, even after controlling for family back-
ground and cognition (see for example Mueller and Plug, 2006; Heckman et al., 2006; Almlund et al.,
2011; Heckman, 2008). Intervention studies, like the Perry Pre School Program, provide evidence for
a causal effect of changes in noncognitive skills on economic and social outcomes (Heckman et al.,
2013). Further evidence on the importance of noncognitive skills for individual economic success can
be found in Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), Borghans et al. (2008a), Heckman and Kautz (2012)
and Kautz et al. (2014).
Noncognitive skills have also been related to the performance of students on cognitive tests. The
possibility that test takers might not exert maximal effort has been largely recognized by researchers
on intelligence testing. For instance, Wechsler (1940) noted that intelligence tests not only measure
intelligence and pointed out that the tendency to try hard on low stakes intelligence tests might derive
from non-intellective traits, such as competitiveness and compliance with authority. More recently,
Duckworth et al. (2011) provide evidence for the role of test motivation in intelligence testing. Ob-
server ratings of test motivation, based on the behavior of adolescent boys completing intelligence
tests, explains IQ-scores and reduces the predictive validity of IQ-scores for life outcomes, particu-
larly for nonacademic outcomes. Their findings show that under low-stakes testing conditions some
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individuals try harder than others. Economists have also recognized that engaging in complex think-
ing is effortful and therefore motivation to exert effort affects the performance on achievement tests.
For example, in Borghans et al. (2008b) subjects were given questionnaires to determine psycholog-
ical traits and were asked to make trade-offs to determine relevant economic preference parameters.
They found that preferences have a direct impact on cognitive test scores.4 Moreover, various studies
have found that offering a material reward can substantially improve scores on cognitive tests (Gneezy
and Rustichini, 2000; Segal, 2012).
These findings have motivated using answering patterns to obtain measures of noncognitive skills
that do not rely on self-reports. In addition to Borghans and Schils (2012), Herna´ndez and Her-
shaff (2014) propose using skipped items in a non-penalized test to measure noncognitive skills; Hitt
(2016), Zamarro et al. (2018) and Zamarro et al. (2017) explore careless answering patterns in sur-
vey questionnaires; and Hitt et al. (2016) find that skipped questions at six nationally-representative,
longitudinal surveys of American youth are a significant predictor of later-life educational attainment
net of cognitive ability. The use of self-reports to measure noncognitive skills has been challenged
(Duckworth et al., 2011; Duckworth and Yeager, 2015; Paulhus, 1984; West et al., 2016). By re-
lying on Borghans and Schils (2012), we can avoid the problems associated with self-reports and
simultaneously measure cognitive and noncognitive skills.
5.3 The Test Score Decomposition
Borghans and Schils (2012) developed an approach to decompose test scores into two elements: the
starting performance and the decline in performance during the test. They observed that students
perform worse on questions that appear later in the test. Because knowledge should be the same
at the beginning and end of the test, they attribute the decline in performance during the test to
motivation, which can be thought of as a noncognitive skill. One concern with this interpretation is
that the performance decline might be related to unobservable characteristics, such as the difficulty
of the test items.5 If this were the case, the performance decline would be a consequence of cognitive
skills rather than noncognitive skills.
To address this important issue, Borghans and Schils (2012) exploit the variation in the question
ordering of the PISA test. As shown in Table 5.1, PISA 2006 has 13 different versions of the test
(booklets), all of them containing four clusters of questions (test items). A booklet contains approxi-
4This finding is consistent with Borghans et al. (2011) and Heckman and Kautz (2012), who find that personality
variables explain roughly a third of explained variance in achievement tests.
5In fact, the sequencing of items from easy to difficult is used as an explicit strategy for sustaining morale (Duckworth
et al., 2011).
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Table 5.1: Rotation design of the 13 PISA booklets
Booklet Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
1 Science 1 Science 2 Science 4 Science 7
2 Science 2 Science 3 Math 3 Reading 1
3 Science 3 Science 4 Math 4 Math 1
4 Science 4 Math 3 Science 5 Math 2
5 Science 5 Science 6 Science 7 Science 3
6 Science 6 Reading 2 Reading 1 Science 4
7 Science 7 Reading 1 Math 2 Math 4
8 Math 1 Math 2 Science 2 Science 6
9 Math 2 Science 1 Science 3 Reading 2
10 Math 3 Math 4 Science 6 Science 1
11 Math 4 Science 5 Reading 2 Science 2
12 Reading 1 Math 1 Science 1 Science 5
13 Reading 2 Science 7 Math 1 Math 3
Source: OECD (2009)
mately 60 test items. Each cluster of questions represents 30 minutes of test time, which means each
student undertakes two hours of testing. Students are allowed a small break after one hour, typically
shorter than 5 minutes, where they are allowed to stand up and stretch. There are 13 clusters of test
items (7 science, 2 reading and 4 math) and they are distributed over the 13 different booklets ac-
cording to a rotation scheme. Each cluster appears in each of the four possible positions within a
booklet once (OECD, 2009). This means that one specific test item appears in four different positions
of four different booklets. For instance, cluster Science 1 is included in booklets 1, 9, 12 and 10
as respectively the first, second, third and fourth cluster. This rotation scheme generates exogenous
variation in the question number (position in the test) of test items because the booklets are randomly
assigned to students (OECD, 2009). In other words, the random assignment of booklets ensures that
the positioning of questions is unrelated to student characteristics. The results of balancing tests are
consistent with random assignment. Table A.5.1 shows estimates from separate regressions of back-
ground characteristics on booklet indicators. Almost all of the coefficients of these indicators are
statistically insignificant at conventional levels and the F-tests for joint significance never reject the
null hypothesis.
The exogenous variation in question position can then be exploited to estimate the decline in
performance during the test by using the following fixed effects model:
P [Yij = 1] = F (α0 + α1Qij +
J∑
j=2
µj) (5.2)
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where Yij is an indicator for whether student i answered question j correctly, Qij is the position
of question j in the version of the test answered by student i and µj is a question fixed effect that
takes account of unobservable characteristics of question j such as difficulty. Conditional on question
fixed effects, the variation we are exploiting lies within a question across different students. As such,
the identifying assumption becomes random variation in the position of a question across different
students. This assumption is met due to the random allocation of booklets to students: we are com-
paring the performance of identical students on the same question in four different positions. The
estimated parameter α1 will not be biased by unobserved factors and can be interpreted as the decline
in performance during the test. The decomposition of the test scores into the starting performance
and the performance decline is based on the estimation of Equation (5.2). We estimate Equation (5.2)
separately for each country by using a probit model and use the PISA weighting factors to ensure
that the sample is representative.6 The parameter α0 measures the starting performance of a specific
country, because the question numbers have been rescaled such that the first item is numbered as 0
and the last item as 1. Both components are robust to the definition of the start of the test. For in-
stance, including the first five questions in the starting performance does not affect the estimates of
the two components. We use all test items for estimating Equation (5.2). Skipped and non-reached
items were coded as incorrectly answered questions. This allows us to stay closer to the framework
of HW (2012) in which uncompleted items were interpreted as incorrectly answered to compute final
test scores.7
We have also estimated Equation (5.2) using the average performance on all test items within a
cluster as the outcome variable. In this analysis the clusters have been rescaled such that the first
cluster is numbered as 0 and the fourth cluster is numbered as 1. With this approach the unit of
randomization exactly matches the unit of analysis. The results are very similar to the results from
our main approach. We find a correlation of 0.936 for the estimates of the starting performance of the
two approaches, and a correlation of 0.964 for the decline in performance.
5.3.1 Interpretation of the Two Components
The main purpose of the decomposition is to generate two components that capture both types of
skills relatively well. The performance decline is a measure of noncognitive skills, where the starting
6Estimating Equation (5.2) with OLS gives very similar results. In fact, the correlation of the components estimated
with probit and OLS equals 0.996 for the starting performance and 0.969 for the performance decline. Notice that despite
using a probit model with question fixed effects, the incidental parameter problem does not apply. The number of fixed
effects to be estimated (questions) remains constant when increasing the number of observations (students).
7Borghans and Schils (2012) note that it is unclear which type of skills determine that test items are not reached. In
Section 5.7 we will investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative ways of dealing with non-reached questions.
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performance provides a measure of cognitive skills that, differently from test scores, is not confounded
by the personality factors that cause the decline in performance.
Conceptually, obtaining a clean measure of cognitive skills is difficult. Cunha and Heckman
(2008) and Cunha et al. (2010) show that noncognitive skills positively affect the accumulation of
cognitive skills during childhood. Moreover, in our case it might be that the performance at the start
of the test is influenced by ex-ante motivation as well. Although the starting performance, arguably,
provides a better measure of cognitive skills than the final test scores, we cannot rule out that it is
fully devoid of noncognitive skills. The consequence would be an attenuated estimate of the effect of
noncognitive skills in the growth regressions.
This does not challenge, however, our investigation on whether noncognitive skills are impor-
tant for the relationship between test scores and economic growth. For this purpose we only need a
measure of noncognitive skills that is not contaminated with cognitive skills. Therefore it is concep-
tually important that cognitive skills do not affect the accumulation of noncognitive skills (Cunha and
Heckman, 2008; Cunha et al., 2010). With regard to our particular measure, let us label the possibil-
ity that “the performance decline captures noncognitive skills but does not capture cognitive skills”
interpretation A, while interpretation B admits the possibility that “the performance decline captures
both cognitive and noncognitive skills”. Our efforts are concentrated towards obtaining a measure of
noncognitive skills that fits with interpretation A. The arguments provided below are consistent with
the performance decline providing such a measure.
Borghans and Schils (2012) provide four arguments in support of interpretation A. First, the per-
formance decline differs from the students’ performance at the beginning of the test, which indicates
that the two components measure different types of skills. Second, they show that the two compo-
nents are stable for the years 2003 and 2006 and that there are differences between countries. This
suggests that the two components are able to measure stable traits of the 15-year-old population of
a country. Third, they show that the performance decline is related to specific noncognitive skills.
With the data collected in the Dutch Inventaar 2010 study they find that students with higher lev-
els of agreeableness (a Big Five personality trait), ambition and motivation towards learning have a
smaller performance decline. Fourth, using data from the British Cohort Study 1970, they show that
the performance decline predicts future outcomes above and beyond the pure test score.
Additional evidence comes from Balart and Oosterveen (2017). These authors noted that girls
typically score better on reading tests than boys, but perform worse in science and math (Hyde and
Linn, 1988; Hyde et al., 1990; Caplan et al., 1997; Kimura, 2004; Dee, 2007; Fryer Jr and Levitt, 2010;
Cornwell et al., 2013; Quinn and Cooc, 2015). They argued that if the performance decline were in
fact induced by cognitive skills, then we should observe girls experiencing a less pronounced decline
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in reading, while boys would have a less pronounced decline when answering math and science ques-
tions. Balart and Oosterveen (2017), however, found the opposite: girls exhibited a less pronounced
decline than boys in both reading and in math/science. Specifically, using the PISA 2009, they find
that in 66 (62) out of the 74 countries, girls perform better (worse) in reading (math-science) than
boys at the start of the test. However, there is no single country in which boys exhibit a statistically
significant lower decline in performance than girls either in reading or in math-science. Girls exhibit
a less pronounced decline than boys in 68 countries for reading (statistically significant for 40) and
in 68 countries for mathematics and science (statistically significant for 46). A smaller performance
decline independent of one’s ability in a topic strongly supports the argument that the decline is not
driven by cognitive skills. Moreover, it is consistent with gender differences in noncognitive skills
found in previous research.8
Another element in support of interpretation A arises from the growing body of research that has
used the decomposition strategy proposed by Borghans and Schils (2012). Using an epidemiological
approach, Rodriguez-Planas and Nollenberger (2018) show that gender differences in the starting
performance are related to gender equality of the country of origin of second generation immigrants
while the same is not true for gender differences in the performance decline. They interpret that
gender gaps in test scores are affected by social gender norms through cognitive skills rather than
noncognitive skills. Zamarro et al. (2016) show that, at the country level, the performance decline is
associated with other non-self reported measures of student effort such as careless answering patterns
and non-response in the student background questionnaire after PISA. The non-challenging nature
of filling out a questionnaire makes it unlikely that this is driven by cognitive skills (Herna´ndez and
Hershaff, 2014; Hitt, 2016; Hitt et al., 2016). As they argue, this is strengthened by the fact that
careless answering patterns do not exhibit a higher correlation with test scores in reading than with
non-reading ones.
Finally, following Linton (1945), Hofstede and McCrae (2004) and Benet-Martı´nez and Oishi
(2008), we make use of the similarities between culture and noncognitive skills. Similar to noncog-
nitive traits, culture is defined in terms of behavior and is transmitted from generation to generation.9
Mendez (2015) directly associates culture with differences in noncognitive skills and exploits cultural
variations in second-generation immigrants to show that differences in cultural values and accom-
panying noncognitive skills are related to differences in PISA test scores. By contrast, cognition
8Girls are found to have more self-discipline (Duckworth and Seligman, 2006), have less behavioral problems (Jacob,
2002), to be less prone to overconfidence (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), show more developed attitudes towards learning
(Cornwell et al., 2013) and report higher levels of extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (Schmitt et al., 2008).
9For instance, Guiso et al. (2006) or Fernandez and Fogli (2009) define culture as customary beliefs, values and actions
that social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation. Intergenerational transfers of noncognitive
skills is argued by Heckman (2008), he shows enhancements of family environments (socioemotional nurturing) improve
child outcomes, of which personality traits are the most important channel.
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Table 5.2: Regressions of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions on the starting performance and performance decline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Power Individualism Masculinity Uncertainty Long term Indulgence
Distance Avoidance Orientation
Starting -1.626 5.818∗ 0.751 2.579 6.406 0.644
performance (-0.33) (1.81) (0.19) (0.48) (1.37) (0.16)
Performance 2.426 1.759 0.303 -7.516∗∗ 11.37∗∗∗ -9.712∗∗∗
decline (0.89) (0.70) (0.11) (-2.10) (4.68) (-3.37)
N 53 53 53 53 56 55
Adj. R2 0.296 0.469 -0.056 0.165 0.255 0.225
Std.Dev. Y 22.23 24.19 20.58 53.28 21.97 19.86
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Regressions include a constant and initial GDP per capita. The starting performance and performance decline
are standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
does not have a strong link with culture. Indeed, psychologists distinguish two types of second-order
factors of cognitive ability: fluid intelligence and crystalized intelligence (Cattell, 1987). Only the
second is partially influenced by culture.10 We provide additional evidence on the difference between
the two components by regressing the cultural dimensions of Hofstede and Hofstede (2001) upon the
standardized starting performance and performance decline in Table 5.2.11
We find that the performance decline has a stronger association with the cultural values than the
starting performance. Whereas the starting performance is only significantly related to higher levels
of individualism at the 10%-level, the performance decline shows strong associations with measures
of uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation and indulgence.12 These results suggest that the
performance decline is smaller in countries with: (i) more thriftiness, perseverance for achieving
results and higher efforts in modern education (long term orientation), (ii) less preference for leisure-
time, more control on the gratification of desires and stricter social norms (indulgence) and (iii) more
positive preference towards uncertainty, ambiguity and curiosity (uncertainty avoidance).13 In sum,
this can be interpreted as evidence that the performance decline is related to motivation, thriftiness,
and less-preference towards leisure and certainty which are related to time- and risk-preferences.
10For instance, the Raven Progressive Matrices Test, a test commonly used to measure fluid intelligence, is referred to as
“culture-free”
11We use PISA 2009 to maximize the number of countries. Using the other waves of PISA does not change our results.
We include initial GDP per capita in 1990 to control for economic development. Controlling for an OECD indicator or
GDP per capita in 1960 gives almost identical results, but controlling for GDP per capita in 1960 sharply decreases our
sample size. The components are standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
12Interestingly, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2016) provide evidence for a causal effect of individualism on long run
growth. Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011) show that individualism is the only measure of culture, among the ones they
consider, that has a robust effect on growth.
13See the Appendix for explanations on the six cultural dimensions of Hofstede and Hofstede (2001).
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Figure 5.1: The decline in performance for Azerbaijan and Brazil
Notes: The figure is based upon PISA 2006 and uses LOWESS to visualize the rela-
tionship between Y and Q of Equation (5.2) with a bandwidth of 0.8N , the program
default. We do not use PISA weights or question fixed effects for the computation of
this figure.
Remarkably, these are a large subset of the noncognitive skills that Heckman (2008) lists as being
related to earnings, employment, college attendance, and other socioeconomic outcomes.
5.3.2 Differences between Countries and Years
Results of the decomposition of the PISA test of 2006 are shown in Table A.5.2. Equation (5.2) is
used for computing the probability of correctly answering the first and the last question of the PISA
test. Column (1) shows the average of the PISA 2006 test scores, column (2) shows the probability
of correctly answering the first question, column (3) shows the probability of correctly answering
the last question and column (4) shows the difference between these two probabilities. Column (2)
can be interpreted as the starting performance of a country and column (4) can be interpreted as the
performance decline. Countries are ranked with respect to the latter from high to low.
We observe that there are large differences between countries. Columbia and Uruguay have the
largest decline in performance. That is, their probability to answer the last question correctly is 30
percentage points lower than their probability to answer the first question correctly. Within the top
ten of countries with the largest decline we observe six countries from South America. Among the
countries with the least pronounced performance declines, we observe Northern European and Asian
countries. Moreover, Table A.5.2 indicates that these differences between countries are important
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Table 5.3: Correlations between the starting performance and performance decline for PISA 2003, 2006 and 2009
Starting Decline PISA Starting Decline Starting Decline
performance 2003 2003 2006 performance 2006 2006 performance 2009 2009
Starting performance 2003 1.000
Decline 2003 0.426 1.000
PISA 2006 0.860 0.745 1.000
Starting performance 2006 0.967 0.521 0.920 1.000
Decline 2006 0.526 0.947 0.716 0.584 1.000
Starting performance 2009 0.950 0.480 0.856 0.912 0.501 1.000
Decline 2009 0.539 0.911 0.760 0.631 0.923 0.462 1.000
Notes: The components are estimated using Equation (5.2) with PISA weights.
for the total test score. We observe that Azerbaijan and Brazil have a very similar starting perfor-
mance. However, the decline in performance for students in Brazil is much larger than for students
in Azerbaijan. This translates into a difference on the PISA test of more than 19 points. This dif-
ference is shown in Figure 5.1, where we use locally weighted scatterplot smoothing to visualize the
performance decline and the starting performance for the two countries. This flexible nonparametric
method also suggests that, without putting assumptions on the process that generated the data, the
linear specification in Qij used in Equation (5.2) seems to be a good approximation.
We have also decomposed the test scores for PISA 2003 and 2009 using the same procedure as was
used for the PISA 2006. Table 5.3 shows the correlations between the different components for the
three years. The correlations of the estimated starting performances (performance declines) over time
are shown in bold. All of them are above 0.91. As indicated by Borghans and Schils (2012), a high
correlation between the starting performances (performance declines) over the years suggests that
these components capture some of the traits of the 15-year-old population of a country. Consistent
with the literature on noncognitive skills, the correlation between the starting performance and the
performance decline is much lower, which indicates that the two components measure different traits.
5.4 Estimation of the Relationship between Skills and Economic Growth
The starting point of our empirical analysis of the effect of skills on economic growth is the standard
cross-country growth regression as shown by Equation (5.1). The main previous studies aggregate
scores from all available international cognitive tests and use this as a measure for cognitive skills
(see Section 5.2.1). We label the aggregate test score from HW (2012) as the HW-index. In this study
we decompose the scores on an international cognitive test into the starting performance (Sc) and the
performance decline during the test (PDc). Therefore, instead of using test scores as a unidimensional
proxy for human capital (Hc), we use the two components: Hc = f(Sc, PDc)+νc. We include these
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two components into the cross-country growth regression to re-estimate Equation (5.1):
Gc = β0 + β1Sc + β2PDc + β3GDP0c +
∑
n
δnZnc + c (5.3)
When estimating Equation (5.3), we try to stay as close as possible to HW (2012). We use the same
data on economic growth, the same growth period (1960-2000), identical covariates, estimate the
same model specifications, and start with the same sample of countries. However, the decomposition
method that we apply in this paper exploits a specific feature of the PISA test, namely the random
allocation of the PISA booklets (see Section 5.3). Hence, we can apply the decomposition method
only to one of the tests included in the HW-index. This has two implications for the estimations. First,
the sample of countries that participated in the PISA test differs from the sample used in HW (2012).
As a first step in our analysis, we check whether the reduction in sample size from 50 to 37 countries,
due to our reliance on the PISA, changes the results obtained in HW (2012). The second implication is
that we use the PISA test only for measuring skills, and not the complete set of tests used for the HW-
index. However, the PISA scores are highly correlated with the HW-index (r = 0.91). Further we
will show below that re-estimating the main models from HW (2012) with PISA scores instead of the
HW-index delivers very similar results. This suggests that PISA scores are a good proxy for the HW-
index and, therefore, we use the PISA scores for estimating Equation (5.1). Next, we decompose these
PISA scores into the two components and we use these two components for estimating Equation (5.3).
We estimate Equation (5.3) with OLS and report robust standard errors. This analysis naturally relies
upon the assumption that the distribution of both the starting performance and the performance decline
across countries remained relatively stable over time, which is supported by Table 5.3.
As we are using a two-step estimation approach it could be argued that the standard errors should
be adjusted because the regressors are not fixed (see e.g. Murphy and Topel, 2002). However, due to
the large number of observations used in the estimation of Equation (5.2), which is the number of stu-
dents times the number of test items, the estimates for the starting performance and the performance
decline are very precise, and can be considered as fixed (see Table A.5.3 for the standard errors of the
two components and the number of students participating in PISA 2006 per country).14
14The maximum likelihood estimation of Equation (5.2) gives us consistent estimates. Since the number of observations
is large, we can be confident that the ML-estimates have reached their true values. For computational tractability, standard
errors in Table A.5.3 are computed using sample PISA weights but not their 80 replicates. Using the 80 replicates does
not substantially increase the size of standard errors. For instance, the standard error of the starting performance and the
performance decline of Iceland increase from 0.0437 to 0.0476 and from 0.0101 to 0.0132, respectively.
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5.5 Data
The data used in the analysis come from various sources. The HW-index is from HW (2012). This
index aggregates all available math, science and reading scores from international cognitive tests that
took place in the period 1964-2003 for 50 countries.15
In addition, we use data collected by the Programme for International Student Assessment. PISA
is a triennial international survey which aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing
the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students. The key subjects of the test are reading, science
and math. The first PISA study took place in 2000. The method for decomposing test scores into
a cognitive and a noncognitive component is applied for countries that participated in PISA 2003,
2006 and 2009.16 We start our analysis with PISA 2006 which allows us to include 37 countries
that were included by HW (2012). We standardize the decomposed test scores and the total PISA
score separately to set the mean and standard deviation equal to the HW-index, allowing us to directly
compare the size of our estimates to those of the HW-index.
We follow HW (2012) for sources on the other data. Real GDP per capita comes from version 7.1
of the Penn World Tables (Aten et al., 2009).17 Data on years of schooling are taken from the most re-
cent version of the Barro and Lee dataset (Barro and Lee, 2013, version 2.1). Further control variables
used by HW (2012) are regional indicators and two proxies for the quality of economic institutions:
openness of the economy and protection against expropriation. For the regional indicators we follow
the classification of HW (2012). The measure of openness is the Sachs et al. (1995) index reflecting
the fraction of years between 1960 and 1992 that a country was classified as having an economy open
to international trade.18 For the data on protection against expropriation Acemoglu et al. (2001) is
followed, the measure is an index between 0 and 10 averaged over 1985-1995. A higher score on
this index means that there is more protection against expropriation. Two other controls that are used
are fertility, obtained from World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012), and tropical location
measured as the proportion of a countries’ area located in the tropics (Gallup et al., 1999). Table A.5.3
provides the data per country on GDP growth, the HW-index and the two components of the PISA
test for the sample of 37 countries used in Section 5.6.2.
15See the Appendix of HW (2012) for further details on the computation of this measure.
16We choose not to use the two most recent PISA waves (2012 and 2015) because fewer countries participated in these
waves and to mitigate concerns regarding reverse causality.
17Real GDP per capita for Tunisia was not available for 1960, so we used data from 1961 onwards.
18Because Romania was not available in Sachs et al. (1995), we used Romanian data from Sachs and Warner (1997) for
the period 1965-1990.
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5.6 Main Estimation Results
This section shows the main estimation results in three steps. First, we replicate the main analysis of
HW (2012) for the sample of countries for which it is possible to decompose the PISA test. Second,
we include the two components from the decomposition in the main estimation models.19 Third, we
repeat the latter analysis and extent the sample towards 55 countries.
5.6.1 Replication of Previous Cross-Country Growth Regressions using PISA
In the first step of our analysis we check whether the estimation results obtained by HW (2012)
change when we use scores of PISA 2006 instead of the HW-index. The results could, in theory,
change because we are going from 50 to 37 countries, or because we use the PISA score instead of
the HW-index. To show that none of these changes drive our results, we replicate the main models
from HW (2012) using the sample of 37 countries. Panel A of Table 5.4 shows the results from
models that use the HW-index, Panel B shows the results when using the PISA 2006 scores.
Panel A of Table 5.4 shows that the results for the growth regressions with the HW-index for the
restricted sample are very similar to the results for the unrestricted sample in Table 1 of HW (2012).
Column (1) shows the effect of years of schooling on economic growth. The estimated effect is
statistically significant and suggests that an additional year of schooling increases the average annual
growth rate in GDP per capita across 40 years with 0.2 percentage point. Column (2) shows the
results from a model in which the HW-index is used as a proxy for human capital instead of years of
schooling. A one standard deviation increase in cognitive test scores is associated with 2.3 percentage
point increase in the annual growth rate of GDP per capita over 40 years. Similar to what HW (2012)
found, replacing years of schooling with cognitive test scores increases the explained variance from
one to three quarters. In column (3), we report results from a model that includes both proxies of
human capital. The estimate of cognitive test scores is similar to that in column (2), but the estimated
coefficient of years of schooling is no longer statistically significant. In columns (4)–(9) we report
estimates from alternative specifications of the model; column (4) uses average years of schooling
over the period 1960-2000 instead of the years of schooling in 1960, column (5) controls for outliers,
column (6) includes eight regional indicators, column (7) includes measures for the openness of the
economy and protection of property rights, column (8) adds fertility and tropical location as additional
controls and column (9) controls for GDP per capita in logs instead of levels. These various estimates
19We start this analysis using test scores from the PISA 2006, but our results do not change when we use the PISA 2003,
although the number of countries does decrease to 31. Using the PISA 2009, the sample increases to 40 countries and the
results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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Table 5.4: Growth regressions with the HW-index and PISA scores using the PISA sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Panel A: HW-index as a measure of human capital with restricted sample
HW- 2.256∗∗∗ 2.260∗∗∗ 2.310∗∗∗ 2.186∗∗∗ 1.144∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗ 1.378∗∗∗ 2.213∗∗∗
index (9.15) (9.22) (9.14) (9.59) (2.71) (3.74) (3.74) (9.92)
Years of 0.187∗ -0.00375 -0.0320 -0.0661 0.0420 0.0582 0.0115 -0.0250
schooling (1.80) (-0.05) (-0.49) (-1.02) (0.51) (0.85) (0.15) (-0.30)
N 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 37
Adj. R2 0.208 0.730 0.722 0.723 0.809 0.784 0.770 0.799 0.717
Panel B: PISA 2006 as a measure of human capital with restricted sample
PISA 2.282∗∗∗ 2.245∗∗∗ 2.235∗∗∗ 2.223∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗∗ 1.265∗∗∗ 1.220∗∗ 2.299∗∗∗
2006 (7.98) (7.59) (6.84) (7.16) (3.53) (2.83) (2.74) (9.73)
Years of 0.187∗ 0.0426 0.0316 -0.0241 0.0654 0.104 0.0526 0.0305
Schooling (1.80) (0.53) (0.38) (-0.28) (0.84) (1.46) (0.63) (0.35)
N 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 37
Adj. R2 0.208 0.700 0.694 0.692 0.691 0.803 0.754 0.781 0.728
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1960-2000
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1960
a Measure of years of schooling refers to the average over the period 1960-2000
b Controlling for outliers by using rreg command in Stata
c Includes indicators for the eight world regions
d Controlled for openness of economy and protection against expropriation
e Controls in d plus fertility and tropical location
f GDP per capita 1960 measured in logs
confirm that cognitive test scores are associated with economic growth and the results for our sample
of 37 countries are very similar to the results for the full sample used by HW (2012).
In Panel B of Table 5.4 we show estimates of models that use PISA 2006 scores instead of the HW-
index. We find that the estimated effects are very similar to those in Panel A. In fact, the estimates
for the PISA scores are always within the 95% confidence interval of the estimates for the HW-
index, which can be explained by the high correlation (r = 0.91) between the PISA scores and the
HW-index. This indicates that PISA 2006 is a good proxy for the HW-index in models that explain
differences in economic growth between countries.
In sum, we find that the results obtained by HW (2012) are robust to using the sample of countries
participating in PISA 2006 and to using PISA scores instead of the HW-index, suggesting that, within
the framework of HW (2012), we can use the PISA scores as a proxy for the HW-index.
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Figure 5.2: The association between the conditional starting performance and the conditional decline in performance with
economic growth for the period 1960-2000
5.6.2 The Relationship of the Starting Performance and the Performance Decline with
Economic Growth
In this section, we present the main estimation results of models that include the two components
obtained by decomposing the PISA scores. Figure 5.2 provides a first impression of the relationship
between these two components and economic growth, conditional on initial GDP and years of school-
ing. The left panel shows a positive association between the starting test score level and GDP growth.
However, the right panel shows a very similar association between the decline in performance and
GDP growth, which suggests that noncognitive skills are also related to economic growth. Below, we
confirm that the association is not solely driven by the three Asian countries in the upper right corner
and the three Southern American countries in the lower left corner of Figure 5.2.
Table 5.5 replicates the model from Table 5.4 using the starting performance and the decline in
performance as the main explanatory variables. Columns (1) and (2) show estimates of the rela-
tionships presented in Figure 5.2. The starting performance is positively and significantly associated
with economic growth. The estimated effect is somewhat smaller than the previous estimate from
the model that uses the PISA score in Table 5.4, suggesting that the starting performance is less
confounded by personality factors than the PISA score.
The performance decline is also positively and significantly associated with economic growth.
Moreover, the size of this association is quite similar to that obtained for the starting performance. A
comparison of columns (1) and (2) also reveals that years of schooling is associated with economic
growth only in column (2). Years of schooling is more highly correlated with the starting performance
(r = 0.64) than with the performance decline (r = 0.38), perhaps indicating that the latter also
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Table 5.5: Regressions of economic growth on the starting performance and performance decline
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 2.143∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗∗ 1.345∗∗ 1.049∗∗∗ 0.766∗ 0.701 0.249 1.934∗∗∗
performance (4.84) (2.76) (2.69) (3.05) (2.00) (1.38) (0.49) (4.45)
Performance 1.872∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗ 1.467∗∗∗ 0.680∗ 0.917∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗
decline (6.36) (4.44) (4.17) (5.14) (1.83) (3.09) (4.95) (2.64)
Years of 0.0415 0.173∗ 0.0871 0.0651 0.0483 0.0793 0.131∗ 0.0839 0.0344
schooling (0.53) (1.86) (1.23) (0.96) (0.64) (1.00) (1.93) (1.14) (0.44)
N 37 37 37 37 37 37 36 36 37
Adj. R2 0.579 0.623 0.726 0.721 0.746 0.787 0.754 0.798 0.716
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1960-2000
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1960
a−f See the description of Table 5.4
captures factors that are independent of what is learned at school, which is consistent with the idea
that noncognitive skills are more affected by out-of-school influences than cognitive skills.20
In column (3) of Table 5.5, we report estimates from a model that includes both components on
the right-hand side. We find that the starting performance and performance decline are positively and
significantly associated with economic growth, but these estimates are considerably smaller than those
reported in columns (1) and (2). The estimated effect of cognitive skills (the starting performance),
falls approximately 40 percent as compared to the estimate in column (1), implying that noncognitive
skills are partially driving the relationship between test scores and economic growth found by previous
studies. These results are consistent with the models of skill formation of Cunha and Heckman (2008)
and Cunha et al. (2010): noncognitive skills appear to be important for the development of cognitive
skills, but not vice versa. By using the starting performance rather than test scores, we are correcting
for the measurement error induced by noncognitive skills in the generation of current test scores but
not for the accumulated effect of noncognitive ability on the development of cognitive skills. As a
consequence, once we include a measure of noncognitive skills in the growth regression model, we are
explicitly accounting for the association between growth and cognitive skills for which noncognitive
skills are responsible. This explains why the coefficient of the corrected measure for cognitive skills is
only marginally smaller in column (1), while it is reduced by approximately 40 percent after including
noncognitive skills in the growth regressions in column (3).
In the remaining columns of Table 5.5, we report results from using the different specifications in-
troduced in Table 5.4. In general, the results are quite robust to these sensitivity tests. Controlling for
20The estimated effects become somewhat smaller but remain statistically significant at the 1% significance level if
potential outliers are excluded from the analysis (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Columbia, Uruguay and Argentina).
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average years of schooling over the period 1960-2000 does not change the estimates. Moreover, the
results do not appear to be driven by outliers or by countries that belong to certain regions. However,
when including regional indicators, noncognitive skills are only significant at the 10% level, which is
consistent with the idea that cultural differences are an important determinant of noncognitive skills
embedded in the performance decline. The estimated effect of the performance decline is robust to the
inclusion of additional controls in columns (7) and (8). We observe that the starting performance is no
longer a significant determinant of growth when controlling for the quality of economic institutions.
A possible explanation for this result is that better institutions go hand in hand with better schools,
capturing some of the effects of cognitive skills that the starting performance is intended to measure.
Finally, controlling for the initial GDP level in logs in column (9) increases the estimated effect of
starting performance and reduces the estimated effect of the performance decline. Both components,
however, remain significant at conventional levels. This same pattern of results for cognitive skills
was documented by HW (2012) and in Table 5.4. HW (2012) noted that specification (9) is more con-
sistent with neoclassical growth models in which human capital affects steady-state levels of income
but not growth rates.
By using PISA 2009 and the average economic growth for the period 1970-2010, we can ex-
tend our sample to 55 countries.21 Table 5.6 shows the results are virtually identical compared to
Table 5.5.22 Not only are the estimates for both components of comparable magnitude, but the re-
lationship between the performance decline and economic growth appears to be more robust to the
inclusion of controls related to the quality of economic institutions than is the starting performance.
The only difference is a marginally insignificant coefficient for the starting performance when we con-
trol for the regional dummies. Although the point estimate for the starting performance is somewhat
larger than the estimated effect of the performance decline in column (6), it is less precise.
In sum, we find that both the starting performance and the performance decline are positively and
significantly associated with economic growth. The estimated effects are similar in terms of magni-
tude, where the differences between the two components in both Tables 5.5 and 5.6 are statistically
insignificant except in columns (8) and (9). The estimated effect of the performance decline is more
robust to the inclusion of the quality of economic institutions than is the effect of the starting perfor-
mance level. Finally, the estimate for the starting performance drops by roughly 40 percent after the
21PISA 2009 was the first wave where countries where allowed to include a subset of seven “easier” booklets. These
seven easier booklets were identical to the standard booklets, but each had one reading cluster replaced by an easier reading
cluster. We computed the performance decline on the set of 13 standard booklets that where the same for every participating
country.
22In this sample we also include China, India and Venezuela. These three countries only sample students within certain
regions for PISA 2009. Results are qualitatively similar when we exclude these three countries.
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Table 5.6: Regressions of economic growth on the starting performance and performance decline, maximizing our sample
size
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.674∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗ 0.959∗∗ 0.743∗ 0.580 0.636 -0.00459 1.577∗∗∗
performance (3.40) (2.61) (2.62) (1.98) (1.61) (1.28) (-0.01) (5.02)
Performance 1.616∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 0.535∗ 1.094∗∗ 1.264∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
decline (4.69) (4.32) (4.30) (4.45) (1.73) (2.13) (2.55) (2.70)
Years of -0.00391 -0.0407 -0.0580 -0.05298 0.00447 0.0335 0.0341 -0.00407 -0.0107
schooling (-0.03) (-0.43) (-0.59) (-0.56) (0.05) (0.34) (0.34) (-0.04) (-0.13)
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.415 0.525 0.568 0.567 0.573 0.725 0.594 0.652 0.677
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
inclusion of the performance decline, which implies that noncognitive skills are partly responsible for
the relationship between test scores and economic growth.
5.7 Robustness Checks
In this section we perform two types of analyses. First, we focus on measurement issues and test
whether our results are robust to more restrictive (and alternative) computations of the performance
decline. We use our large sample because it gives us more statistical power. Second, we perform two
tests of whether the observed associations reflect a relationship from skills to growth, or from growth
to skills.
5.7.1 Stricter Measures of the Performance Decline
A concern with the interpretation of our previous analysis is that cognitive skills might have a direct
effect on the performance decline. The correlation between the two components is 0.46, which could
indicate that the performance decline is also capturing cognitive skills. We address this concern by
using two stricter measures of the decline in performance. The first of these measures only exploits
variation that is orthogonal to the starting performance. More precisely, we regressed the performance
decline on the starting performance for all the countries participating in PISA 2009 and used the
residuals of this regression as a corrected measure. As personality factors can boost the acquisition
of cognition (Cunha and Heckman, 2008), the estimates obtained when using this new measure in
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Table 5.7: Regressions of economic growth on components of test scores using an orthogonal measure of the performance
decline
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.674∗∗∗ 1.599∗∗∗ 1.608∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗ 1.181∗ 0.625 1.910∗∗∗
performance (3.40) (4.13) (4.03) (4.09) (2.52) (1.82) (0.91) (5.85)
[4.07] [3.98] [2.38] [2.12] [1.82] [0.88] [5.18]
Performance 1.176∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗ 1.121∗∗∗ 1.109∗∗∗ 0.461∗ 0.942∗∗ 1.088∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
decline (3.55) (4.32) (4.30) (4.45) (1.73) (2.13) (2.55) (2.70)
[3.72] [3.76] [3.78] [3.22] [1.52] [2.01] [2.33] [2.42]
Years of -0.00391 0.00206 -0.0580 -0.05298 0.00447 0.0335 0.0341 -0.00407 -0.0107
schooling (-0.03) (0.02) (-0.59) (-0.56) (0.05) (0.34) (0.34) (-0.04) (-0.13)
[0.02] [-0.58] [-0.55] [0.04] [0.30] [0.33] [-0.04] [-0.13]
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.415 0.397 0.568 0.567 0.573 0.725 0.594 0.652 0.677
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Bootstrapped z statistics in squared brackets,
based on 1000 replications
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
Equation (5.3) can be thought of as a lower bound for the relationship between noncognitive skills
and economic growth.
Table 5.7 shows that the results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 5.6.23 The estimated
effect of the performance decline is statistically significant in all specifications but, as a lower bound,
the estimates are somewhat smaller than the corresponding estimates in Table 5.6. The effect of the
starting performance is statistically significant in all but one specification and the estimated coeffi-
cients are larger than those in Table 5.6. Because the association between the starting performance
and economic growth is more easily distinguished if the starting performance is uncorrelated with the
performance decline, the estimates in Table 5.7 can be interpreted as an upper bound of the correlation
between cognitive skills and economic growth.
Our second restrictive measure of the performance decline concerns non-reached questions. In
the PISA 2009, the average number of non-reached questions per student is 1.83.24 However, this
number differs per country with a standard deviation of 1.65. It is unclear what factors are driving non-
reached questions. They could be a consequence of cognitive and/or noncognitive skills. To take all
23The reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors, but the results do not qualitatively change if the standard
errors are bootstrapped. Bootstrapped z-statistics are shown in square brackets. We used the bootstrap procedure for the
two-step estimator as described in Cameron and Trivedi (2005). Bootstrapping is more relevant for the analysis in this
section than for the analysis in Section 5.6.2 because we can only use 73 observations in the first step of the estimation,
making the argument for consistency less plausible.
24PISA distinguishes between non-reached and skipped test items. Non-reached questions are defined as all consecutive
unanswered questions clustered at the end of test, except for the first missing answer.
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Table 5.8: Regressions of economic growth on components of test scores coding non-reached questions as missing
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.832∗∗∗ 1.528∗∗∗ 1.526∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗ 0.790 0.0344 1.912∗∗∗
performance (3.84) (3.53) (3.48) (3.11) (2.11) (1.26) (0.05) (6.00)
Performance 1.034∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗ 0.618∗∗ 0.548∗ 0.164 0.484 0.661∗ 0.306
decline (2.93) (2.63) (2.62) (1.72) (0.91) (1.67) (1.97) (1.58)
Years of -0.0193 0.0308 -0.0244 -0.1792 -0.000662 0.0427 0.0760 0.0295 0.0135
schooling (-0.17) (0.30) (-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.01) (0.42) (0.73) (0.26) (0.16)
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.454 0.354 0.486 0.486 0.417 0.717 0.553 0.593 0.669
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
questions into account, we coded non-reached questions in our main results as incorrectly answered.
Alternatively, we can code them as missing, which has the effect of making the performance decline
(α1) weaker for all countries, whereas the starting performance (α0) is hardly affected. The standard
deviation for the performance decline also decreases by 57 percent, which makes it more difficult
to find potential effects. Moreover, as noncognitive skills are potentially the cause of non-reached
questions, this can be considered as another lower bound for the effect of noncognitive skills.
Recognizing this, we show results for this second stricter measure in Table 5.8. The estimated
effects of the starting performance are similar in magnitude or somewhat larger than the effects shown
in Table 5.6, consistent with the finding that this component is unaffected by considering non-reached
questions as missing. The estimate for the performance decline is reduced in magnitude, but remains
statistically significant in most specifications. The estimated coefficient of the performance decline
is small and insignificant in the specification that controls for regional indicators (column (6)), which
is consistent with the idea that cultural differences are important determinants of noncognitive skills.
Despite the notable reduction in the estimates observed after excluding non-reached questions, this
alternative measure does confirm that the relationship between test scores and economic growth is par-
tially mediated by noncognitive skills. Table A.5.4 in the Appendix shows this conclusion does not
change when combining the two restricted measures (orthogonal correction and non-reached ques-
tions as missing).
The Appendix reports results for several alternative measures of the starting performance and
the decline in performance. Table A.5.5 shows the results when the two components are obtained
through OLS instead of using a probit. As suggested by the correlations of 0.96 and higher of the two
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components when estimated with the two different methods, the results are essentially unchanged
compared to Section 5.6.2. Subsequently, in Table A.5.6, we use the probability of answering the
first question correctly as the starting performance and the probability of answering the last minus
the probability of answering the first question correctly to measure the performance decline. Despite
being a nonlinear function of the original probit-estimates α0 and α1, the results are robust to using
these probabilities. Table A.5.7 reports regression results using a measure of the starting performance
that incorporates performance on the first five questions, which might be considered a more accurate
measure of the performance at the beginning of the test.25 Results do not change when using this
alternative measure of starting performance.
We have also computed the decomposition on the cluster level as explained in Section 5.3 so that
the unit of analysis matches the unit of randomization and the starting performance corresponds to the
first cluster of the test. Whereas the estimates reported in Table A.5.8 are qualitatively similar to those
discussed in Section 5.6.2, the estimate for the starting performance (performance decline) is some-
what larger (smaller) and more (less) significant. This pattern of results can be explained by the fact
that this version of the starting performance already includes the first part of the performance decline.
Next, in Table A.5.9, we report estimates from using the average of the components for PISA 2003,
2006 and 2009. As both the performance decline and the starting performance are being estimated,
albeit precisely, this mitigates measurement error.26 We find qualitatively identical estimates to those
discussed in Section 5.6.2. For a similar reason, we repeat our main analysis weighting the observa-
tions by the inverse of the standard error of the performance decline in Table A.5.10, decreasing the
weight put on observations for which the performance decline is measured imprecisely. The results
are qualitatively unchanged. Repeating these weighted regressions coding non-reached questions as
missing confirms that the lower-bound estimate for the effect of noncognitive skills is statistically
significant (see Table A.5.11). In sum, we find that the relationship between the two components
and economic growth is remarkably robust and we conclude that noncognitive skills are an important
mediator in the relationship between test scores and economic growth.
5.7.2 From Skills to Growth or From Growth to Skills
We have applied the decomposition strategy to the PISA test, which is mostly a post period measure.
Despite the starting performance and the performance decline being stable over time and the PISA
2006 being a good proxy for the HW-index, the use of a post period measure raises obvious concerns
25In particular, we set Qij of Equation (5.2) equal to zero for any item j that was ordered in any of the first five positions
in the test.
26We include a country in this regression if it participated in at least one of three PISA waves. Repeating this analysis
with countries that participated in all three PISA waves restricts us to 31 countries, but does not change our results.
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about reverse causality. In other words, our analyses may be capturing the effect of growth on the
accumulation of skills. To address this issue, we test for the presence of a reversed channel from
growth to skills and apply the decomposition method to an international test administered in 1991.
Most importantly, growth might provide a country with resources that are invested in human
capital:
Rc = η0 + η1Gc +
∑
n
κnXnc + uc (5.4)
 Sc
PDc
 =
 piS0
piPD0
+
 piS1
piPD1
Rc +
V Sc 0
0 V PDc
 γS
γPD
+
vc
ξc
 (5.5)
Where Rc are the (educational) resources in country c, and Xc and Vc are vectors containing control
variables, where the latter could potentially be different for the starting performance versus the per-
formance decline. Consequently, the estimate of β1 and β2 in Equation (5.3) could also reflect the
effect of economic growth on the starting performance and the performance decline through its effect
on resources. In particular, if we assume that Equations (5.3) to (5.5) only include a constant and, re-
spectively, the starting performance, economic growth and the (educational) resources as explanatory
variables, the estimate for the starting performance in Equation (5.3) equals:
βˆ1 = β1 +
pis1η1
1−pis1η1β1
var[c]
var[Sc]
However, this also shows that if pis1 is equal to zero, it strongly reduces the concerns for reverse causal-
ity.27 Previous studies failed to find consistent, strong evidence that test performance is affected by
real classroom resources, financial aggregates, and other facilities such as availability of a labora-
tory or the size of the library (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Lee and Barro, 2001; Hanushek, 2002;
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011a; Woessmann, 2003). We revisit this issue by regressing the starting
performance and the performance decline in the PISA 2009 on educational expenditures, which we
collected from the World Development Indicators. Within our framework (i.e., if growth affects the
two PISA components only through resources), consistent estimates are obtained if u is uncorrelated
with v and ξ. Table 5.9 reports the results of regressing the starting performance and the performance
decline on two measures of educational expenditures, average government expenditure on education
as percentage of GDP for the period 1970-2009, and the average pupil-to-teacher ratio in primary
27As pis1, η1, and β1 are expected to be non negative, for a shock to die out the term pis1η1β1 must be less than 1. Note
that one can obtain a similar expression for the bias of the performance decline, where Equation (5.3) is only a function of
the performance decline.
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Table 5.9: Regressions of the two PISA components on measures for educational expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5) (6) (7)
Starting Performance Starting Starting Performance Starting Performance
performance decline performance performance decline performance decline
Gov. exp. 0.00214 0.0129 -0.0289 0.0102
% of GDP (0.06) (0.78) (-0.84) (0.54)
Pupil-to-teacher -0.0117∗ 0.00512 -0.00526 -0.0118∗ -0.00293
ratio (-1.93) (0.59) (-1.40) (-1.94) (-0.74)
N 59 59 60 60 60 53 53
Adj. R2 0.480 0.227 0.438 0.327 0.204 0.460 0.204
F-test 0.1249 0.5633
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Regressions include a constant and an OECD indicator
a Controlled for regional indicators instead of an OECD indicator
We include the country in the regression if it has more than 25% nonmissing observations of the educational expenditure measure
within the time period 1970-2009. As on average 75% of the variation of these two measures lies between countries (and 25%
over time), we feel this criteria is strict enough in order to give a good picture of the average educational expenditures of a
country. Results are robust to different criteria, also to including the country if we have just one observation within the whole
time period.
school for the same period.28 We control for economic development by including an OECD indica-
tor. Although there is little evidence of an association between educational expenditures and the two
components of the PISA-test, columns (3) and (6) show that the pupil-to-teacher ratio is negatively
related to the starting performance (p-value = 0.059). In column (6), however, the two measures are
jointly insignificant. Moreover, these estimates are likely to be upward biased, as favorable, but omit-
ted, state policies tend to be positively correlated with resource-usage (Hanushek, 2002). Including
regional indicators does not change our results and, in fact, column (4) shows the marginally signifi-
cant estimate of the pupil-to-teacher ratio of column (3) is insignificant after controlling for regional
indicators.
A more direct approach to address the possibility of reverse causality is to apply the decompo-
sition method to an “early” international test. The main advantage of this approach is being able to
explore the effects of noncognitive skills among workers in the labor force on economic growth. How-
ever, potential problems of early international tests are low country participation, bad documentation
and the absence of (exogenous) variation in the ordering of the questions. Despite these potential
problems, we apply the decomposition method to the Reading Literacy Study (RLS), a test adminis-
tered in 1991, which is also included in the HW-index. This is the first test with relatively high country
participation and we were able to retrieve the order of the questions in the test. All 14-year-old pupils
28We experimented with other educational expenditure measures, such as percentage of qualified teachers in primary
education, government expenditure per primary student, secondary student, tertiary student, and expenditure on education
as a percentage of total government expenditure. These measures give us the same results, but are available for less countries
and a shorter time period (mostly from 1998 onwards).
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in the RLS were administered the same booklet, so we are unable to separate the performance de-
cline from the difficulty of the question. To the contrary, Elley (1992) notes that the end of the RLS
contains the longer and more difficult reading passages, which suggests the performance decline is
contaminated by cognitive skills.
Recognizing these potential problems, we use Equation (5.2) without question fixed effects to
decompose the RLS into the starting performance and performance decline.29 Then, we use the
average economic growth in the period 1995-2010 as our outcome in the post period.30 Table 5.10
reports our results, restricting the sample to countries examined by HW (2012). Consistent with the
results discussed above, we find that both components are positively related to economic growth and
the estimates are statistically significant. The size of the estimates must be interpreted with care,
as the performance decline is identified without variation in the order of the questions and could,
therefore, be influenced by cognitive skills. This, in fact, could explain why we find somewhat larger
estimates for the performance decline in Table 5.10 as compared to the results in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.
Nevertheless, the overall results are very similar to those discussed in Section 5.6.2. Again, the
performance decline seems to be more resilient to the inclusion of controls related to the quality
of economic institutions than the starting performance, and including regional indicators reduces its
coefficient.
Elley (1992) notes that the more difficult questions are concentrated at the end of the test. There-
fore, we also compute the performance decline while excluding the last (two blocks of) questions
from the RLS as an extra robustness check, so that the performance decline is estimated based on a
more homogeneous sample of questions.31 Table A.5.12 in the Appendix shows that the results are
insensitive to this change.
29The 14-year-old pupils make two separate booklets for the RLS of 40 and 49 multiple-choice questions, we take the
average of the two components to reduce measurement error. We are unsure about the length of the break in between the two
tests, but results are very similar if we use the components of both booklets separately. Similarly to the previous analysis
using PISA, we use the students weights provided by the RLS-dataset to ensure a representative sample. We do not use the
data for the test of the 9-year-old pupils in the RLS, as this would again introduce concerns for reverse causality.
30We have also considered different periods of economic growth, for example starting at 1990 or ending at 2007 to avoid
an influence of the financial crisis, and results are robust. We control for initial GDP and years of schooling in 1990, as
to coincide with the measurement of the starting performance and performance decline. Results are qualitatively similar
controlling for the initial values in 1995, though the starting performance loses some significance.
31Elley (1992) does not contain specific information on when the more difficult questions are asked, so the choice of
which questions to exclude is somewhat arbitrary. However, we exclude two blocks of questions that are centered around
the same reading passage. These two blocks contain 9 and 13 questions, of in total 40 and 49 questions in test 1 and 2
respectively. Moreover, we did observe a somewhat sharper increase in the number of incorrectly answered questions at the
start of these two blocks.
204 Test Scores, Noncognitive Skills and Economic Growth
Table 5.10: Regressions of economic growth on the starting performance and performance decline using an early test (RLS
1991)
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.961 2.428∗∗ 2.347∗∗ 2.377∗∗ 1.693 0.303 0.00903 0.927
performance (1.50) (2.51) (2.66) (2.51) (1.50) (0.27) (0.01) (0.61)
Performance 1.413∗ 1.677∗∗∗ 1.750∗∗∗ 1.467∗∗ 0.998 1.798∗∗ 1.469∗∗ 1.402∗∗∗
decline (1.93) (2.89) (2.92) (2.49) (1.68) (2.77) (2.85) (3.07)
Years of 0.00812 0.140 0.0969 0.2209 0.143 0.190 0.254 0.330 -0.00523
schooling (0.05) (0.95) (0.67) (1.36) (1.09) (1.01) (1.07) (1.60) (-0.05)
N 23 23 23 23 23 23 21 21 23
Adj. R2 0.034 0.090 0.304 0.350 0.261 0.349 0.339 0.380 0.195
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1995-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1990
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1990-2010 and GDP per
capita in 1990 in logs
5.8 Conclusion
Previous studies have found a positive association between cognitive test scores and economic growth.
Although this association is difficult to interpret because of the potential for reverse causality, omitted
variables and measurement error, HW (2012) have found evidence consistent with a causal inter-
pretation. The goal of the present study was to investigate whether the well-documented relation-
ship between cognitive test scores and economic growth is, at least in part, driven by noncognitive
skills. Specifically, we have applied a recently developed method for decomposing test scores into two
components: the starting performance and the decline in performance during the test. Research by
Borghans and Schils (2012), Balart and Oosterveen (2017) and Zamarro et al. (2016), as well as our
results reported in Section 5.7.1, suggest that the performance decline provides a measure of noncog-
nitive skills that is not confounded by cognitive skills. Consequently, it allows us to analyze whether
the relationship between test scores and economic growth is, at least in part, driven by noncognitive
skills.
We find that both components are associated with economic growth. The estimated effect of
the performance decline is approximately equal to the estimated effect of the starting performance.
Moreover, we find that the effect of the starting performance is reduced by 40 percent after control-
ling for the decline in performance, implying that previous estimates of cognitive skills are biased
upwards and that noncognitive skills are partly responsible for the relationship between test scores
and economic growth. This result is consistent with those of other recent studies that have raised
concerns about the size of the effects of cognitive skills on economic growth (Atherton et al., 2013;
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Breton, 2011; Levin, 2012). Our results are robust to using a variety of measures of the performance
decline, to testing for the presence of a reverse channel from growth to skills, and to using a post
period measurement of economic growth.
It would, of course, be ideal to use a more direct approach to test for causal effects (e.g. via the
use of instrumental variables), but finding a foolproof instrument for cross-country growth regressions
is extremely difficult. Table A.5.13 in the Appendix takes a first step towards this goal by exploring
cultural measures as an instrument for the performance decline. Nunn (2012) and Guiso et al. (2006)
argue that culture reflects customary beliefs and values inherited from previous generations and can
therefore be seen as a source of exogenous variation. We exploit that Hofstede’s measures are defined
as stable and, specifically, that long term orientation is described as thrift and effort, something di-
rectly related to the noncognitive skills the performance decline is hypothesized to measure. When we
estimate the first stage, long term orientation is strongly correlated with the decline in performance.
The second-stage estimates confirm our main findings.
In this study, we have tried to stay as close as possible to the approach used in previous studies that
have established a clear relationship between test scores and economic growth. It should be noted that
we are not able to apply the decomposition method to the HW-index, used in the previous studies, but
we have applied this method to the PISA test which is only one of the tests included in the HW-index.
However, it is likely that the results are also relevant for the other tests that compose the HW-index.
First, a large literature in psychology, dating back to test pioneers as Thorndike and Wechsler, and
a more recent stream of studies in economics provide evidence for the importance of noncognitive
skills for cognitive test scores. Second, we find a very high correlation between the HW-index and
the PISA scores, and using PISA scores instead of the HW-index produces very similar results when
models used by previous studies are re-estimated. Third, the components resulting from the PISA-
decomposition are very stable between countries and over time. Fourth, applying the decomposition
to the Reading Literacy Study 1991, an international test also included in the HW-index, gives similar
results. Therefore, it seems not likely that the decomposition results found for the PISA test are
relevant to this specific test only.
Given the different types of policy interventions required to foster cognitive and noncognitive
skills (Cunha et al., 2010), it is important to have a good understanding of the consequences of each
type of skill. This distinction has been largely studied at the microeconomic level. Our study pro-
vides a first attempt to explore the implications of distinguishing between cognitive and noncognitive
skills at the macroeconomic level. Our findings imply that noncognitive skills are also important for
explaining the relationship between test scores and economic growth.
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5.A Appendix
Cultural Dimensions of Hofstede
• Power Distance: this dimension expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of
a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. The fundamental issue here is
how a society handles inequalities among people. People in societies exhibiting a large degree
of Power Distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and which needs
no further justification. In societies with low Power Distance, people strive to equalise the
distribution of power and demand justification for inequalities of power.
• Individualism: the high side of this dimension, called individualism, can be defined as a pref-
erence for a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of
only themselves and their immediate families. Its opposite, collectivism, represents a prefer-
ence for a tightly-knit framework in society in which individuals can expect their relatives or
members of a particular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. A
society’s position on this dimension is reflected in whether people’s self-image is defined in
terms of “I” or “we”.
• Masculinity: the Masculinity side of this dimension represents a preference in society for
achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success. Society at large is more
competitive. Its opposite, femininity, stands for a preference for cooperation, modesty, caring
for the weak and quality of life. Society at large is more consensus-oriented. In the business
context Masculinity versus Femininity is sometimes also related to as “tough versus tender”
cultures.
• Uncertainty Avoidance: the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension expresses the degree to which
the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. The fundamental
issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the future can never be known: should we
try to control the future or just let it happen? Countries exhibiting strong UAI maintain rigid
codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas. Weak UAI
societies maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practice counts more than principles.
• Long Term Orientation: every society has to maintain some links with its own past while deal-
ing with the challenges of the present and the future. Societies prioritize these two existential
goals differently. Societies who score low on this dimension, for example, prefer to maintain
time-honoured traditions and norms while viewing societal change with suspicion. Those with
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a culture which scores high, on the other hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encourage
thrift and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future. In the business context
this dimension is related to as “(short term) normative versus (long term) pragmatic” (PRA). In
the academic environment the terminology Monumentalism versus Flexhumility is sometimes
also used.
• Indulgence: indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and
natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society that
suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms.
Source: https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html
Retrieved: July 1st, 2016
Table A.5.1: Randomization test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Gender Mother Father Self Mother Father Language Possessions Possessions How many Age of
highest highest born in born in born in at home desk own room books student
schooling schooling country country country at home
Booklet=2 0.0219∗∗ 0.00937 0.0216 -0.00430 -0.0000963 -0.000727 0.0110 0.00126 -0.00566 -0.0385 -0.00141
(2.31) (0.36) (0.82) (-1.12) (-0.02) (-0.13) (1.05) (0.15) (-0.71) (-1.40) (-0.24)
Booklet=3 0.0138 0.000973 0.0320 -0.000545 0.00458 0.00398 0.00969 0.00383 -0.00966 -0.0178 -0.00400
(1.46) (0.04) (1.21) (-0.13) (0.80) (0.69) (0.92) (0.48) (-1.22) (-0.65) (-0.68)
Booklet=4 0.0105 0.0254 0.0361 -0.00620∗ -0.00460 0.000133 -0.00145 -0.00271 -0.00862 -0.0246 0.00145
(1.11) (0.99) (1.39) (-1.65) (-0.83) (0.02) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-1.11) (-0.91) (0.24)
Booklet=5 0.00380 0.000718 0.0132 -0.000969 -0.000655 0.00415 0.00862 0.00109 -0.00358 0.00290 0.00161
(0.40) (0.03) (0.50) (-0.23) (-0.12) (0.72) (0.82) (0.14) (-0.45) (0.11) (0.28)
Booklet=6 0.0151 0.00317 0.0463∗ -0.000802 0.00137 0.00195 0.00322 0.0149∗ -0.00731 0.0127 0.00453
(1.60) (0.12) (1.76) (-0.20) (0.24) (0.34) (0.31) (1.83) (-0.91) (0.47) (0.51)
Booklet=7 0.0112 -0.0139 0.0187 -0.000645 0.00157 0.000849 0.00214 0.00432 -0.0101 -0.0497∗ 0.00296
(1.19) (-0.55) (0.71) (-0.16) (0.28) (0.15) (0.21) (0.53) (-1.28) (-1.84) (0.50)
Booklet=8 0.0166∗ 0.0213 0.0361 -0.00442 -0.00145 0.000277 0.00387 0.00361 -0.00711 -0.0603∗∗ -0.00148
(1.77) (0.83) (1.37) (-1.15) (-0.26) (0.05) (0.38) (0.45) (-0.88) (-2.23) (-0.25)
Booklet=9 0.00706 0.0371 0.0233 -0.00329 -0.00369 -0.000517 0.00476 -0.00314 0.00158 -0.0493∗ 0.00333
(0.75) (1.43) (0.88) (-0.84) (-0.66) (-0.09) (0.47) (-0.40) (0.19) (-1.81) (0.56)
Booklet=10 -0.000460 0.00574 0.0170 0.0000214 -0.000589 0.00270 0.00300 -0.00194 -0.00600 -0.0384 0.000419
(-0.05) (0.23) (0.65) (0.01) (-0.10) (0.47) (0.29) (-0.25) (-0.76) (-1.41) (0.07)
Booklet=11 0.00842 -0.000262 0.0146 -0.00526 0.00428 0.00426 0.00507 0.00435 0.00357 0.00683 -0.00255
(0.90) (-0.01) (0.56) (-1.36) (0.73) (0.73) (0.49) (0.54) (0.44) (0.25) (-0.43)
Booklet=12 0.0118 0.0253 0.00712 -0.00374 0.00228 0.00254 0.00654 -0.000107 -0.00620 -0.0125 0.00600
(1.26) (0.99) (0.28) (-0.95) (0.40) (0.44) (0.63) (-0.01) (-0.78) (-0.48) (1.02)
Booklet=13 0.0120 0.0248 0.0273 -0.00200 0.000499 0.00227 0.000449 0.00373 0.00191 -0.0213 -0.00285
(1.28) (0.96) (1.04) (-0.50) (0.09) (0.40) (0.04) (0.46) (0.24) (-0.78) (-0.49)
Constant 1.485∗∗∗ 2.110∗∗∗ 2.074∗∗∗ 1.044∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗∗ 1.164∗∗∗ 1.240∗∗∗ 2.962∗∗∗ 15.78∗∗∗
(223.51) (119.07) (111.35) (357.29) (271.57) (264.96) (160.00) (207.22) (218.42) (155.55) (3713.17)
Observations 397916 378276 367202 390715 389346 386517 383775 390488 391047 390014 397920
F-value 0.92 0.62 0.49 0.66 0.45 0.20 0.27 0.66 0.67 1.52 0.49
P-value 0.5267 0.8268 0.9234 0.7875 0.9448 0.9985 0.9941 0.7943 0.7816 0.1074 0.9200
AdjustedR2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Regressions of background characteristics upon separate indicators for every booklet. The columns ‘F-value’ and
‘P-value’ refer to the tests for joint significance of the booklet indicators. PISA 2006 and PISA weights are used.
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table A.5.2: The starting performance and decline in performance per country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Country PISA P[Q0 = 1] P[Q1 = 1] Decline Country PISA P[Q0 = 1] P[Q1 = 1] Decline
score score
Colombia 381 .59 .243 .347 Lithuania 481.3 .737 .64 .097
Uruguay 422.7 .722 .423 .299 United States 481.5 .776 .679 .097
Argentina 382 .636 .359 .277 Luxembourg 485 .807 .71 .097
Tunisia 377 .454 .229 .225 Poland 500.3 .823 .726 .097
Brazil 384.3 .547 .331 .216 China, Macao 509.3 .828 .732 .096
Kyrgyzstan 306 .393 .185 .208 Hungary 492.3 .789 .694 .095
Mexico 408.7 .594 .387 .207 Slovakia 482 .816 .725 .091
Chile 430.3 .714 .508 .207 Sweden 504 .842 .752 .09
Qatar 326.3 .525 .337 .188 Japan 517.3 .877 .791 .086
Israel 445 .686 .506 .18 Azerbaijan 403.7 .584 .499 .085
Russia 465 .832 .654 .177 Canada 529.3 .832 .748 .084
Greece 464 .786 .609 .177 Ireland 508.7 .753 .67 .083
Jordan 402.3 .51 .339 .171 Australia 520 .836 .754 .082
Romania 409.7 .6 .432 .168 Belgium 510.3 .836 .755 .081
Thailand 418.3 .533 .368 .165 Denmark 501 .866 .787 .079
Bulgaria 416.3 .667 .502 .165 Taiwan 525.7 .833 .754 .078
Indonesia 392.3 .574 .411 .163 Czech Republic 502 .845 .766 .078
Italy 468.7 .735 .582 .153 New Zealand 524.3 .814 .737 .077
Turkey 431.7 .537 .388 .149 Slovenia 505.7 .819 .742 .077
Serbia 424 .709 .578 .131 Germany 505 .826 .753 .073
Latvia 485 .761 .638 .123 Estonia 515.7 .829 .756 .072
Portugal 470.7 .779 .658 .121 Netherlands 521 .83 .76 .07
Spain 476.3 .803 .682 .121 Hong Kong 541.7 .817 .746 .07
Montenegro 401 .583 .467 .117 Korea 541.7 .823 .755 .067
France 493 .807 .693 .114 Switzerland 513.7 .85 .789 .061
United Kingdom 501.7 .762 .652 .11 Liechtenstein 519 .885 .828 .057
Norway 487 .83 .721 .109 Austria 502 .843 .789 .054
Iceland 493.7 .85 .75 .1 Finland 552.7 .898 .856 .042
Croatia 479 .759 .66 .099
Notes: Probabilities are based on the estimates from Equation (5.2), using PISA 2006 and PISA weights.
Table A.5.3: Descriptive statistics
Country Initial GDP GDP growth HW- Starting Performance Num. of
(1960) (1960-2000) index performance (st. error) decline (st. error) students
Argentina 6.033 1.258 3.920 .3478 (.0427) -.710 (.0118) 4339
Australia 15.20 2.061 5.093 .9789 (.0250) -.292 (.0059) 14170
Austria 10.54 3.173 5.089 1.007 (.0418) -.204 (.0094) 4908
Belgium 10.16 2.975 5.041 .9766 (.0310) -.287 (.0072) 8685
Brazil 2.469 2.709 3.637 .1183 (.0338) -.555 (.0096) 9295
Canada 12.90 2.382 5.037 .9610 (.0284) -.292 (.0068) 22646
Chile 3.700 2.689 4.049 .5664 (.0358) -.546 (.0095) 5233
Colombia 2.940 1.758 4.152 .2271 (.0459) -.924 (.0127) 4478
Denmark 11.60 2.757 4.962 1.107 (.0421) -.310 (.0096) 4532
Finland 9.034 3.149 5.126 1.271 (.0442) -.207 (.0094) 4714
France 10.19 2.815 5.040 .8680 (.0369) -.362 (.0090) 4716
Greece 5.588 3.428 4.607 .7919 (.0371) -.515 (.0093) 4873
Hong Kong 3.289 5.633 5.194 .9025 (.0413) -.239 (.0097) 4645
Iceland 14.07 2.584 4.935 1.038 (.0437) -.363 (.0101) 3789
Indonesia .6651 3.719 3.879 .1871 (.0343) -.411 (.0101) 10647
Ireland 7.280 4.008 4.994 .6842 (.0363) -.245 (.0093) 4585
Israel 6.989 3.133 4.686 .4848 (.0363) -.470 (.0095) 4584
Italy 8.718 3.174 4.757 .6285 (.0249) -.420 (.0064) 21773
Japan 5.594 4.521 5.310 1.160 (.0369) -.349 (.0084) 5952
Jordan 2.721 .8659 4.263 .0257 (.0332) -.441 (.0092) 6509
Korea 1.670 6.129 5.337 .9255 (.0365) -.234 (.0090) 5176
Mexico 4.942 2.271 3.997 .2379 (.0278) -.526 (.0076) 30971
Netherlands 13.43 2.606 5.114 .9557 (.0429) -.249 (.0099) 4769
New Zealand 14.26 1.661 4.978 .8943 (.0388) -.259 (.0093) 4823
Norway 12.50 3.286 4.830 .9542 (.0386) -.369 (.0094) 4692
Portugal 4.181 4.134 4.563 .7694 (.0376) -.362 (.0095) 5109
Romania 1.362 3.904 4.562 .2532 (.0478) -.425 (.0127) 5118
Spain 6.333 3.809 4.829 .8522 (.0308) -.379 (.0075) 19604
Sweden 14.31 1.912 5.013 1.001 (.0407) -.320 (.0104) 4443
Switzerland 21.02 1.494 5.141 1.035 (.0339) -.234 (.0077) 12192
Taiwan 1.858 6.459 5.451 .9650 (.0320) -.276 (.0074) 8815
Thailand .9620 4.713 4.564 .0835 (.0336) -.420 (.0094) 6192
Tunisia 1.805 2.945 3.795 -.115 (.0373) -.627 (.0105) 4640
Turkey 3.183 2.285 4.127 .0923 (.0370) -.376 (.0103) 4942
United Kingdom 11.20 2.558 4.949 .7134 (.0304) -.322 (.0077) 13152
United States 15.38 2.373 4.902 .7598 (.0364) -.294 (.0098) 5611
Uruguay 5.010 1.562 4.300 .5873 (.0409) -.782 (.0104) 4839
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the sample used in Table 5.5. GDP per capita in 1960 PPP adjusted (in 2005
international Dollars), shown in thousands. The PISA-components are related to the wave of 2006.
Table A.5.4: Regressions of economic growth on components of test scores coding non-reached questions as missing and
using an orthogonal measure of the performance decline
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.832∗∗∗ 1.778∗∗∗ 1.778∗∗∗ 1.551∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗ 0.987 0.303 2.036∗∗∗
performance (3.84) (4.06) (3.98) (3.90) (2.35) (1.48) (0.43) (6.14)
[ 4.28] [4.17] [2.33] [1.87] [1.49] [0.41] [5.51]
Performance 0.656∗∗ 0.565∗∗ 0.567∗∗ 0.503∗ 0.150 0.444 0.606∗ 0.280
decline (2.19) (2.63) (2.62) (1.72) (0.91) (1.67) (1.97) (1.58)
[2.53] [2.55] [2.53] [2.00] [0.75] [1.69] [1.89] [1.56]
Years of -0.0193 0.0534 -0.0244 -.01792 -0.000662 0.0427 0.0760 0.0295 0.0135
schooling (-0.17) (0.52) (-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.01) (0.42) (0.73) (0.26) (0.16)
[0.50] [-0.22] [-0.17] [-0.00] [0.38] [0.73] [0.26] [0.16]
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.454 0.274 0.486 0.486 0.417 0.717 0.553 0.593 0.669
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Bootstrapped z statistics in squared brack-
ets, based on 1000 replications
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
Table A.5.5: Regressions of economic growth on components of test scores, where the two components are estimated via
OLS instead of probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.697∗∗∗ 1.164∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 1.055∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗ 0.763 0.109 1.735∗∗∗
performance (3.45) (3.35) (3.28) (2.87) (2.10) (1.43) (0.20) (5.62)
Performance 1.466∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 0.392 0.983∗∗ 1.123∗∗ 0.538∗∗
decline (4.15) (3.96) (3.94) (4.20) (1.35) (2.14) (2.42) (2.16)
Years of -0.0145 -0.0187 -0.0543 -0.0464 -0.00789 0.0350 0.0422 0.00136 -0.00891
schooling (-0.13) (-0.19) (-0.54) (-0.48) (-0.09) (0.35) (0.42) (0.01) (-0.11)
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.424 0.485 0.562 0.561 0.567 0.725 0.595 0.650 0.677
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
Table A.5.6: Regressions of economic growth on components of test scores using the probabilities related to the probit
estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.600∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗ 0.895∗∗ 0.779∗∗ 0.637∗ 0.595 0.00406 1.534∗∗∗
performance (3.20) (2.62) (2.58) (2.13) (1.76) (1.21) (0.01) (5.20)
Performance 1.681∗∗∗ 1.380∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗ 1.387∗∗∗ 0.440 1.156∗∗ 1.300∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗
decline (4.67) (4.42) (4.41) (4.67) (1.32) (2.15) (2.47) (2.78)
Years of -0.0116 -0.0179 -0.0446 -0.04028 0.00493 0.0353 0.0474 0.0209 -0.0107
schooling (-0.10) (-0.19) (-0.45) (-0.42) (0.06) (0.35) (0.48) (0.20) (-0.13)
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.404 0.531 0.570 0.570 0.581 0.724 0.591 0.645 0.681
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
Table A.5.7: Regressions of economic growth on components of test scores including the first five questions of the test in
the starting performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.718∗∗∗ 0.957∗∗ 0.965∗∗ 0.751∗ 0.586 0.644 -0.000494 1.594∗∗∗
performance (3.51) (2.59) (2.60) (1.98) (1.60) (1.27) (-0.00) (4.98)
Performance 1.626∗∗∗ 1.285∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 0.529 1.093∗∗ 1.277∗∗ 0.636∗∗
decline (4.72) (4.26) (4.25) (4.36) (1.67) (2.13) (2.60) (2.56)
Years of -0.00727 -0.0412 -0.0582 -0.0529 0.00388 0.0329 0.0331 -0.00422 -0.0112
schooling (-0.06) (-0.44) (-0.60) (-0.56) (0.05) (0.33) (0.33) (-0.04) (-0.14)
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.425 0.527 0.570 0.569 0.576 0.725 0.595 0.653 0.678
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
Table A.5.8: Regressions of economic growth on components of test scores, where the two components are estimated using
the average score within a cluster as outcome variable and the position of the cluster in the test as explanatory variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.960∗∗∗ 1.372∗∗∗ 1.383∗∗∗ 1.313∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 1.239∗∗ 1.066 1.701∗∗∗
performance (4.87) (3.74) (3.67) (3.45) (2.95) (2.26) (1.59) (5.70)
Performance 1.497∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 1.001∗∗∗ 0.301 0.676∗ 0.763∗ 0.326
decline (4.24) (3.26) (3.29) (3.19) (1.08) (1.79) (1.99) (1.25)
Years of -0.0607 -0.0282 -0.0760 -0.0734 -0.0204 0.00170 0.0107 0.00208 -0.0395
schooling (-0.58) (-0.29) (-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.24) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (-0.48)
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.535 0.491 0.590 0.589 0.626 0.765 0.649 0.687 0.680
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
Table A.5.9: Regressions of economic growth on the average of both components of the test score, using PISA 2003, 2006
and 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.747∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗ 0.591 0.792 0.0523 1.618∗∗∗
performance (3.60) (2.86) (2.84) (2.43) (1.64) (1.47) (0.09) (4.97)
Performance 1.649∗∗∗ 1.306∗∗∗ 1.315∗∗∗ 1.279∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗ 1.118∗∗ 1.353∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗
decline (4.67) (4.30) (4.30) (4.48) (2.06) (2.10) (2.58) (2.73)
Years of -0.0324 -0.0375 -0.0739 -0.07441 -0.0225 0.0236 0.0126 -0.0157 -0.0377
schooling (-0.29) (-0.41) (-0.77) (-0.79) (-0.27) (0.24) (0.12) (-0.14) (-0.47)
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.432 0.528 0.585 0.584 0.589 0.729 0.599 0.660 0.688
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
Table A.5.10: Regressions of economic growth on components of test scores using the standard error of performance
decline as weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.815∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗ 0.939∗∗ 0.743∗ 0.470 0.598 0.133 1.633∗∗∗
performance (3.63) (2.08) (2.20) (1.98) (1.35) (1.22) (0.29) (4.55)
Performance 1.764∗∗∗ 1.394∗∗∗ 1.385∗∗∗ 1.287∗∗∗ 0.608 1.367∗∗ 1.420∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗
decline (4.84) (4.05) (4.03) (4.45) (1.58) (2.44) (2.53) (2.72)
Years of -0.0391 -0.102 -0.101 -0.0897 0.00447 -0.0358 0.0280 0.00234 -0.0632
schooling (-0.36) (-1.03) (-0.98) (-0.85) (0.05) (-0.34) (0.25) (0.02) (-0.81)
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.487 0.578 0.604 0.600 0.573 0.744 0.639 0.670 0.715
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
Table A.5.11: Regressions of economic growth on components of test scores coding non-reached questions as missing and
using the standard error of performance decline as weights
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 1.942∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗∗ 1.561∗∗∗ 1.328∗∗∗ 0.654∗ 0.916 0.313 1.998∗∗∗
performance (3.94) (3.46) (3.47) (3.11) (1.74) (1.39) (0.48) (6.00)
Performance 1.095∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗ 0.646∗∗ 0.548∗ 0.214 0.646∗∗ 0.741∗ 0.329
decline (3.01) (2.58) (2.57) (1.72) (0.88) (2.10) (1.98) (1.51)
Years of -0.0533 -0.0383 -0.0655 -0.0546 -0.000662 -0.0298 0.0852 0.0566 -0.0434
schooling (-0.49) (-0.38) (-0.61) (-0.51) (-0.01) (-0.29) (0.80) (0.50) (-0.55)
N 55 55 55 55 55 55 47 47 55
Adj. R2 0.518 0.449 0.548 0.546 0.417 0.738 0.592 0.611 0.711
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1970-2010 and GDP per capita
in 1970 in logs
Table A.5.12: Regressions of economic growth on the starting performance and performance decline using an early test
(RLS 1991) and excluding the last two blocks of questions
(1) (2) (3) (4)a (5)b (6)c (7)d (8)e (9)f
Starting 2.133 1.936∗ 1.913∗ 0.707 0.973 0.579 0.0590 0.237
performance (1.63) (1.85) (1.84) (0.78) (0.89) (0.64) (0.06) (0.18)
Performance 1.781∗∗ 1.697∗∗ 1.680∗∗ 0.910∗ 1.185∗ 1.727∗∗ 1.412∗∗ 1.490∗∗
decline (2.68) (2.63) (2.51) (1.96) (2.12) (2.45) (2.34) (2.67)
Years of 0.00556 0.164 0.113 0.120 0.144 0.222 0.332 0.391∗ 0.0105
schooling (0.03) (1.29) (0.90) (1.35) (1.40) (1.28) (1.60) (2.12) (0.09)
N 23 23 23 23 22 23 21 21 23
Adj. R2 0.061 0.232 0.359 0.388 0.154 0.437 0.378 0.399 0.262
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1995-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1990
a−f See the description of Table 5.4. We use average years of schooling over the period 1990-2010 and GDP
per capita in 1990 in logs
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Instrumental Variable Analysis
Despite the usual set of controls in the cross-country growth regressions, it is desirable to use a more
direct approach to identify causal effects. To this end we use an instrumental variable approach.
This small-sample analysis has to be interpreted with caution, IV estimators can have a finite-sample
distribution that differ from the asymptotic distribution. As in Guiso et al. (2006), we use cultural
measures as an instrument, in our case for the performance decline. They argue that culture reflects
customary beliefs and values that are inherited by an individual from previous generations, rather
than voluntarily accumulated. Because of the difficulty of changing culture, it is largely given to
individuals throughout their lifetime and can therefore be seen as a source of exogenous variation.
Similarly, Nunn (2012) conceptualizes culture through decision making heuristics or rules of thumb
that have evolved given our need to make decisions in complex and uncertain environments. He
argues these are typically slow-moving.
The growing body of research investigating the effects of culture upon economic growth raises
questions regarding the validity of using culture as an instrument (Tabellini, 2010; Gorodnichenko and
Roland, 2011, 2016). For example, Gorodnichenko and Roland (2016) use genes as an instrument
to document a direct effect of individualism on growth. To the best of our knowledge, however, the
cultural measures used below have not been well studied (also not by Gorodnichenko and Roland
(2011)). Moreover, Guiso et al. (2006), arguably, define cultural measures as potential instruments,
whereas this IV-analysis might also reduce the risk of reverse causality as we call upon slow-moving
variation in the performance decline.
Table A.5.13 shows our results, where the upper and lower panel display the first- and second
stage respectively. First, we exploit the Weber-hypothesis which states that the emergence of the spirit
of capitalism, accumulation of wealth, and virtues of hard work can be attributed to Protestant work
ethic (Nunn, 2012). We use the share of Protestantism in 2000 from Barro (2003) as an instrument for
the performance decline (column (1)). We find a positive first-stage relationship, but the F-statistic
reveals we are dealing with a weak instrument. The second stage shows an IV-estimate that is close to
OLS, but it is very imprecisely estimated which can be explained by the amount of noise introduced
in the first stage. Moreover, problems related to finite-sample bias and potential endogeneity of the
instrument are magnified if the instrument is weakly correlated with the endogenous variable.
Next we exploit Hofstede’s long term orientation cultural component as an alternative instrument
for the performance decline. Hofstede explains his components as follows: “These relative scores
have been proven to be quite stable over time. The forces that cause cultures to shift tend to be global
or continent-wide. This means that they affect many countries at the same time, so if their cultures
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Table A.5.13: Growth regressions using instrumental variables for the performance decline and starting performance
(1)a (2)a (3)a (4)a (5)b,c (6)b,c (7)b,d (8)b,d
First stage
Protestant 0.342
share in 2000 (1.52)
Long-term 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.00798∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗
orientation (5.19) (2.72) (4.15)
Private 0.0046∗∗ 0.0022
enrollment share (2.58) (1.38)
Catholic 0.766 0.358
share in 1900 (1.31) (0.73)
Years of 0.0433 0.0495 0.035 0.0624
schooling (1.10) (1.65) (0.82) (1.34)
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes No Yes
F-test 2.31 26.94 7.40 17.22 3.74 3.05 1.12 1.12
Second stage
Performance 1.095 2.604∗∗∗ 2.998∗∗∗ 2.375∗∗∗
decline (0.79) (4.39) (3.17) (3.67)
Starting 0.457 2.472∗ 3.474∗ 1.50 1.771
performance (0.94) (1.93) (1.95) (0.83) (1.16)
Years of 0.006 -0.104 -0.081 -0.108
schooling (0.07) (-1.01) (-0.65) (-1.08)
N 53 51 45 51 21 21 42 41
Adj. R2 0.495 0.415 0.504 0.461 0.395 0.152 0.617 0.666
Notes: t and z statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Dependent variable: average annual growth rate in GDP per capita, 1970-2010
Regressions include a constant and GDP per capita in 1970. Additional controls include: openness of the
economy and protection against expropriation (column (6) and (8)), plus fertility and tropical location (column
(3))
a Dependent variable in first stage is the performance decline
b Dependent variable in first stage is the starting performance. We treat initial years of schooling (in 1970) as an
extra instrumental variable
c Sample restricted to OECD countries
d Controlled for the share of Catholics in 1970 in both the first and second-stage
shift, they shift together and their relative positions remain the same”.32 Using long term orientation
as an instrument for the performance decline gives a strong first-stage relationship with an F-statistic
of 26.94 (column (2)). The second-stage estimate for the performance decline is statistically sig-
nificant, the OLS-estimate falls within the 95% confidence interval of the IV-estimate. Regarding
the validity of long term orientation as an instrument, the exclusion restriction is violated if culture
affects economic growth through other channels than the performance decline. In particular, Nunn
32https://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html, retrieved July 1st, 2016.
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(2012) argues historical shocks can have a persistent effect upon culture (only) if formal institutions
change with it. Column (3) and (4) respectively show our results are robust to the full set of con-
trols, including the quality of economic institutions, and to controlling for the potentially endogenous
starting performance, which addresses concerns on this particular violation of the exclusion restric-
tion. Moreover, long term orientation is described as thrift and effort which are directly related to the
noncognitive skills the performance decline is hypothesized to measure.33
Ideally we would instrument both of the potentially endogenous components within one model.
To this end, column (5) until (8) investigate whether two of the instruments used by HW (2012) can
be used for the starting performance. For comparability we perform this analysis on the same sample
as HW (2012) and also use initial years of schooling as an additional instrument.34 The potential
instruments are private enrollment share in 1985 and the catholic share in 1900, which use the idea
of private competition being beneficial for student achievement. HW (2012) state one can plausibly
assume this institutional feature to be exogenous.35 For both instruments the first stage shows weak
F-statistics, there is only a significant relationship in column (5) at the 5%-level. This reduces the
interest in the second stage, which show positive estimates that are either borderline significant or
insignificant. We will refrain from an analysis with both components instrumented within one model.
33For the significant IV-estimates (columns (2), (3) and (4)) we tested for exogeneity of the performance decline using
the Durbin-Wu and Hausman test. Under the assumption that the instrument is valid, we reject exogeneity at the 5%-level
for all three specifications. While IV has the property of being consistent, keep in mind we are working with a small sample.
34As we have more instruments than endogenous variables, we can use the Sargan test to test whether the moment
conditions are valid. For columns (5) until (8) we cannot reject the null-hypothesis of exogeneity for the instruments at
conventional significance levels.
35See HW (2012) for details, but in particular they argue that many educational institutions are slow-moving and reflect
long-standing policies that are not the outcome of economic growth. The data for the private enrollment share refers to the
private enrollment as a percentage of total enrollment in general secondary education in 1985 and come from UNESCO
(1998). The Catholic shares in 1900 and 1970 are obtained from Barro (2003).

Nederlandse Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Onderwijs is een investering in menselijk kapitaal en heeft een grote invloed op private en maatschap-
pelijke uitkomsten. Beleidsmakers hebben dan ook een enorme verantwoordelijkheid wanneer zij
schaarse middelen gebruiken om het onderwijsstelsel vorm te geven. Een weloverwogen beslissing
van een beleidsmaker vereist kennis over welk beleid het meest effectief is om voorgestelde doelen te
bereiken. Dit proefschrift beoogt aan deze kennis toe te voegen door middel van vier hoofdstukken
over de impact van ontwerpkenmerken in het onderwijs.
Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt peer-effecten in het klaslokaal; hebben klasgenoten een effect op elkaars
gedrag en uitkomsten? Zo ja, dan kan een alternatieve toewijzing van leerlingen over klassen school-
prestaties verbeteren, zonder dat hierbij extra geld wordt uitgegeven. In dit hoofdstuk bestuderen wij
peer-effecten op een grote Europese universiteit, waar studenten willekeurig worden geplaatst in een
werkgroep en in e´e´n van twee subgroepen binnen een werkgroep. De universiteit stimuleert sociale
interactie en peer-binding binnen, en niet tussen, de subgroepen via informele bijeenkomsten. Elke
student kan haar peers binnen de werkgroep dus indelen in nabije en verre peers. Ons onderzoek
toont aan dat er positieve peer-effecten zijn op de prestaties van studenten, welke uitsluitend afkom-
stig zijn van nabije peers. Onze interpretatie is dat peer-effecten worden gegenereerd door sociale
interactie tussen studenten en niet door effecten die spelen op klassikaal niveau. De peer-effecten zijn
heterogeen; studenten van hoge en lage bekwaamheid presteren beter (slechter) wanneer zij nabije
peers hebben die hoog (laag) bekwaam zijn. Een alternatieve toewijzing van studenten - zoals het
toewijzen van hoog bekwame studenten aan dezelfde werkgroepen - kan de prestaties van studenten
gemiddeld verbeteren. De baten zijn echter geconcentreerd bij studenten van hoge bekwaamheid.
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoeken wij de impact van een beleidsmaatregel die de aanwezigheid van
studenten op een grote Europese universiteit verplicht. Deze beleidsmaatregel verplicht studenten om
naar ten minste 70 procent van de tweedejaars werkgroepen te gaan als zij gemiddeld lager dan een 7
hebben gescoord in het eerste jaar. Door studenten met een gemiddeld cijfer rond de 7 te vergelijken
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kunnen wij de causale impact van verplichte en regelmatige aanwezigheid in kaart brengen. Re-
cent onderzoek beargumenteert dat het aanbrengen van een dergelijke structuur tot betere prestaties
van studenten leidt. Wij vinden echter dat de gedwongen studenten lagere cijfers en slagingsper-
centages hebben. Wij stellen dat de beleidsmaatregel studenten dwingt om een substantieel aantal
uren te spenderen aan werkgroepen waardoor zij minder tijd hebben voor andere belangrijke studie-
activiteiten. Prestaties van studenten dalen doordat de negatieve impact van dit tijdsverlies groter is
dan de potentie¨le positieve impact van meer aanwezigheid bij de werkgroepen. Een analyse naar het
totaal aantal studie-uren suggereert dat studenten ook minder tijd besteden aan activiteiten buiten de
universiteit. Oftewel, studenten hebben minder vrije tijd. Deze beleidsmaatregel zorgt er dus voor dat
gedwongen studenten slechter af zijn.
Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert genderverschillen in de testuitslagen van 15- en 16-jarigen in de PISA test
(Programme for International Student Assessment). In dit hoofdstuk vergelijken wij het antwoord van
jongens en meisjes op dezelfde vraag die zij op willekeurig verschillende posities beantwoorden in
de test. Wij vinden dat meisjes hun prestatie beter kunnen vasthouden gedurende de test dan jongens.
Dit resultaat geldt voor de meerderheid van de landen die meedoen met de PISA test en wordt niet
beı¨nvloed door het onderwerp van de test. Dit biedt nieuwe inzichten in de genderverschillen van
testuitslagen. Aan het begin van de test presteren jongens beter in wiskunde en natuurkunde en
presteren meisjes beter in lezen. Aan het eind van de test is er geen genderverschil meer in wiskunde
en natuurkunde, of is het juist omgekeerd in eenderde van de participerende landen. In meer dan de
helft van de landen hebben meisjes het initie¨le genderverschil met ten minste 50 procent gereduceerd
aan het eind van de test. Dit suggereert dat het ontwerp van testen een rol zou kunnen spelen bij het
verder bevorderen van gendergelijkheid in STEM-vakken.
In hoofdstuk 5 analyseren wij of non-cognitieve vaardigheden (gedeeltelijk) verantwoordelijk zijn
voor de, in eerder onderzoek aangetoonde, positieve relatie tussen cognitieve test scores en economis-
che groei. Om te beginnen gebruiken wij een soortgelijke methode als in hoofdstuk 4 om de PISA test
score te ontbinden in twee componenten: het startniveau en de prestatiedaling gedurende de test. De
prestatiedaling is gerelateerd aan non-cognitieve vaardigheden, terwijl het startniveau een geschoonde
meting is voor cognitieve vaardigheden. Studenten uit verschillende landen verschillen in zowel hun
prestatie aan het begin van de test als in de daling van hun prestatie gedurende de test. Ons onderzoek
toont aan dat beide componenten positief gerelateerd zijn aan economische groei. De relatie tussen
beide componenten en economische groei is ongeveer even groot en vrij robuust. Deze resultaten
suggereren dat non-cognitieve vaardigheden ook belangrijk zijn voor de relatie tussen test scores en
economische groei.
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Education is an investment in human capital which has large positive 
impacts upon individual and social outcomes. This implies that 
policymakers have an enormous responsibility when using scarce 
resources as to design the education system. Policymakers like to make 
informed decisions, but this requires knowledge about the consequences 
of intended policies. This thesis aims at contributing to this knowledge 
by means of four self-contained chapters on the impact of design 
features in education. It contains, among others, a chapter on ability peer 
effects in the classroom. If peer effects exist, reorganizing students across 
classes could increase aggregate student performance without spending 
additional resources.
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